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This publication shares and analyses people’s sense of threats and safety through the 
lens of human security. Spanning six regions of the world, it presents the accounts of 
people living in Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, 
Mexico, and the Philippines. As a people-centred approach to understanding threats 
to people’s livelihoods, safety and dignity, human security is useful as both an 
analytical tool and an operational approach for addressing socio-political problems. 
Executive summary
Part 1 presents and analyses people’s reflections on threats in Afghanistan, Ukraine   
and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with an emphasis on the state as a provider  
of security and the ways that individuals and society as a whole cope with threats.  
Part 2 demonstrates ways that human security is operationalised through citizen action 
and multi-stakeholder dialogues in Mexico, the Philippines and Zimbabwe. 
In Part 3, we describe the approach, considerations and challenges in producing 
this information. Part 4 presents a conclusion on cross-cutting themes as well as 
implications for human security and the field of conflict prevention.
The chapters are based on interviews with community members, leaders and activists 
in individual and group settings. Their words reveal the potential power of the state is 
a security provider through the rule of law, but also the ways the state can undermine 
human security through corruption, abuse of human rights, and failure to provide 
necessary goods and services. The stories also suggest the potential of civil society 
organisations to transform the citizen-state relationship and facilitate human security. 
Security is not only defined by the state’s protection capabilities and actions, but also by 
the perspectives of people from diverse social groups who have different interests. The 
citizen-state relationship emerges as a primary tool and indicator of human security, 
where context-specific protection and empowerment strategies go hand in hand.
Based on these reflections, this publication recommends the human security approach 
as a valuable entry point for dealing with the prevention of violent conflict. Specifically, 
this publication advocates that the UN, governments, and civil society organisations 
bridge the gaps that separate their respective work, by establishing a common human 
security learning and practice platform that will facilitate analysis of and planning for 
human security at the local, national and regional levels. These groups should invest 
in methodologies that are people-centred, context-specific, and gender-sensitive to be 
consistent with human security principles. 
After analysing threats through the lens of human security, the UN, donors, governments 
and civil society should develop human security interventions that take into account 
existing capacity and coping strategies within communities. This requires that governments 
and civil society invest in building local and national capacities for multi-stakeholder 
dialogues and citizen-state partnerships. Finally, to breathe life into the human security 
concept where it most matters, the UN and civil society should support and implement 
local and national awareness campaigns that promote the articulation of human security 
needs and the possibilities of protection and empowerment strategies. The perspectives 
presented here demonstrate the power of the human security approach as both an 
analytical tool and as a method of engagement to promote individual safety and dignity. 
We hope this work provides insight into the ways that civil society, governments, and 
international bodies can work together towards addressing complex societal problems 
together. It encourages a shift in the human security debate towards the practical 
implementation of strategies that elicit local and multi-faceted understandings of what it 
means to feel – and be – secure.
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these accounts will 
move the human 
security debate to the 
contexts where people 
experience insecurities 
on a daily basis.
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Human security offers an opportunity to reorient and broaden traditional security 
approaches to prioritise the survival, livelihood, and dignity of all individuals. Unlike 
national security, which emphasises the territorial integrity of the state, human 
security addresses sustainable peace by recognising the social, economic and 
political grievances that are often at the root of violent conflict and societal violence. 
In the following chapters, women and men in six widely different contexts share 
their everyday experiences of security. Their stories tell us that feeling secure has 
many dimensions; these are both deeply personal and intimately connected with 
the broader community, state and society. While the views expressed are illustrative 
rather than based on scientific samples, they are a striking reminder of the premise 
of a human security approach, where the understanding and definition of security is 
in the hands of those individuals and communities that directly experience it. 
The combination and relative importance of 
different types of security, ranging from freedom 
from fear to freedom from want and freedom 
from indignity, are unique to each individual 
and each context. This publication aims to give 
voice to the concerns of the local communities, 
leaders and activists interviewed by local civil 
society organisations in Afghanistan, Ukraine, 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mexico, The 
Philippines and Zimbabwe. We hope that these 
accounts will move the human security debate to 
the contexts where people experience insecurities 
on a daily basis. They encourage us to listen to 
multiple voices and respect their experiences as 
the starting point for genuine discussion about 
what human security means and how it can be 
strengthened. In a human security approach, local 
voices should lead the conversation.
from theory to practice
Twenty years after the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report first introduced the idea 
of human security, academics and policymakers 
continue to argue about the practicality, scope 
and the very definition of the concept. Progress 
in implementing human security programmes has 
also been delayed by misgivings over the tension 
with state sovereigntya, illustrating just how much 
the discussions on human security have mainly 
a A historical association with interventionism through the Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine continues to colour debates on human security, in spite 
of United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) resolution 66/290 explicit 
clarification that human security respects state sovereignty.
been confined to international or foreign policy 
arenas rather than being explored as a framework 
for domestic agendas.1 Disagreements often centre 
on which threats human security analysis should 
encompass, and the means by which individuals 
and communities should be protected.2 Yet, the 
very principles of human security point to the 
importance of listening to people and communities 
as the referents of security themselves. It is high 
time to move beyond conceptual debate. What 
is needed is investment in exploring the practical 
applications of human security, to understand its 
limitations and dilemmas, and ultimately, to breathe 
life into the concept.b 
b  Efforts to map human security projects have taken place under the UN 
Trust Fund for Human Security and in the Report of the UN Secretary General 
'Follow-up to GA resolution 66/290 on human security' 2013, however their 
dissemination beyond UN and academic arenas has been limited. 
Introduction
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experience it. 
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Comparing the different country chapters, 
we conclude that the active roles of the state 
and civil society respectively are both needed 
to safeguard human security. The possibilities 
of complementarity between protection and 
empowerment strategies is a neglected area of 
study and practice. From an operational point of 
view, this leads us to focus on the convergence of 
protection and empowerment strategies, and on 
how local national and international actors can 
play specific roles within that. In a 2009 guidance 
document, the UN Human Security Unit points out 
the following key questions as integral to the design 
of human security strategies:7   
•  What are the relationships between the specific 
protection and empowerment strategies?
•  Which protection strategies have the greatest 
positive externalities [effects] on empowerment?
•  Which empowerment strategies have the greatest 
positive externalities [effects] on protection 
strategies?
The stories presented in the following chapters only 
scrape the surface of these important questions. We 
suggest that the understanding of human security 
should be further developed through the meeting of 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives, in a process 
that is driven by real-life experiences and practice. 
Stories of Human Security
Part 1 of this publication gives three examples of 
human security as a tool for analysing security from 
the ground up. The chapters from Afghanistan, 
Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
present views on what is considered a threat to 
security, on the state as a provider, and on coping 
mechanisms of interviewees.
Part 2 additionally provides examples of the ways 
that communities in Mexico, the Philippines and 
Zimbabwe have put human security into practice 
through citizen action and multi-stakeholder 
dialogues. 
In part 3 on methodology, we share the accounts 
of the authors on how their respective organisations 
went about collecting the information. We discuss 
some of the considerations on gathering and 
presenting this information, where sensitivities of 
the subject matter were revealed in the process. 
A concluding chapter, part 4 identifies themes 
across the different areas explored. It identifies ways 
that local perspectives presented here inform our 
understanding of key protective and empowerment 
strategies needed in a human security approach. 
Finally, we present a brief overview of 
recommendations drawn from these chapters, 
in which we challenge not only UN agencies, 
governments, and academia but also ourselves 
and fellow civil society groups in continuing 
the enhancement of human security through its 
practical application and awareness building. 
It is our hope that the reflections, conclusions and 
recommendations in this publication will serve to 
encourage practitioners from all sectors to continue 
implementing and learning from the people-
centred, comprehensive approach that human 
security provides. In doing so, we should seek to 
take the concept out of the technical, bureaucratic 
resolutions and rhetoric, and ensure it becomes 
meaningful and tangible for people who experience 
varying forms of insecurity every day. 
central to achieving human security. But they also 
illustrate how the abuse of power or negligence 
of both state and non-state actors can undermine 
human security, highlighting the importance of 
addressing power dynamics. The stories from 
Mexico, Zimbabwe and the Philippines illustrate 
means for addressing such challenges peacefully 
and by drawing strength from local structures, 
traditions and social actors. 
Peacebuilding and development interventions can 
only work in the long term if they respond to local 
demand, and are accepted and supported by the 
people they are intended to benefit. It is widely 
accepted by now that inclusivity and processes 
that are steered and owned by local actors are key 
to sustainable development and peace. However, 
this idea of ‘local ownership’ is often unclear, and 
needs to be negotiated within each individual 
context.5 By enhancing of methodologies that can 
take into account subjective and diverse interest 
groups, the human security approach can make 
local ownership more tangible. Moreover, while 
such efforts can be constructively supported by 
regional and international ‘outsiders’, human security 
also calls attention to the need for accountability of 
international interventions to local populations.
Empowerment and protection
The implementation of a human security approach 
calls for the protection and empowerment of 
populations, implying the need for both ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ measures. The stories 
from practitioners and communities in their 
different contexts illustrate the range of coping 
strategies people resort to in order to feel secure, 
and whom or what they turn to for protection. 
Security providers tend to range from self-
protection (individual, family, community), to 
‘horizontal’ protection by non-state actors (lifelines, 
humanitarian organisations, militant groups), and 
‘vertical’ protection by state actors, foreign state 
and/or intergovernmental actors such as NATO 
or UN troops.6 The striking paradox that can be 
found throughout the stories is that these have in 
some cases also become the threat, either through 
‘dysfunctional’ empowerment strategies such as 
self-arming of non-state actors, or through abuse 
of power by states and intervening foreign forces, 
for instance in counter-terrorism strategies that 
undermine human rights. This calls for greater 
accountability of all security providers and for 
heightened civilian oversight of law enforcement.
Many civil society organisations around the world 
shape their principles and operational strategies 
around the people-centred approach articulated 
by the human security frameworkc. As a global 
network of civil society peacebuilding organisations, 
the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (GPPAC) is founded on the premise and 
principles of human security.3 Alongside its network 
members and partners, GPPAC has rallied around 
the need for its practical implementation.4 Based on 
the assumption that local populations and governing 
authorities are best placed to define and address the 
security threats that they face, many peacebuilding 
organisations and practitioners relate to human 
security as an overarching theory of change on 
the path towards sustainable and just peace. One 
example of complementarity between the broader 
field of human security and peacebuilding practice 
can be found in the concept of ‘infrastructures 
for peace’, which emphasises the enhancement of 
local mediation and conflict prevention structures 
as translated through institutions, policies and 
capacities at the national level.d 
Human security as a domestic agenda
Referring to the stories presented here, we argue 
that the principles of human security call for a 
domestic policy framework; one which directs 
the state to address the needs, vulnerabilities and 
coping mechanisms of society, and where response 
strategies emerge from and build on existing 
capacities amongst a variety of local actors. The 
many views expressed in the country chapters 
suggest that the existence and agency of a state is 
The principles of human 
security call for a domestic 
policy framework.
freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from indignity: 
Types of security and examples of main threats
Economic security Persistent poverty, unemployment
Food security Hunger, famine
Health security Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food and water, 
malnutrition, lack of access  
to basic health care
Environmental 
security
Environmental degradation, resource depletion,  
lack of access to water, natural disasters, pollution
Personal or physical 
security
Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, 
child labour
Community security Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions
Political security Political repression, human rights abuses
Adapted from source: UNDP Human Development Report of 1994.
c  Practical examples were outlined in: The Human Security approach 
in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding - A Civil Society Position Paper - 
GPPAC, Civil Security Network for Human Security, IKV Pax Christi, April 2013 
d  UNDP defines infrastructures for peace as 'A network of interdependent 
systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and 
community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent 
conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society.' 
UNDP Issue Brief: Infrastructure for Peace, 2013
HUMAn SECURITy PRInCIPLES
People-centred: Human security puts people and communities at  
the centre of analysis and response strategies; they are both agents 
and beneficiaries of interventions. 
Interconnected and comprehensive: Threats to human security tend 
to be mutually reinforcing and interlinked; coordination is needed  
to understand how they relate to each other and how they should  
be addressed as part of a broader strategy. 
Context specific: Human security acknowledges the variations from 
one situation to another amongst and within countries; response 
strategies need to be tailored to the situation and locally owned.
Preventive: Human security focuses on root causes and risk factors; 
it calls for early warning systems and coordinated early response.
Protection and empowerment: Human security highlights the mutual 
social contract between states and citizens. This implies an equal 
importance of protection strategies by top-down institutional and 
governance structures, and empowerment strategies that build  
on the capacities of affected communities to cope with and  
respond to threats.
113
A People-
Centred 
Lens on 
Protection 
Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territory
A people-centred approach to analysis encourages us to listen to the stories of 
individuals and take their experiences as the starting point for genuine discussion 
about what human security means. The diverse experiences from Afghanistan, 
Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, provide accounts of people’s 
sense of protection – or the lack thereof – and the means they resort to for coping 
with the threats they face in their daily lives. Their reflections on the state as a 
security provider and what they consider as threats to security are diverse. They 
show that people in a given context identify threats as multifaceted and complex, 
understanding the effects they have on their personal, communal or physical well-
being. They underscore the need for comprehensive responses and strategies.
" If there is no one in 
uniform around, or if 
you don’t trust them,  
you can only count  
on your own self..."
Yana, university student in Kyiv, Ukraine
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Interviews with Afghan citizens highlight the sense of insecurity that many continue to feel despite 
a decade of international reconstruction. Mixed progress in economic stability, women’s rights, and 
the establishment of a central governing authority has resulted in varied experiences of individual 
security. Persistent violent conflict, illiteracy, and weak governance continue to undermine individual 
experiences of security, yet economic opportunities, personal freedoms, and feelings of safety are 
better than in years past. However, international efforts have been insufficient to guarantee good 
governance or economic security, and the upcoming withdrawal of international forces in 2014 has 
created anxiety about Afghanistan’s future. 
Urban 
perspectives: 
Human Security 
in Afghanistan
Shafeek Seddiq | Mariam Safi | Afghanistan Justice Organisation (AJO) 
” As long as the locals are not allowed 
to shape our government, these 
structures of insecurity will continue  
to exist.“ 
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AFGHANISTAN
In response to terrorist attacks on the united states on 
september 11, 2001, an international coalition led by the united 
states militarily intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 to oust 
the ruling taliban government which hosted al-Qaeda leader 
osama bin Laden. following the fall of the taliban, the united 
nations (un) convened prominent Afghan political and ethnic 
factions at the Bonn conference of 2001 in order to establish an 
interim Afghan administration and roadmap for a future Afghan 
government. the Bonn Agreement requested an international 
force to ensure peace and stability in the country, and designated 
a role for the un to aid the new government with the country’s 
reconstruction. the un subsequently established the International 
security Assistance force (IsAf), ultimately led by nAto, and the 
un Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (unAMA) to assist with 
the political transition. In the ensuing decade, the role of the 
international community expanded to include a comprehensive 
reconstruction agenda. 
Efforts to bring military security and stability to 
Afghanistan were coupled with development 
projects, meant to establish better governance 
and win the support of local populations. ISAF 
engaged with tribal elders, religious figures, 
technocrats, powerbrokers and members of the 
warring factions to achieve its mission. Though the 
international effort envisioned social, economic 
and institutional infrastructure developments 
as a means to win popular support for and 
strengthen the central government in Kabul, the 
central government’s legitimacy was never fully 
consolidated. 
The militarised and political logic of the 
international intervention lacked the conceptual 
underpinning of human security, which could 
have bound the social, economic and institutional 
changes to the priorities of the Afghan people. As 
a result, much of the progress toward establishing 
human security – through good governance, 
human rights, economic opportunities, education, 
healthcare and information – has been limited.  
Yet despite the ongoing conflict, rampant 
corruption, inadequate state institutions, and 
widespread poverty that continue to plague 
Afghans, many citizens believe that progress has 
been made since 2001. 
a third of Afghans – mostly rural Afghans and 
Pashtuns – had sympathy for armed opposition 
groups, mainly the Taliban.3
The Taliban insurgency has been one factor 
impeding the central government’s ability to 
exercise its power and influence over its citizens, 
especially in the periphery. The return of some 
warlordsa ousted by the Taliban, and the advent 
of new power brokers formed by the civil war 
has also fragmented authority across the country.4 
Many warlords were military leaders from the 
mujahedeen factions who were active in the Afghan 
civil war prior to the early 1990s. As powerbrokers, 
they play an important role in local and national 
politics, competing in local and national elections. 
Their role is a controversial one, as they often act 
opportunistically and switch allegiances. Although 
many hold warlords responsible for past war crimes 
and current corruption and instability, many also 
believe their local warlords are the only reliable 
protection from acts of violence. Some warlords 
fill the need for stability at local level and provide 
physical security, enforce religious/tribal laws, and 
promote economic opportunities in areas where the 
central government has less authority.5 
In other areas, the central government has 
continued to work through informal bodies at the 
local level, such as community councils (sh r s)  
and tribal assemblies (jirgas). The Loya Jirga has 
played a key role in Afghan politics since the 
fall of the Taliban, for example by establishing a 
transitional government in 2002, and ratifying 
a new constitution in 2003.6 However, the 
inability of both the international community 
and the current Afghan government to build 
formal institutions in the last decade has further 
prevented the development of human security.
the current state of human security 
and development   
Despite ongoing threats to Afghans’ physical 
security, Afghanistan’s international ranking 
on development indicators has improved since 
a  A warlord can be a military commander, a disarmed former military 
commander or not have any military background. Examples include: 
Ismail Khan, current Minister of Energy, former popular governor of Herat 
and Mujahedeen commander, disarmed and sent to Kabul by the central 
government; Maulavi Azizullah Agha, defected Taliban commander from 
Kandahar; Abdul Rashid Dostum, Vice-presidential candidate, militia leader 
allied with former communist regime, popular Uzbek leader, allegedly 
responsible for the Dasht-i-Leili massacre of Taliban prisoners of war
the intervention in 2001. In 2013, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) report rated Afghanistan 
amongst fourteen other countries that had 
registered remarkable HDI gains of more than 
two percent annually since 2000.7 In its 2010 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) review, 
the Afghan government highlighted major 
improvements in progress towards the MDGs that 
were seen in some areas, while in other areas little 
progress was made, particularly in tackling the 
eradication of extreme poverty.8
While student enrolment figures and the number 
of primary schools have increased, the quality of 
education is substandard, and in most districts there 
are no education facilities beyond primary level. In 
addition, almost 230 districts do not have female 
teachers, creating serious barriers for female students, 
as families do not generally allow their daughters to 
attend co-education facilities in rural areas.9 While 
unemployment figures remain alarmingly high at 
4 million, there are some significant improvements 
from 2001.10 The most effective poverty reduction 
strategies exist in countries that have gained a basic 
level of physical security. But in Afghanistan, physical 
insecurity continues to remain a predominant and 
critical threat to human security, hindering the pace 
of development.
Shifts in power: the rise of the taliban  
and the mujahedeen 
Prior to 2001, decades of violence had left millions 
dead and displaced, devastating the social fabric 
of Afghan society. Occupation by the former 
Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, and the imposition of a 
communist government, fuelled an insurgency of 
the mujahedeen which was backed by the United 
States in its efforts to limit Soviet influence in the 
region. In 1989, the USSR withdrew its forces from 
Afghanistan and in 1992, the communist regime 
collapsed. Internal struggle broke out between 
various mujahedeen factions and Afghanistan 
descended into civil war and chaos.1 The Taliban, 
composed of the more radical mujahedeen groups 
from the tribal Pashtun areas and fresh recruits 
from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, had a 
meteoric rise and came to power in 1996. Although 
many initially supported the Taliban for the sake of 
stability, the regime failed to provide social services 
and basic governmental functions. The situation was 
particularly abusive to women, who were stripped 
of virtually all rights and subjected to extreme 
punishments for violation of strict laws.2 
governance structures after 2001 
Though the Taliban initially retreated in the wake 
of the US-led intervention in 2001, it re-emerged 
in 2005. Over the past few years, the Taliban have 
conducted hundreds of suicide bombings meant 
to drive anti-Taliban forces out of Afghanistan, and 
have reinvigorated its imposition of strict Islamic 
law. The Taliban have the support of a significant 
number of Afghans. In a survey conducted in 2013, 
The militarised  
and political logic 
of the international 
intervention lacked 
the conceptual 
underpinning of 
human security.
Background
In Afghanistan, physical 
insecurity continues to  
remain a predominant  
and critical threat to  
human security, hindering  
the pace of development.
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Views on security  
threats and protection
Interviews with Afghans offer insights on what human security 
means to them. As the majority of interviews are of Afghans who 
are living in Kabul, it largely reflects the lives of Afghanistan’s 
urban population. nevertheless, the reflections from this chapter 
are relevant beyond an urban perspective in revealing how the 
Afghan people express their human security concerns. this section 
will focus on the leading drivers of insecurity as identified by the 
respondents. this will be followed by an analysis of what security 
providers people see as contributing to their security. 
“ Good governance 
and a country 
where I can 
express myself is 
most important for 
my security.” 
Zahid is a 32-year-old ethnic Pashtun who 
works as a legal advisor in Kabul. 
Illiteracy, lack of good governance, absence of 
national unity, poverty, and unemployment are all 
factors that add to my insecurity. Mass illiteracy 
has prevented people from understanding others' 
opinions no matter how well informed, [which] has 
led me in many instances to use self-censorship. 
Weak governance has prevented people from 
reaching their goals, it has given way to nepotism 
and weak rule of law. the absence of national 
unity amongst all ethnicities has led some to 
feel excluded and this has led to deep-seated 
grievances. 
Poverty has oriented people to worry about 
meeting only their own needs with no consideration 
for […] others. unemployment has pushed people 
to join the insurgency. In my village in Wardak 
province I have asked elders why the youth 
join the taliban, and they have told me that it’s 
because they’re jobless and the government is 
unable to provide them with work, so they join the 
insurgency. But I would say illiteracy is the most 
important driver.
the factors that contribute to my sense of security 
are the presence of a government even if it’s weak. 
I say this because a few years ago we didn’t even 
have a government in place at all. When I was living 
in Islamabad [Pakistan] before 2001, as a student 
[...]a few of the Afghan students wanted to create 
an Afghan students union, but since there was no 
legitimate government in Afghanistan the university 
wouldn’t recognise our student union. After 2001, 
when a legitimate government was established, 
we were able to create the student union. this 
revealed to me the importance of a government, 
even if weak, on the local population and even on 
the refugee populations. Also the opportunities 
for work in the past 12 years have given me much 
security. 
Both factors enable me to exercise my rights and 
freedoms; they enable me to think of my future 
and what investments I can make to ensure that 
I continue to prosper. I believe these issues are 
different for each individual. But for me good 
governance and a country where I can express 
myself is most important for my security.
Leading drivers  
of insecurity
Respondents name a number of sources of 
insecurity, including terrorism and ongoing 
armed conflict, weak governance and rule of 
law, a lack of human rights, unemployment, 
limited development, old traditions and patronage 
systems, illiteracy, and ethnic discrimination. 
These issues cut across all ethnicities, 
communities and provinces and represent 
common and shared fears and threats amongst 
men and women. 
Physical insecurity:  
foreign troops and acts of violence
Physical insecurity continues to be a common 
issue for most people in Afghanistan and those 
interviewed. However, the sources of insecurity 
vary considerably among different regional groups. 
As described below, the Taliban insurgency, 
international troops, private security personnel and 
warlords are some of the actors identified as posing 
a threat to physical security. Interviewees emphasise 
that while the Taliban are an obvious security 
threat, the presence of NATO forces on the streets 
also causes much anxiety. They say altercations 
between NATO and the Taliban almost always 
lead to civilian deaths and NATO forces sometimes 
target local civilians. 
Physical insecurity is deemed a bigger threat 
by those living in rural areas than in urban 
centres, because military operations against the 
insurgency are active in rural Afghanistan, such 
as in the southern provinces. Seddiq Ahmad, a 
25-year-old resident of Kandahar province, says, 
“Foreign troops and a weak government add to my 
insecurity. The presence of international troops on 
our roads poses a security problem for them and 
all of us. I always feel scared when I see troops 
roaming the streets because I feel that they will be 
attacked at any moment and anyone around them 
will get hurt.”
Suicide attacks are a common a source of physical 
insecurity in the urban areas. Zohal, a 25-year-old 
female student from Kabul, says, “The Taliban and 
suicide attacks make me feel very insecure. These 
issues I think are caused by bad governance and 
police. The Taliban disrupt peace and security, 
and this disturbs everyone in their daily lives, 
especially young girls as it prevents them from 
moving around freely and living their lives free 
from fear. What makes suicide attacks the most 
serious threat to my sense of insecurity is that it 
can happen anywhere, at any time and is very 
difficult to predict.” 
governance failures
The majority of interviewees point to a lack of 
good governance as a primary source of insecurity. 
Unaccountable political leadership, rampant 
corruption, injustice, lack of freedom of speech 
or access to fundamental rights all contribute to 
a sense of political insecurity. Irshad, a 32-year-
old ethnic Pashtun working as a shopkeeper 
in Kabul, says, “The current government is the 
most important driver of my insecurity because 
it is supposed to be responsible for our safety 
and security. But instead it’s just a collection of 
warlords, and this makes me feel unsafe as I fear 
this country will go back to old times again.” 
Mizra Ahmad, an ethnic Tajik in Kabul, comments 
on the lack of political will to provide human 
security, “Traditions and culture in Afghanistan 
and promotion of warlords have created a 
government that does not care for its people. I 
don’t feel secure myself. If there is no international 
support, this country is going to fall down after 
they leave. I think these issues are concerns for 
everyone but especially for those who live in the 
provinces.” 
Dr. Wadir Safi is a Pashtun who works as the vice 
president of the Afghanistan Justice Organisation 
and as a senior professor at Kabul University. In 
his view, “Illiteracy, ethnic divisiveness, lack of 
good governance, and injustice are issues that 
contribute to my insecurity and that of the entire 
country. These issues originate from long standing 
economic, political and structural issues which 
in the past, and even now, do not provide locals 
with the space needed to shape their own socio-
“ Foreign troops and  
a weak government  
add to my insecurity.”
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very insecure and in fact reinforces the notion 
that women are not capable enough to carry on 
substantial roles and responsibilities in our society.” 
illiteracy and lack of education 
Many respondents cite illiteracy as a cause of 
insecurity. The inability to read reduces peoples’ 
awareness and understanding of their rights and 
obligations, as mentioned by Zahid. As a result, it 
is perceived as easier for the government and other 
security providers to exploit the common people. 
Illiteracy remains an important security challenge 
government because it cannot provide fundamental 
rights and justice, according to Wadir Safi, an ethnic 
Pashtun teaching at Kabul University. “No access to 
one’s basic rights is the most important driver of my 
insecurity. [There] is no justice, people can't enjoy 
their basic rights.” In addition, Wadir points out that 
“lack of rule of law and injustice is another very 
important contributor to insecurity because even 
though we now have a Constitution, which has 
enshrined our rights in practice, I do not enjoy these 
rights because of the prevalence of corruption.” 
Balancing traditionalism and modernity
Many interviewees discuss orthodox and 
conservative attitudes and longstanding socio-
political structures as factors contributing to their 
insecurity. Abdul Hamid Ansary is an ethnic 26-year-
old Tajik who owns and operates a shop in Kabul. 
He puts it this way, “The main issues I am worried 
about are our government and people’s old ways of 
thinking. These issues originate mostly from a lack of 
education and no awareness. [It] makes me feel most 
insecure because people are not transforming their 
mind-sets and that’s why issues like ethnic differences 
continue to disrupt our society.” 
Some point to a growing chasm between the 
conservative and progressive or modern segments 
of society. Limited opportunities in education and 
employment in the last twelve years has led to a 
growing class of progressive and modern thinkers 
in Afghanistan who feel they cannot freely express 
their views without being judged by others. Khalid, a 
36-year-old Pashtun from Kabul who works as a legal 
advisor, says, “We have difficulties with the various 
political structures, and so it is always imposed 
on them. As long as locals are not allowed to 
shape their government then these structures of 
insecurity will continue to exist.”
Corruption and injustice
Corruption is a symptom and an outcome of a 
weak government that adversely affects a country’s 
economy, public trust in the institutions, and 
respect for the rule of law. The continuation of 
patronage systems in Afghanistan is perceived to 
hinder the government’s ability to fully exercise 
all its functions. The sentiment is that some 
people benefit from the state of insecurity as 
it has created an environment where nepotism 
and patronage systems flourish. Ahmad Shah, 
a 63-year-old resident of Nangahar province, 
comments, “Corruption and no peace are factors 
adding to my insecurity and this is mainly a result 
of our corrupt government. No matter which 
government office you go to, you are faced with 
these issues and it’s very discouraging.” 
“ These political 
leaders are not 
serious about solving 
people’s problems; 
they are just working 
for their  
own benefits.” 
Interviewees are particularly vocal about their 
disapproval of authorities who are unaccountable, 
such as (former) warlords and police. “Warlords 
in the government and the police force are the 
greatest contributors to my insecurity. I feel 
that these issues are due to old traditions. […] 
Their power makes everyone in this country feel 
uncomfortable. Also, the police are unprofessional 
and they don’t feel the need to be accountable to 
the public, so as a common man I fear the police,” 
says Asadullah, a 38-year-old professor in Kabul. 
Many of those interviewed lack trust in the 
interpretations of culture and religion, so when I, as 
a scholar of Sharia, share my views on cultural and 
religious practices with those at the community level 
I feel they start judging me. As a result, most of the 
time I resort to self-censorship. But I would say that 
the lack of physical security is my main worry. This is 
actually connected with my sense of lack of freedom 
of speech. I constantly live in fear that my comments 
may make me a target of the government or other 
groups who do not agree with me.”
Orthodox attitudes are seen by some as violating 
women’s rights and curbing women’s freedoms 
to realise their full potential outside of the 
household. Laila, a 27-year-old housewife from 
Kabul, shares Rabia’s opinion, “The existence 
of discrimination against girls and women, 
violence against women and the constant 
ignoring of women’s rights and in our society 
feed my insecurity. These issues originate from 
lack of opportunities for the youth, elders way 
of thinking and illiterate people. At times those 
who are supposed to ensure our security like 
the government and police turn out to be the 
ones who jeopardise it, especially the police who 
misbehave with women all the time, and the 
government which does not do anything about it. 
In our society, women tend to face these issues 
more than others, since women don’t have any 
authority and men treat them like their slaves.” 
Sadaf, a 22-year-old Tajik university student in Kabul 
affirms, “The unequal treatment and position of 
women in Afghan society is the biggest contributor 
to my insecurity. For instance, I can’t even leave 
home without a male escort. This makes me feel 
“ I constantly live 
in fear that my 
comments may 
make me a target of 
the government or 
other groups who do 
not agree with me.”
“ People view women 
who work outside 
of the home as 
indecent while they 
call those women 
who stay at home 
as irresponsible.“
 
rabia is a 23 -year-old ethnic tajik who is a 
university student in Kabul. she is originally 
from Parwan province.  
“What I feel contributes to my insecurity is being 
a woman living in this society, people’s attitudes 
towards gender and lastly the growing support for 
the taliban. I often overhear people say that life 
under the taliban regime, though it was difficult, 
was still physically safer. since they don't feel 
they have security now, they are starting to show 
support to the taliban, which means they may 
support their possible return. All of these issues I 
believe originate from people’s lack of education. 
But I would say that the absence of gender equality 
in our society is the most important driver of my 
insecurity. People view women who work outside of 
the home as indecent while they call those women 
who stay at home as irresponsible. this takes 
down my motivation to do something in life. But 
the fact that we now have established systems, 
rules and regulations and legal structures makes 
me feel more secure, because I know that if I have 
a problem there are laws in place to help me. not 
like during the taliban time, when we had no legal 
system to refer to.”
What I fe l contributes to my insecurity is being 
irresponsible. this takes down 
my motivati n to do s mething in life. But the 
fact that we now have established systems, rules 
and regulations and legal structures makes me 
fe l more secure, b cause I know that if I have  
problem ther  are laws in place to help me. not 
“ l
 
f t
i t
ll t
 t
irresponsible.“ 
“ At times those who  
are supposed to 
ensure our security 
like the government 
and police turn out 
to be the ones who 
jeopardise it.”
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Legal and political framework
Another commonly cited security provider is 
the government system. Paradoxically, many of 
the interviewees who mention the presence of 
the government as a contributing factor to their 
security also say that they believe the government 
is weak and ineffective. These respondents believe 
the mere presence of the government provides 
some stability, compared to the situation before 
2001. The existence of a constitution, even though 
not adequately implemented, provides a legal 
framework that is seen to contribute to human 
security. Hashmat Mustafa, a 29-year-old Pashtun 
who works for a private company in Kabul 
illustrates this point: “The government is most 
important because unlike the past, when there 
was no system, at least now there is an established 
government that is elected by the people. The 
difference this has made in our society today is 
evident when you compare it to ten years back.” 
Economic opportunities
Improvements in the Afghan economy coupled 
with better and more employment opportunities 
are mentioned by interviewees as contributors 
to security, irrespective of their backgrounds. 
Business owners, NGO workers and students all 
cite employment as a significant source of security. 
from the provincial areas; however, the degree of 
pessimism is higher in the provinces than in Kabul. 
Physical insecurity is a greater threat to those living 
in rural areas than in urban centres. This can be 
attributed to arbitrary military operations that 
are more prevalent in rural areas than in urban 
centres. Fears associated with limited economic 
opportunities, poverty, and bad governance are 
also higher at the provincial level. The lack of 
infrastructure development and trickle-down effect 
of humanitarian aid have also hampered people’s 
access to basic services. 
Gender
According to both male and female interviewees, 
women tend to face insecurity more than men, 
due to orthodox attitudes and their lower social 
standing. This leads to the unequal treatment of 
women both in and outside the home. Women 
interviewed express a fear of fighting for their rights, 
and gave many examples of the ways in which their 
freedoms are restricted.
Security Providers
Afghans named a number of sources of security, 
including family and friends, the government 
system, non-governmental organisations, jobs, 
education, laws and mass media. 
family ties
Most personal interviewees include family and 
friends as the greatest contributor to people’s 
personal security. Irrespective of the presence 
of the government or security institutions, most 
Afghan youth still revert to their family as their 
main protector and show little trust and faith in 
the government. This is particularly noteworthy 
considering that most of the Afghan population 
is below the age of 30. Qadir, an ethnic Pashtun 
and university student in Kabul, is a prime 
example: “without the support of family one 
cannot survive in such a society.” Sadaf, an ethnic 
Tajik and university student in Kabul, reflects on 
women’s reliance on family: “My family is the 
main contributor to my security. Their support 
is extremely important for me in all aspects of 
my life. For women their family tends to be their 
best support in all conditions.” Abdul Hakim from 
Kunar province says that, “There is nothing that 
contributes to my security but my family and 
friends.”
Demographic differences and commonalities
Ethnic discrimination
Perceptions of the leading drivers of insecurity 
differ slightly amongst different ethnic groups. 
Ethnic discrimination is cited more by Hazara and 
Tajik interviewees than by Pashtun interviewees. 
Hazara and Tajik interviewees identify ethnic 
discrimination, inadequate political representation 
and lack of national unity or reconciliation as 
significant contributors to their sense of insecurity. 
They attribute parochial perceptions of ethnicity to 
traditionalist mindsets and illiteracy. 
Rural versus urban
Many of the issues mentioned by interviewees in 
Kabul are similar to those mentioned by people 
for Afghanistan, particularly for women. Though 
it is difficult to estimate the illiteracy rate, a 2010 
report by UNICEF found that almost 80 percent of 
women aged 15 to 24 are illiterate.11 Since literacy 
has the potential to raise individuals’ standard of 
living it is tied to other human security concerns, 
such as unemployment. 
Unemployment and lack of economic opportunity 
Reflecting on the role of economy and human 
security, many of those interviewed point to the 
lack of employment, low income levels, declining 
business profits and general conditions of poverty 
as factors that greatly contribute to their insecurity. 
Sohail, a woman from Kunduz province working for 
the government says, “I feel insecure all the time. 
My government salary is not enough to sustain my 
family. I want to move my family to Kabul where my 
children can get a better education but I can’t afford 
to shift my family with my government salary.”
Many interviewees are concerned about the Afghan 
economy, in particular about the impact that the 
withdrawal of the international community will 
have. Businessmen cite a decline in their profit 
margins, while others are concerned with the lack 
of social security in the private sector. This issue is 
cited as a matter of greater anxiety for the poor and 
those living in rural areas than those in the urban 
centres. Moreover, as Zahid pointed out earlier, 
unemployment is often linked to the issue of youth 
and their vulnerability as recruits for the insurgency.
Gul Nabi, a 46-year-old from Laghman, expresses 
concern over his business. He says, “I am not happy 
with my life and from what I see happening around 
me, the poor are getting poorer and the economy 
is worsening. My greatest fear is unemployment. 
[…] I used to get a hundred customers a day and 
now I don’t even get ten, so I fear that when I lose 
my business it will be very difficult for me to find 
employment in this environment.”  
“ There is nothing 
that contributes to 
my security but my 
family and friends.”
“ The government 
is most important 
because unlike  
the past, when  
there was no system, 
at least now there 
is an established 
government that 
is elected by the 
people.”
razmal is an ethnic Pashtun, who works as 
a journalist in Kabul but is originally from 
Kandahar.
In Kabul the most significant contributor to my 
insecurity is the gun culture. nowadays all of our 
political leaders drive around with an entourage 
of private security personnel who are threatening, 
because they are not held accountable. this is 
a trend that has its roots in the civil war period, 
when mujahedeen leaders depended on guns for 
their position and power. this has created a hostile 
environment in Afghanistan where you can’t feel 
comfortable to travel around freely without fear for 
your security and it’s because those with arms tend 
to ignore the basic rights of others.
What makes me feel secure is the opportunities for 
work. for instance, I am a journalist and I feel proud 
when I present myself as one, because it empowers 
me and enables me to raise my voice against any 
issue that I feel is important. As a youth I feel that 
the challenges I have mentioned as contributing to 
my insecurity are also relevant to other youth. this 
is because there are no facilities for youth. they are 
isolated from the decision-making process or are 
influenced by others’ decisions.
“ What makes  
me feel secure is 
the opportunities  
for work.“ 
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etHnIcIty In AfgHAnIstAn 
Afghanistan is a heterogeneous society with many different 
ethnic backgrounds and languages. the Afghan constitution 
mentions 14 ethnic groups. the main groups are Pashtuns, 
tajiks, and uzbeks – predominantly sunni – and the Hazaras – 
who are mostly shia. throughout history, the ethnic card has 
been played by those in power to rally support and pit Afghans 
against one another. After the fall of the soviet-supported 
regime in 1992, more than 100,000 people died during the 
ensuing civil war, which was fought along ethnic lines. though 
ethnocentric conflict has been minimal in Afghanistan over the 
past 12 years, in political circles and the media, the potential 
for such conflict exists. In 2013, lawmakers in the Afghan 
Parliament vehemently debated the issue of whether national 
identification cards should identify citizens as Afghans or 
whether they should include other ethnicities. Discrimination of 
minority groups in daily life persists.   
Stories collected from those over age 30 rarely 
mention family as a security provider and instead 
reference employment opportunity, rule of law, 
institutions to lodge complaints, and the presence of 
a governmental system. 
Approximately 68 percent of the population is well 
below the age of 25.12 The potential implications 
this demography holds for Afghanistan and 
the region as a whole can be both positive and 
negative, and depend largely on whether the state 
is able to address the immediate and long-term 
needs of youth. Issues such as access to education, 
employment, and representation at the decision-
making levels are some of the immediate needs 
of the youth that need to be addressed by the 
government. 
Ethnicity
While interviewees from minority backgrounds 
say that discrimination is still present in society 
and affects their sense of security, a few mention 
that improvement in other human security factors, 
such as employment, has given them more 
opportunities. Karim is an ethnic Hazara originally 
from Badakhshan province, who is 43 years old 
and a professor in Kabul. He says, “For my family, 
more opportunities for work have contributed to 
my sense of security, [which] in the last ten years 
has made a real difference in my life.  Now I’m 
a professor, I have a good job, and I know I can 
advance further if I want to. As an ethnic Hazara,  
I would not have had such opportunities or been 
in this position during the Taliban regime. But 
there are still many Afghans who think along 
ethnic lines, and when it comes to the Hazara 
community, the belief that they are only suited 
for physical labour still exists. That is why I feel 
ethnic minorities face these issues of insecurity 
more than others.”
Likewise, Abdul Hamid Ansary, an ethnic Tajik 
shopkeeper in Kabul, says, “The government, my 
family and education and my business make me 
feel secure. For me, both my education and having 
my own business are the most important factors 
as they have allowed me to be independent. 
Education and employment have put me in 
a position to fight for my rights.” In addition, 
the presence of mass media is seen as a very 
important way to enable people with a platform 
to voice their concerns, and gain satisfaction that 
these are being heard.
Demographic differences
Differences in age, gender, and ethnicity influenced 
people’s perceptions of security providers.  
Age and gender
Most of the personal stories of those 30 or under 
cite family, friends, and the government, followed 
by education, employment opportunities, and 
improved security as contributors to their sense of 
security. Amongst this group, female interviewees 
predominantly see their family and the presence of 
the government as providing security, while men 
mostly cite employment, improved security and 
education opportunities. 
Many of the interviewees state that having a job 
enables them to protect and provide for their 
families, which in return gives them a sense of 
gratification, while others mention that having a 
job enables them to fight for their rights. Others 
believe that opportunities for employment have 
improved since 2001 and that this has given them 
independence and hope for a better future. 
As Ahmad Shah, a 63-year-old resident of Nangarhar 
province, reflects, “The economy is the greatest 
contributor to my security. When I saw that the 
economy in Afghanistan was improving I decided to 
return to Afghanistan with my family, leaving my job 
in Pakistan. I now have a business here and am able 
to take care of my family’s financial needs.”  
Similarly, Abdul Rahim, an ethnic Tajik who is 48 
years old and works as a driver, says, “Employment 
opportunities and the presence of the international 
community make me feel secure.”
Education and literacy 
Utilising education and one’s knowledge of the 
legal framework is repeatedly cited as a means 
of creating security. Respondents comment 
not only on education’s ability to raise income 
and skill level, but also on how important it is 
to truly understand constitutional rights when 
dealing with the police. Asadullah, a 38-year-
old professor in Kabul, attests to the value of 
education: “The awareness of people and more 
educated people make me feel secure because 
people now have a sense of their rights. If 
something happens, you know you can go to the 
many independent agencies to file a complaint 
and get help. Education has the power to change 
anything. Unfortunately, such institutions are 
limited to cities and have not yet extended to 
rural areas where people suffer most from these 
challenges.” 
“ The economy is  
the greatest 
contributor to  
my security.”
“ Education has  
the power to  
change anything.”
Approximately 
68 percent of the 
population is well 
below the age of 
25. The potential 
implications this 
demography holds 
for Afghanistan and 
the region as a whole 
can be both positive 
and negative. 
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A lack of good governance and continued physical insecurity, 
illiteracy, and economic insecurity are the major factors 
contributing to Afghans’ insecurity across all segments of society. 
the views shared here highlight the complexity of the situation in 
Afghanistan today. Interviewees share contradictory perspectives, 
as some of the issues that are mentioned as sources of insecurity 
are seen by others to be contributing to their security.
and freedoms. Comprehensive awareness and 
education programmes are needed to reach all 34 
provinces and bridge the gap between the literate 
and illiterate.
▪  The government and international aid 
groups should prioritise Afghan economic 
participation by encouraging local investment 
and local participation in development design 
and implementation. Many of Afghanistan’s 
development programmes have not taken existing 
individual, institutional or societal capacities 
into account and have imposed programmes on 
local populations. Therefore, individuals’ skills, 
knowledge, and needs should be identified to 
provide a better context for both the Afghan 
government and international aid groups.  
Ensuring local participation in this process is 
crucial in developing entrepreneurships and a 
sustainable economy.
by the withdrawal. The most difficult transition is 
the security sector, with signs that some warlords 
may arm their militias again, as they feel the Afghan 
army is incapable of providing security against the 
Taliban.13 It begs the question whether these critical 
transitions will be able to achieve the scale of good 
governance, economic growth and stability that 
are needed to ensure human security in the next 
chapter of Afghanistan’s history.
Recommendations 
While the regional and international dimensions of 
the current conflict in Afghanistan clearly demand 
additional recommendations to address the more 
acute, physical human security challenges, these 
recommendations are based on the underlying 
security concerns that people identified in this 
chapter, which are relevant to ensure a holistic 
approach to Afghanistan’s human security 
challenges.  
▪  The government and international 
organisations such as the UN should work 
to promote a sense of physical security by 
working towards demilitarisation. While the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) currently 
stands at 350,000, more efforts are needed to 
improve public security. For example, decreasing 
the use of personal security apparatuses, ending 
the misuse of weapons, and eliminating illegally 
held weapons would improve public safety. 
▪  The government should improve state 
legitimacy. Afghanistan has been in transition 
from conflict to peace since 2001. A durable 
peace is dependent upon consensus building 
and participatory processes, otherwise it will be 
deemed illegitimate. The government must earn 
peoples' trust by improving governance, providing 
adequate public services, developing mechanisms 
to access justice, and fighting corruption. Integrity 
must return to public offices. 
▪  The government and civil society 
organisations should continue and increase 
efforts to reduce illiteracy. Illiteracy is the root 
cause of inadequate political, economic, social 
and cultural freedoms. Illiteracy in Afghanistan 
is not only leading to self-censorship by the 
literate minority but it is also preventing the 
illiterate majority from enjoying their basic rights 
history of violent conflict in the country. The level of 
physical security has impacted Afghanistan’s overall 
development and contributed to Afghanistan’s 
inability to meet its MDGs. Those who do not suffer 
from violent conflict have more potential to ensure 
development gains and are more resilient.
Economic opportunity and development
Although development seems to have improved 
since 2001, annual reviews of the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS), which 
aims to reduce poverty, show that much progress 
remains to be made.b Failures in prioritising local 
problems and needs and applying regionally specific 
strategies have plagued development efforts. 
The interviews reflect that people perceive the 
economic opportunities to be increasing on the 
one hand, and unemployment and poverty rising 
on the other, underscoring the rural-urban divide 
and the importance of economic opportunities and 
livelihoods to foster human security. Moreover, 
illiteracy and traditional ways of thinking are 
intertwined with unemployment and education.
Ensuring security after the withdrawal
Afghanistan will likely face additional human 
security challenges in the future. It is currently 
transitioning its political, economic and security 
sectors in preparation for the international military 
withdrawal at the end of 2014. Afghans will also 
have to find a way to fill the economic gap created 
b  A programme launched in 2008 to channel the “multi-dimensional 
human development cause” of the MDG objectives into a national 
development strategy.
governance
While the government and weak governance 
structures are described as a threat to security, they 
are at the same time seen as security providers, as 
the presence of a government and legal framework 
offer more opportunities for protection. The 
state remains the main referent for the provision 
of human security, even if it is criticised and 
challenged. In addition, the people interviewed 
clearly mention warlords or other power figures in 
the central government as a threat to their security, 
as they fear continued patronage practices presage 
a return to old ways of governing the country, and 
prevents the central government from asserting 
its authority. At the same time, these leaders 
are supported in some areas of the country, less 
represented in the sample here, as a source of 
protection due to the lack of central authority. 
Physical security
While many respondents fear physical insecurity, 
some feel that the security climate is improving.  
While not optimal, some believe life is better now 
than under the Taliban or during the civil war in 
the 1990s. They believe current security conditions, 
though precarious, have created an environment 
that will not give way to an all-out war again, 
particularly amongst ethnic factions, or allow the 
Taliban to take over the government. 
This sentiment may be very different for the 
people in rural areas, who are more affected by 
violent conflict on a daily basis. The level of fear 
and insecurity experienced amongst the Afghan 
population that is caused by house raids, bombings 
and suicide attacks and the trauma of the thousands 
of deaths each year from the ongoing war is difficult 
to capture within the scope of the interviews and this 
chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge 
that the physical, personal security aspect of human 
security is the most critical to address, given the 
Conclusion  
and recommendations 
The level of physical 
security has impacted 
Afghanistan’s overall 
development and 
contributed to 
Afghanistan’s inability 
to meet its MDGs.
the authors work for the Afghanistan Justice 
Organisation (AJO) an Afghan-led, non-profit, 
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Afghanistan’s youth—the next generation of 
Afghans responsible for Afghanistan’s continued 
social and economic development. AJo seeks to 
empower youth to take ownership of their country 
and to make a difference in the lives of others 
through public awareness campaign, application 
of the law, and freedom of choice. furthermore, 
AJo is organised exclusively for the purpose of 
promoting reform through education and training 
and to advance free markets and individual liberty 
under the laws of the government of the Islamic 
republic of Afghanistan. AJo is a member of the 
south Asia network of the global Partnership for 
the Prevention of Armed conflict (gPPAc).
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Interviews with residents of Kyiv and Simferopol in late 2013 revealed widespread mistrust of the 
police and lack of protection from state authorities, leading many Ukrainians to rely on personal 
connections or themselves for security. Public outcry through the media and advocacy were seen 
as main sources to influence government authorities. The lack of accountability and transparency 
of the authorities, particularly among the police, were some of the chronic issues that fuelled the 
mass Euromaidan protests in late 2013. These events have since been overtaken by the ousting 
of President Yanukovych, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and a pro-Russian armed insurgency 
in eastern Ukraine. While this conflict has brought human security concerns to another level, this 
chapter points to underlying structural issues which are important for Ukraine's domestic agenda.
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” Tensions related to identity politics highlighted 
in the interviews were visible and had been 
known long before the conflict broke out, with 
material conditions exacerbating inter-group 
and state-citizen relations.”
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Situated in the fertile agricultural lands between Eastern Europe 
EU member states and Russia, Ukraine is home to 45 million 
people. While ethnic Ukrainians make up nearly three-quarters of 
the population, the population also includes minority groups of 
Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian descent. Eastern Ukraine is 
home to a large minority of ethnic Russians, along with the Crimea 
Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group native to the Crimean Peninsula.1
annexation and resistance
Ukraine’s modern day territories have historically 
been divided among surrounding and competing 
empires. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian empires after World War I provided 
an opening for the brief emergence of a unified 
Ukrainian state, which was soon subjugated and 
divided once again, with the eastern territories 
falling to the Russian Red Army in 1920 and the 
western lands to the Polish. In the first decade 
of Josef Stalin’s totalitarian rule, the population 
endured famine, mass executions and deportations. 
Most of Ukraine’s modern day territories were 
united following the Nazi-Soviet pact that redrew 
Eastern European borders. Heavy losses in World 
War II under Nazi occupation resulted in the deaths 
of millions of Ukrainians, including millions of Jews. 
The victory of the Allied Forces firmly established 
Ukraine as a satellite state of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) until 1991. The Crimean 
peninsula, initially part of the Russian Federation 
within the Soviet Union, became part of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. This 
was 10 years after Stalin had deported the Crimea 
Tatars to Siberia. They returned in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.2
a history of protest
Decades of Soviet repression of Ukraine’s language 
and culture sparked extended nationalist resistance, 
which led to mass protests in the final days of 
the USSR and established the foundations for the 
strong civic activism and mass participation that still 
characterise Ukrainian politics. Ukrainians voted 
for independence in a nationwide referendum in 
1991, establishing the country as a democratic, 
independent state after hundreds of years of 
nationalist struggles. Ukrainian democracy had 
weak institutional foundations following decades 
of totalitarian rule. Flagrant fraud and manipulation 
in the presidential election of 2004 galvanised 
Ukrainians to take to the streets in mass nonviolent 
concerns in the eastern Donbass region. At the 
time of writing, pro-Russian separatists are fighting 
the Ukrainian government for control of territories 
in Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine. The 
conflict continues to unfold, and has escalated into 
fully-fledged armed warfare. Many fear that the 
international ramifications of this conflict signal a 
return of Cold War dynamics. 
protests to demand a new round of free and fair 
elections that eventually brought to power pro-
Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko in what is 
known as the Orange Revolution.3
new crisis and conflict
In 2014, Ukraine again faced a political crisis that 
reflected many of the challenges of its political 
transition and its complex geopolitical and cultural 
legacy. This chapter portrays the public mood in 
Kyiv and Simferopol in the early stages of the crisis 
(December 2013), months before the development 
of the armed conflict currently unfolding in the 
eastern part of the country.
The’ Euromaidan’ crisis which began in late 2013 
in response to a governmental decision to turn 
down an Association Agreement with the European 
Union (EU), increased incrementally after the 
interviews in this chapter had been conducted. 
Mass demonstrations in the Maidan square in 
downtown Kyiv spread across the country, and 
grew as clashes and violent government crackdowns 
left 167 people dead and 2,200 injured – including 
both protestors and security forces – and 32 
missing.4 The government attracted international 
criticism by criminalising the protest movement and 
authorising riot police to use force against civilians, 
including stun grenades, tear gas, rubber bullets, 
and eventually firearms. As the conflict escalated, 
protesters increasingly called for the resignation of 
President Viktor Yanukovych and his government. 
By the end of February 2014, demonstrators 
occupied government buildings, president 
Yanukovych had fled the country, and parliament 
voted to remove him from office.a Protestors 
demanded a radical overhaul of government 
structures and practices. 
The events sparked fears among some Russian-
speaking Ukrainians about alleged nationalistic 
Ukrainian tendencies and the distancing from 
historic ties with Russia. Following the ousting of 
president Yanukovich, Russian president Vladimir 
Putin ordered the annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula in March 2014. New elections were held 
in Ukraine on 25 May 2014, and were won by pro-
European Petro Poroshenko by 54.7% of the votes.5 
However, due to the annexation, the elections 
did not cover Crimea, and were marred by safety 
a At the time of writing, the course of these events are still being 
contested.
Background
This chapter portrays  
the public mood in Kyiv  
and Simferopol in  
the early stages of the crisis, 
before the development of 
the armed conflict currently 
unfolding in the eastern part 
of the country.
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Perspectives  
on security
elderly Simferopol respondent speaks on nationalist 
and generational tensions between the communist 
legacy of Russia and Ukrainian identity. 
Police impunity
Political violence was perceived as a threat in both 
Kyiv and Simferopol. Kyiv respondents noted police 
violence against protestors in the early days of 
the Euromaidan protests. Anatoliy, a journalist in 
his fourties noted, “Among the new things is that 
the cops appear to have started assaulting people 
who go to the Maidan wearing EU arm bands – I 
haven't got it confirmed yet, but I read it in social 
networks.d I have friends and acquaintances, who 
saw that they had been followed at night or in the 
morning when leaving Maidan by two or three 
people. When walking on the Maidan there is 
always a danger that the riot police will capture you 
and throw you in jail.”  
Overall, police brutality or harassment represented 
a common cause of insecurity reported by 
respondents, with young males being the most 
affected population. Dima, a 29-year-old mobile 
coffee shop vendor in the Sviatoshyn district of 
Kyiv, provided the following anecdote: “We got into 
trouble with police once. Drunk police dressed in 
civilian clothes. They were bullying some boys in a 
shop, and it ended up in a brawl. The next day they 
came in uniform, took the boys to the police station 
and beat them up severely. No one ever answered 
for this. The parents even had to pay money to the 
police for the boys to be released.”
Many respondents had stories of police corruption. 
Andrei in Simferopol recounted the story of a 
neighbour and his wife suffering armed robbery, 
followed by abusive police taking advantage of 
the situation: “One [of the robbers] was shot dead 
in the crossfire. The rest left with the money. No 
one was found, but the cops pulled out a very 
handsome amount of money from this guy. We too 
have a similar story. Someone robbed the storage 
facility. The cops started pumping me for money 
under the pretext that they were following [the 
robbers]: ‘give us money or else we will run out of 
gasoline’. Never count on anyone or go anywhere 
[for help] – just don’t let it happen to you. You 
won’t be able to call either the police or the hospital 
– they are all tied up together.”
Street violence
Violent assaults, robbery, and hooliganism or anti-
social behaviour were the most commonly cited 
cause of insecurity among surveyed residents in 
Kyiv, particularly for young men, but also for some 
women and elderly respondents. According to 
Volodymyr, a storage facility manager supervising 
young workers in Kyiv, “If you don’t get injured in 
an unlit subway, you may run into some hopnyks 
[thugs]. The young supermarket workers get in 
trouble often after seeing off their girlfriends on 
unlit city streets.” According to Halyna, a municipal 
employee in Kyiv, “There have been several cases 
of beatings on the streets, robberies with beatings, 
and thefts. I have been robbed myself, and friends 
are often confronted with violence and robbery 
at ATMs. This is very much a characteristic of our 
part of the city, the crime rate is high.” Interviewees 
often associated street crime with social others, 
referring to hopnyks or thugs described as violent, 
unruly, and intoxicated members of the ‘underclass’. 
Marginally, in Kyiv an ethnic other – such as Asian 
migrants – also appeared as a source of threat in 
public imagination.
In Simferopole, 40-year-old businessman Andrei 
described a broader sense of insecurity: “After dark, 
your life and health may be in danger anywhere: 
beatings, murders, practically in all parts of the city, 
though especially in the old city, Zalesskaya, and 
the public housing estates. Car accidents are an 
issue too, but this is peanuts [in comparison to] the 
lawlessness. If you are doing business in the city and 
if someone knows that you’ve got some money – 
be ready. Usually, they rob you first, and then the 
police come to collect what is left.”
Traffic and infrastructure
Traffic accidents and unsafe transport were the 
second most frequently cited cause of insecurity in 
Kyiv. Ihor, an academic in his mid-40s in Kyiv, said, 
“You can get hit by cars, as drivers often do not 
follow the rules, particularly at crosswalks. Drivers 
just don’t pay attention to people.” The issue of 
traffic safety had a strong social justice connotation, 
as the media had reported multiple cases of 
The reflections shared in the following sections were collected
through interviews carried out in late 2013 in Kyiv in the
initial, nonviolent stages of the Euromaidan protests, and in the
Crimean capital of Simferopol before it was annexed by Russia.
as such, they cast light on some of the domestic conditions
that provide the backdrop for the eventual political crisis. The
perspectives highlight citizens’ perceptions of and experiences
with security in their own words, grouped here into the most
frequent categories of threats highlighted by those interviewed.
Sources of insecurity
Crimea and identity politics 
Interviews in Crimea, taken before the peninsula’s 
annexation by Russia, demonstrated that politics or 
politically motivated prejudices play a role in the 
way residents define their security, as the region has 
been a hot spot for Ukrainian identity politics. It is 
a majority Russian region with a strong influence 
of both Russian nationalist groups and communists, 
and also hosts the Crimea Tatars. In contrast to 
local Russians, the Crimea Tatars vote consistently 
for Ukrainian liberal nationalist parties and continue 
to fight for recognition as an indigenous people 
and for compensation for the losses incurred in the 
aftermath of their collective deportation in 1944. 
In contrast to Kyiv, the perception of political 
others as a source of insecurity was characteristic 
of interviewees in Simferopol. These included 
people of different political beliefs and often of 
different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The 
Crimea Tatars or Western Ukrainians were held 
in contrast to the ethnic Russians, referred to as 
‘pro-Russian separatists’ by local Ukrainians. One 
NGO activist’s sense of insecurity was related to 
the feeling of being a political ‘other’ when openly 
expressing his pro-European views. Conversely, an 
c The Baikal–Amur Mainline is a broad gauge railway of over  
4,000 km traversing Siberia and the Russian Far East and was  
widely publicised as a construction project of the century during 
the USSR.
” You won’t be able to call 
either the police or the 
hospital – they are all tied  
up together.”
b  Cossacks historically have been associated with the rise of both 
Ukrainian and Russian identity and nationalism. The Cossack revivalist 
movement received strong official support in post-Soviet Russia. Most 
neo-Cossack groups in modern Ukraine, particularly in Crimea and eastern 
regions, are offshoots of this pan-Russian revivalist movement, whereas 
others have local Ukrainian roots and are based mainly in Western and 
Central Ukraine. Cossack revivalists have formed paramilitary groups, 
wearing uniforms with whips and maintaining horses. In Crimea, pro-
Russian neo-Cossacks have been involved in conflicts with the local Tatar 
population.
nikolai is a 70-year old-man who works as a car 
parking security guard in Simferopol. He is a 
Communist Party member and vividly recalls life 
under communism.
a very serious threat, even greater than the Tatar 
issue, [is] intimidation and the issue of neo-nazism, 
even here in Crimea, in Simferopol. for example, 
in a house across the street there is a Cossack.b 
He goes out with his whip and snaps it loudly and 
ostentatiously. He shows off his ‘abilities’ – be afraid 
of us, the Cossacks. He frightens people. [as for] 
the fascist tough guys of Tiahnybok [the Ukrainian 
nationalist party] – we have to deal with them at 
public rallies. When we would march [as a column 
of workers] and quietly conduct our rally at the alley 
of Heroes [commemorating those who died, many 
of them Russian, defending the city in World War II], 
they come out with their flags and fascist symbols. 
They aren’t afraid of anything. How could the state 
and the government allow the fascists to march by 
our holy places? Confrontation is brewing. If they 
raise their heads again, people won’t let them. We 
won’t stand on ceremony with them.
I see a danger in alcohol abuse, especially in the 
young people. our children, our grandchildren, our 
future, are starting to behave immorally. our children 
do not know what the state is, what the motherland 
is, or how sacred it is. This is what frightens me. 
The young people are not being engaged – we can’t 
make anything out of them. They have nowhere to 
show their worth – no Bamc, no great construction 
sites. They have nothing to occupy themselves with. 
We have people who have lived until the age of 40 
without ever working one day. I don’t know what will 
happen tomorrow. Under socialism, we knew that we 
were going to be provided for in our old age, we would 
have social protection. now, one can’t live out of his 
pension normally. no guarantees, no confidence in  
the future.
d  At the time of writing there had been plentiful reports of such behavior 
in local media including material evidence.
e A smaller sample of interviews was done in Simferopol and as such 
represent more anecdotal information than the broader sample in Kyiv.
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Some time ago I had to take part in litigation as a 
complainant’s friend. This was related to a traffic 
accident. after giving testimony I never saw or heard 
or any activity on the part of the law enforcement. The 
owner of the car was a member of Parliament. frankly, 
given the number plate and the car – a mercedes 600 
– [the defence lawyer] couldn’t guarantee a successful 
trial, even though it drove against a red light and killed 
a cyclist at the pedestrian crossing. He charged $500 
for his work, and said: ‘there are levers of influence up 
there, which will simply lead to failure of the case’. and 
while it was being investigated, they transferred it to 
the prosecutor’s office. It appeared that the defendant 
in this case was the son of the mP. He tried to hush 
the case by ‘gifts’, shall we say. I feel insecure to some 
extent every day as I don’t understand where I can find 
justice in this system.
The range of security threats and the most commonly cited 
insecurities pointed to a marked absence of public security 
provision and rule of law. a 45-year-old lawyer, alex, who moved to 
Kyiv from the eastern city of Donetsk described that “The insecurity 
is in the arbitrary treatment on the part of the authorities.” When 
reflecting on who to turn to and how to cope with insecurity, many 
respondents pointed to the failures of the state institutions, and 
resorted to alternative or individual means for protection and 
empowerment. Coping strategies ranged from passive avoidance of 
risks, to more active engagement with authorities.
Multiple sources of human insecurity
When comparing responses from Simferopol and 
Kyiv there were many commonalities, despite the 
fact that the two regions are usually seen as very 
distinct. For many interviewees, a combination 
of security concerns increased their overall 
vulnerability and a sense of helplessness. Raya, a 
middle-aged domestic worker in Sviatoshyn, Kyiv 
exemplified this: “The state doesn’t provide for 
our [young people], through work or anything 
else. My one son is a drug addict. My other son 
got into a car accident. He wasn’t guilty and now 
he’s disabled and no one needs him. They don’t 
even want to pay his insurance. This boss, the one 
who hit him with his car, is asking him not to go to 
court. [...] I have come to realise that no one needs 
us, the common people. That’s all.” Drug abuse is 
an example of a coping mechanism that is also a 
source of insecurity. It was mentioned by several of 
those interviewed directly affected as users, family 
members or health workers.
In addition to the issues presented above, civic 
unrest was noted as a source of insecurity, even 
before the Euromaidan crisis grew. Middle-aged 
residents also reported concern with infrastructure 
deficits that affect water, electricity and heating, 
whereas older respondents who remembered the 
Chernobyl disaster in the 1980s counted natural 
disasters and technological accidents as potential 
security threats. 
Though respondents did not mention poverty as 
a primary source of insecurity, social inequality 
was reflected in whether and how respondents 
felt in a position to cope with the threats. It should 
also be noted that both Kyiv and Simferopol have 
better employment and income opportunities than 
other areas of the country. To assess the relevance 
of freedom from want as a human security factor 
in Ukraine, specific research would need to be 
conducted in other geographic areas with higher 
levels of poverty such as Ternopil, Rivne, Sumy 
regions, and northern Crimea. 
intoxicated owners of expensive vehicles killing 
people on bus stops and sidewalks and then easily 
escaping from justice. These reports caused strong 
public outrage. Petro, a 25-year-old car mechanic 
described Kyiv as unsafe for drivers: “I know lots of 
cases that resulted from basic traffic rule violations. 
Young partying rich girls don’t follow the rules.  
On the roads of Kyiv, motorcyclists simply can’t 
survive! I know of many deadly cases over the last 
five years.” 
Both street crime and traffic accidents were related 
to an unsafe urban infrastructure. Interviewees 
highlighted collapsing sidewalks, unlit streets, dim 
subways and excessive snow and ice obstructing 
traffic in winter, which reflect a lack of municipal 
governance. Volodymyr recounted that, “most sick 
leaves among workers are due to injuries they get at 
night time – coming back home, at unlit bus stops 
or deserted subways, from icy roads in winter. One 
can be injured easily and there is no chance to get 
medical first aid [from an ambulance].” The idea 
that urban disorder and vandalism contributed to 
increased rates of crime and anti-social behaviour, 
known better as the ‘broken window theory’,6 
resonated with security perceptions expressed by 
many interviewees. 
Lack of health care
Inadequate access to, or poor quality of health 
services was a concern expressed by health care 
workers and the middle aged and elderly. Tetiana, 
a doctor in Kyiv, said, “As a medical doctor I would 
say that a very low level of public healthcare is a 
threat to the patient. The equipment is very bad, 
and the professional level of the doctors is low. That 
leads to wrong diagnosis and incorrect treatment. 
Our security is in our hands. Public healthcare 
doesn’t do its job.” Corruption also affects the 
health care system. Misha, in Simferopol, alleged 
that, “In the hospital, unless you pay ‘a voluntary 
contribution’, they won’t provide help.”  
Security providers
 ” I have come to realise 
that no one needs us, the 
common people. That’s all.”
anton, a 41-year-old IT worker in downtown Kyiv 
describes the weak presence of the state.
[I feel threatened] when I don’t know what to expect 
from the law enforcement when I encounter them in 
everyday circumstances. What rights do I have, and 
what rights do they have? You need to enter into 
an argument with them literally on everything – any 
baseless questions like ‘who are you’, ‘what are you 
doing here’, ‘show your documents’. Things like that. 
How can I explain it? I don’t feel protected in terms 
of, well, the state system, isn’t it? I don’t know who 
owes me and what I owe in different situations. This 
relates to Zhekf, this relates to the police, and even 
public bus drivers. Every time you have to argue 
with a particular individual. I would call it minimal 
awareness and minimal transparency. I don’t feel 
like there is any sort of local authority, at the district 
or street level, and in the same sense I don’t feel 
protection from law enforcement. I am absolutely 
unsure that police is on my side or that they are 
interested in bothering with my case.
” I feel insecure to 
some extent every 
day as I don’t 
understand where I 
can find justice in this 
system.”
f  This term refers to the housing office – a superficially reformed relic 
of the Soviet system – municipal offices that collect payment on behalf 
of large private utilities providers and provide maintenance and repair 
services to the majority of urban households. 
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Awareness of legal rights and obligations was 
a frequently cited coping strategy. Mykhailo 
explained that, “With police, you need to be calm 
and explain the situation. If they ask you to come 
along, tell them you are going to let your friends 
know, cite all the laws you know and don’t know, 
talk about what rights you have. They don’t know 
these [laws] anyway. They will see that you are not 
a simple one and that it is not going to be easy with 
you.” 
Sources of empowerment
Media, public transparency and collective action 
appeared to be important sources of empowerment. 
Several respondents indicated that by taking things 
to the public, media may help make inefficient 
government agencies or particular officials do their 
jobs. While money or political influence may easily 
help hush a criminal case or make courts produce 
essentially unjust rulings, public opinion mobilised 
through media could still exert significant influence. 
The events of the Euromaidan demonstrated to 
many how public knowledge on issues of common 
concern, including human security, could benefit 
the greater community interest. The most powerful 
wave of protests was triggered by anti-protest laws 
promulgated by the government in January 2014 
that attempted to limit civil liberties and enshrine 
greater information asymmetry.7 Mounting violence 
against protestors was restrained when media and 
citizen journalists exposed illegal practices of the 
riot police and paid provocateurs to the public. 
In the absence of state authorities to check 
official power, the public sphere was seen as a 
last recourse. As Dima pointed out, “You need to 
[be able to appeal] to some authorities [to have 
security]. Police will have to punish police, or some 
other organisation. You see, every now and then 
the police are raping and killing, and then what? 
Nothing [happens] to them. Only if it is made 
public, then they may do something about it.” 
Another way of claiming citizens’ rights was 
collective action. For instance, rampant corruption 
among traffic police has prompted a growing 
number of drivers to organise into a movement 
named Road Control which aims to document 
and investigate police abuse – an example of what 
is sometimes referred to as ‘human security from 
below’.8 The group grew incrementally and became 
more politically active during the Euromaidan 
protest rallies. 
said about the police, “As always is the case with 
us, you need to go to a police [officer] you know 
personally, and it will be efficient then.” Yevhen 
saw it this way: “Both sides [of the legal system] 
contribute to the same corruption scheme… one 
prosecutor who takes a larger bribe by the lawyer, 
turns the case slightly the other way than the 
prosecutor who takes a smaller bribe and so on. All 
is built on corruption, from top to bottom. There 
are no other mechanisms, or any other motivations.”
The least protected people in such an environment 
were those with the lowest social capital – including 
the undereducated, the working class, young 
students living independently of their families, and 
single elderly persons. The underlying issues were 
thus closely related to governance and social justice 
issues. Mykhailo, a civic activist in his fourties in 
Kyiv said, “Police who want to clear a crime go after 
people who resemble somebody, and if they see that 
this is not some tough guy, and there is no one who 
would stand up for him, they may simply accuse him 
of some crime. A [guy I know] got his kids accused 
for no reason. It was lucky that he was a judge.” 
rights and access to information
The level of awareness of rights and obligations 
in relation to security providers was a recurring 
theme in the interviews. There was a clear sense 
of information asymmetry that contributed to the 
power imbalance between the state and citizens. 
Information asymmetry concerns the lack of 
information at all levels of public communication, 
including citizens’ awareness of their legal rights,  
the transparency in the work of government 
agencies and informed public opinion in a more 
general sense. 
The police and the vacuum of state protection
The police were simultaneously the least efficient 
government agency and the most in demand as a 
security provider. The attitude of Tolyk, a 32-year-
old security guard in Kyiv was: “In any case, turn 
to the police, it is their job, we pay them taxes and 
the taxpayer has the right to protection.” Yet, there 
was an apparent paradox in how people related to 
authorities as security providers. On the one hand, 
police were most frequently cited as necessary 
authorities. On the other, respondents did not 
express confidence that the police were either likely 
or willing to provide for their security needs. 
Yana, a female university student in Kyiv illustrated 
this ambivalence: “[In some cases], out of pure 
instinct, one goes to the police. But if there is no 
one in uniform around, or if you don’t trust them, 
you can only count on your own self. When [I was 
attacked] there were people around who could 
interfere, but no one did. There are situations when 
you feel like no one will help you.” Illustrating the 
point further, Ihor said, “When you see people 
wearing uniforms, you a priori perceive them as a 
[source] of danger. You don’t know what to expect 
from them. If a situation doesn’t warrant immediate 
action, people usually try to avoid the official route 
if they can.” 
Against the backdrop of a dysfunctional police, 
people mainly relied on their social relations, family, 
friends and community for physical protection. 
Anatoliy said, “You can try and call the police [but] 
this is more like a method to distract attention.  
But, generally, it’s good to have a few friends 
who could physically come and stand by you. 
This is perhaps the best method of protection.” 
The inadequacy of the police is further reflected 
in the use of private security agencies by larger 
corporations and the richer strata of Ukrainians. 
The fact that the elite rely on private firms for their 
security needs is another indicator of the failure of 
the public security sector. 
Corruption and nepotism
State institutions often appeared to work more 
effectively through personal contacts and 
informal relationships, including those established 
through bribes. Knowing ‘the right people’ in the 
appropriate agency was deemed a more important 
resource than the official mandate of the agency in 
question. Oxana, a 25-year-old woman who worked 
with a transport company in Livoberezhna, Kyiv 
” All is built on 
corruption, from top  
to bottom. There are 
no other mechanisms, 
or any other 
motivations.”
misha is a 28-year-old male in Simferopol, 
Crimea, who describes himself as an nGo activist 
and private entrepreneur. 
You feel insecurity when going to all kinds of 
authorities, even the passport office. Insecurity 
in terms of your rights to receive consultation or 
services. I feel insecure in terms of the knowledge 
of laws and the ability of influencing the state 
authorities. You need to be prepared to make 
inquiries, to call, to read the law. 
When you approach [an official] and say that you 
have read the law, they immediately start working 
and their attitude changes. I had a case recently 
with the tax inspection – I read all, learned and 
spoke the terms that they know, and they already 
started calling me back, it was a different story 
then. and when you say, ‘I don’t know’, there are 
immediately a lot of unnecessary steps you have to 
take – they tell you go buy something, come back 
tomorrow. Whenever I say that the law requires that 
you should do this within two days, they do it. most 
civil servants do not know the laws themselves, 
therefore, they are affected by fear, and they think 
you know the truth.
” Most civil servants 
do not know the 
laws themselves, 
therefore, they are 
affected by fear, 
and they think you 
know the truth.”
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recommendations
▪  Ensure that the public security sector, 
especially police, effectively protects law 
and order. Police have the potential to be a 
powerful source of human security for the 
people, rather than a source of insecurity or a 
political instrument. One of the most immediate 
priorities for the new government should be 
not merely a reshuffle, but a profound security 
sector reform, whose ultimate output would 
include a democratically accountable police force. 
State actors can build on the momentum of the 
increasing space and role for the involvement 
of civil society, particularly with the growing 
volunteer movement, to ensure efficient 
mechanisms for public consultations and public 
oversight for the reform processes.
▪  Tackle widespread corruption by addressing 
inefficiencies and strengthening the rule of 
law. As one of the issues that fuelled Euromaidan, 
inefficient government agencies feed corruption 
and hinder citizens’ ability to exercise their rights 
through lawful means. Citizens must be aware 
of their rights in order to exercise them. This will 
not only empower citizens, but also strengthen 
trust in government and the judicial system. Civil 
society have a role to play in enabling feedback 
mechanisms and informing citizens about their 
rights and obligations. 
▪  Prioritise accountability and transparency in 
government activities. Building trust between 
the citizens, government, and other stakeholders 
will require freedom of information. Effective 
governance requires that citizens can hold their 
government accountable and critique its actions. 
The media and social networks can be instrumental 
channels for transparency, and can be used by 
citizens to hold the government accountable. 
▪  Support initiatives to strengthen dialogue 
processes addressing the current disconnect 
and divisions between different political, socio-
economic and cultural groups. The complexities 
of the Ukrainian identity should have room 
for expression as part of a national narrative of 
peaceful co-existence. A number of civil-society 
led dialogue initiatives can further inform the 
reforms aiming to increase both the actual and 
perceived security. 
While the government has changed, the same 
security apparatus is still in place. The armed 
conflict has focused the country’s attention on 
political and national security concerns such 
as the protection of borders and sovereignty. 
However, the risk is that such an approach could 
emphasise the very conditions that fuelled the 
conflict, increasing the polarisation amongst 
some Ukrainian groups and overshadowing 
valid grievances that all groups have against 
the state authorities. The stories presented here 
indicate clear warning signs with regards to the 
politicisation and corruption of the security sector, 
as well as the perception of the ‘social other’ as 
a source of insecurity. Whilst the survey for this 
publication was not carried out in the current 
conflict zones, the dire conditions in areas such 
as Donetsk and Lugansk – and their effect on 
the public mood and community relations – 
have been subject to extensive public concern in 
Ukraine.12 Such grievances must be addressed by 
the Ukrainian government for long-term stability 
to be a possibility. 
As the European Union, the United States and other 
international donors are signing support packages 
for security sector reform with the newly appointed 
government, the risks of a politicised security sector 
must be carefully assessed.13 Frameworks for civil 
oversight of security sectors, underpinned by free 
press and civil rights education, must be integral to 
such reforms. Another conflict factor that inevitably 
affects this process is the rise of paramilitary groups 
on both sides of the conflict, a sign of continued 
militarisation of Ukrainian security. 
On the other hand, the past year has also built 
an unprecedented momentum of Ukrainian civil 
society groups and social movements. Not only 
were they instrumental in leading and calling for 
nonviolent approaches during the Euromaidan 
protests, they are now key in assisting the 
protection and humanitarian support of populations 
affected by the conflict, filling important gaps in the 
state’s capacities. Civil society is a needed partner 
by the government; this provides important entry 
points for a longer-term collaboration for human 
security. However, this will only be a possibility 
if human security concerns are not completely 
overshadowed by the political and militarised 
national security strategies perpetuated in the 
context of the ongoing armed conflict. 
While common citizens were unable to rely on the 
police as a security provider, the Yanukovych 
government in early 2013 was allocating an 
ever-greater share of the budget for the needs of 
the Ministry of Interior.9 At the peak of the mass 
protests in Kyiv, media reported on the six-fold 
increase of state budget allocated to the riot police, 
at a time when Ukraine relied heavily on foreign 
loans to fill in the gaps in its national budget. The 
problems with the police went beyond technical 
inefficiency, as issues flagged concerned their very 
mandate and purpose. Police were seen to be 
concerned with politics and with maintaining the 
political regime, rather than the maintenance of law 
and order. 
The difference between the actual situation and 
what the public expected from police reflected 
two different approaches to security: one derived 
from the communist system based on a hierarchical 
system of top-down control, versus a modern 
bottom-up demand-driven security project whereby 
police operate as a service provider. This debate 
came to the fore as a result of riot police behaviour 
towards protestors, whose excessive brutality 
became graphically visible to the public. 
At the time of writing, the constantly shifting 
conflict dynamics that currently affect the 
population of Ukraine and its neighbours pose 
regional and international challenges of a different 
nature. The humanitarian consequences seen in over 
3,000 violent deaths10 and some 260,000 displaced 
people11 in eastern Ukraine clearly pose additional 
and more acute human security challenges than 
those presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, the 
underlying domestic security concerns that in part 
triggered the political crisis remain relevant for 
current and future policymakers. 
The start of the political crisis in Ukraine reflected the need for 
significant governmental reforms in the country. It is notable that 
the fault lines of the debate generated by the protest movement 
came close to points identified in the interviews. Protesters began 
to demand accountability of the public administration and the 
rule of law, meaningful local self-government, a review of the 
legal framework and law enforcement structures and the way they 
relate to society. furthermore, the tensions related to identity 
politics highlighted in the interviews were visible and had been 
known long before the conflict broke out, with material conditions 
exacerbating inter-group and state-citizen relations. 
Conclusion  
and recommendations 
The author works for the association of Middle 
east Studies (aMeS) is a non-profit organisation 
based in Kyiv, Ukraine, that conducts research 
and analysis of the middle East and of Ukrainian 
foreign and domestic policy regarding muslim and 
other minorities with a particular focus on Crimea. 
amES has done numerous projects on mediation 
and prevention of inter-ethnic tensions (with a 
focus on Crimea), and increasing civic tolerance 
in the region. amES is a member of the Eastern 
Europe network of the Global Partnership for 
the Prevention of armed Conflict (GPPaC). 
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The situation of human security among Palestinians is as complex and fragmented as the problem 
and the people. The pages that follow offer only a snapshot of concerns and responses from focus 
groups and individuals in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These give voice to 
some of the daily issues facing a variety of Palestinians. While the Israeli occupation dominates and 
permeates every aspect of Palestinian life, it is often taken as a given by many of the participants.
Statelessness 
and Insecurity 
in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory
Lucy Nusseibeha, Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND) 
“ Which security are you  
talking about? We have forgotten  
the meaning of this word a long  
time ago.”
a  The chapter was produced with the help of facilitator and researcher Amira Abul Hawa and intern Isobel Whitting
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a feature of the global 
landscape for almost 100 years. for the purpose of this chapter, 
only a brief timeline of events can be outlined.b This chapter only 
addresses the human security situation of Palestinians in the 
occupied Palestinian Territory, and does not include the 1,694 
million Palestinians living under direct Israeli rule and with Israeli 
citizenship in the territories that have been with the State of Israel 
since 1948, nor does it include the approximately two million 
Palestinian refugees living in camps in Jordan, the 442,000 in 
Lebanon and the 499,000 in Syria.1 
b  Many accounts of these historical events are contested.
The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 resulted in the 
expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians.2 In 
the subsequent war of 1967, which lasted only six 
days, Israel seized East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank from Jordan, Gaza and the Sinai from Egypt 
and the Golan Heights from Syria. This marked the 
beginning of Israel’s ongoing military occupation of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and its unilateral 
illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. Another war 
in 1973 failed to change this, and uprisings by the 
Palestinians against the Israeli occupation in 1987 
(the nonviolent First Intifada) and in 2000 (the 
violent Second Intifada) were equally unsuccessful. 
In 2005, the Israeli army and settlers unilaterally 
evacuated the Gaza Strip. Since June 2007, the Strip 
– which has a population density of 
4,657 per square kilometre – has been under 
constant blockade by land, air and sea. 
In December 2008, in response to rocket fire, but 
also at a time when a new cease-fire was being 
negotiated, Israel attacked Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip, mostly by aerial bombardment on a captive 
population. Nearly 1,400 people were killed in 
just 22 days.3 Another major attack took place 
in November 2012, and more recently and most 
destructively in July and August 2014, through the 
Israeli army’s operation ‘Protective Edge’ in the 
control. This area includes the Jordan valley, most 
of the water and many other resources, and many 
Israeli settlements. Areas A, B, and C are separated 
physically by a system of separation walls and 
around 450 military checkpoints/borders.7 In 
2002, Israel began the construction of the so-called 
Separation Wall. Some 85 percent of the wall runs 
inside the West Bank, with the result that 11,000 
Palestinians need permits to live in their homes as 
Israel treats them as falling outside the West Bank.8  
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
are severed from each other with almost total 
restrictions on access to Jerusalem and to the 
Gaza Strip. The restrictions on movement have 
fragmented the Palestinian people to such an extent 
that many are no longer aware that they share the 
same concerns. 
Over-securitisation
Another negative legacy of the Oslo accords has 
been the militarisation of Palestinian society, which 
was almost entirely without even small arms until 
1993, the year that marked the advent of the official 
peace process and the ’return’ of many exiled 
Palestinians. One of the major components of these 
accords was the establishment of a large number 
of security services, including police, preventive 
security, intelligence, and marines. This led to a 
rapid proliferation in the amount and use of arms.9 
Ironically, the security services are not there so 
much for the protection of Palestinian security, as 
for the protection of Israeli securityc, although Israel 
as the occupying power should be responsible for 
security of individual Palestinians.10
 
As society becomes more fragmented, the dangers 
from the use of arms increases; this was brought 
home by the violent split between the two major 
factions, Fatah and Hamas, in 2007. This split led to 
the formation of two separate governments, one in 
the Gaza Strip led by Hamas and the other in the 
West Bank led by Fatah, and to violence by each 
side against the other, whether by open use of arms 
or arrests. The split considerably added to levels 
c “The armed forces’ main task was not to guarantee the security of the 
occupied inhabitants from external attacks or from the occupying power, 
but to maintain law and order within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
and to protect Israel’s citizens from Palestinian militants. Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin made this blatantly clear when he noted that PA security 
personnel operated throughout the West Bank with “Israel’s knowledge and 
in cooperation with Israel’s security forces to safeguard Israel’s security 
interests.” Neve Gordon (2008:40), Israel's Occupation.
of fear, especially in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, 
at the time of writing, an historic reconciliation 
between Fatah and Hamas has taken place, with a 
unity government sworn in on 2 June 2014.11  
Gaza Strip. Every man, woman and child in the 
Gaza Strip – some 1.7 million people – have been 
directly affected by the conflict. The bombardment 
and military ground operations caused the death 
of 2,153, of whom some 1,480 are believed to be 
civilians, including 504 Palestinian children. The 
damage to public infrastructure was unprecedented, 
affecting electricity, clean water and healthcare.4   
Oslo’s legacy
The Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, which 
allowed for the return of many leading exiles, 
and the creation of a ‘Palestinian Authority’, were 
supposed to bring about an end to the occupation 
and the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state by May 1999. Despite these accords and the 
official peace process that they initiated, the Israeli 
state has remained in total control of Palestinian 
lives. This has created a continuing situation of 
minimal human security for the entire Palestinian 
population, and in the case of Gaza, an absence of 
human security to the extent that the population 
barely survives.5 With nearly half a million people 
displaced by the latest Israeli attacks, their survival is 
even more precarious.6
Amongst the legacies of Oslo has been the creation 
of so-called ‘security areas’, which directly impact 
the freedom of movement for every Palestinian 
and thereby their access to health, education, water 
and other necessities. The West Bank has been 
divided internally into a patchwork of different 
security zones: Area A, Palestinian population 
centres, ostensibly under Palestinian civil and 
security control; Area B ostensibly under Palestinian 
civil and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; 
and Area C, some 60 percent of the West Bank, 
under total Israeli civil and military and planning 
Every man, woman 
and child in the 
Gaza Strip – some 1.7 
million people – have 
been directly affected  
by the conflict. 
Background
Amongst the legacies of  
Oslo has been the creation  
of different Palestinian ‘security 
areas’, which directly impact  
the freedom of movement 
for every Palestinian and 
thereby their access to health, 
education, water and other 
necessities. 
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Palestinian perspectives  
on human insecurity
The focus groups and interviews covered a wide range of topics, 
including military security and repression, the Israeli occupation, 
and societal security. The latter includes social services, including 
education, social justice, security of employment, and the poverty 
caused by the occupation. In all contexts, human security was 
unanimously found to be severely lacking. 
narmeen abu Baker lives in Jerusalem and 
married a Palestinian man from the West 
Bank.
Like any girl in the world, I loved a man who was 
my friend at university. When we decided to marry, 
we realised our complicated situation. I’m from 
Jerusalem with a blue ID and he’s from the West 
Bank with a green ID. you feel all your dreams 
could be broken in seconds. But we insisted that 
we should face this together and we believed that 
our love was stronger than the occupation. So we 
decided to marry. 
after marriage, my life started getting more and 
more complicated. I was working in Jerusalem 
and we had to live in ramallah in the West Bank 
because my husband doesn’t have a permit to 
live in or enter Jerusalem. I had to pass through 
Qalandia checkpoint every day to go to work. after 
I got pregnant I started getting really exhausted 
[from standing] in a crowded place for so long. 
In my last month of pregnancy, I had to stay at 
my parent’s house to give birth in Jerusalem to 
prove that my baby was born in Jerusalem and 
has the right to get the blue ID and get health 
insurance. my husband was able to visit me for 
one day. He entered Jerusalem illegally because 
he wasn’t given a permit. and when I was in labour 
he couldn’t make it because police were all over 
the place. It was very heartbreaking to feel that at 
the hardest moment in my life I had to be alone 
without my husband holding my hand. and I really 
cried because he wasn’t able to be the first one to 
see his son. 
after that I had to stay at my parent’s house to 
prove residence in Jerusalem in order to give 
my son the blue ID and health insurance. I was 
lucky that [the Israeli authorities] came after 
four months – it takes years for other people. 
They asked my family questions, they asked our 
neighbours if they saw me living here, they asked 
for electricity bills and many other governmental 
documents. They even looked at very small details, 
like if there were clothes for me and my son in the 
closet and if there was food in the fridge. But they 
don’t come only once.
So my husband had to sneak into Jerusalem for us 
to live together and prove residence in Jerusalem 
and start requesting a ‘family reunion’ which could 
allow him to live with us. The problem is that to 
request this in court, my husband must be older 
than 35 and he’s still 33. yet, we had to stay in 
Jerusalem because my son hasn’t received the 
birth certificate yet.
We are renting a house while my husband is staying 
here illegally. We’re afraid to move, to go shopping, 
to do anything in life because we’re afraid he 
could be caught at any time. He had to stop his 
work as an accountant in the West Bank. He was 
in Jerusalem without any work for five months until 
he started working as a construction worker with a 
very low salary without any human rights. 
It is so frustrating to live such a life. We could 
have lived the best life ever, life as we wanted, but 
unfortunately fate chose for us to be born here in 
such a complicated place. 
While the occupation was discussed, it was not 
cited as the only reason for the absence of human 
security. Many security needs that would normally 
be provided by a state are absent, such as protection 
from military and personal physical attacks, or 
from the danger of arrest and possible torture, even 
for minors.  Also missing is protection from land 
confiscation or having one’s home destroyed, or the 
absence of freedom of movement and other basic 
human rights. 
Although it is clear that the occupation affects 
almost every aspect of Palestinian life, it would 
be inappropriate to portray the Palestinians as 
victims in every sphere, with no autonomy or 
responsibility over the internal issues within their 
society. The lack of human security has been 
exacerbated by other factors such as the internal 
rift between the two major political factions, Fatah 
and Hamas (at the time of the interviews), by the 
weakness of law enforcement in the areas of the 
Palestinian Authority, and by the increasing culture 
of dependency on international aid, linked with 
decreasing economic opportunities.   
However, the effects of the occupation – physical 
and psychological – cannot be underestimated. 
As one participant said, “In Palestine, we are still 
struggling to get our independence, and the whole 
nation is busy in deconstructing occupation and 
collecting the pieces of our fragmented identity.” 
The geographical fragmentation imposed by Israel 
contributes to concomitant social fragmentation. It 
was difficult for the respondents to begin to think 
of rebuilding the three pillars of human security – 
freedom from want, freedom from fear and a sense 
of personal dignity – under the circumstances of 
the occupation. 
life under siege
The occupation has both visible and invisible 
elements, which equally affect the lack of human 
security in Palestine. The former include, for 
instance, the denial of freedom of movement 
to Palestinians, which is now epitomised by the 
separation walls, the heavy Israeli military presence 
in Jerusalem, at the check-points, and the many and 
multiplying settlements. There are multiple kinds 
of military and non-military violence, including 
imprisonment, shooting with live ammunition, 
bombing, and exile. 
The invisible elements demonstrate the use of 
structural violence against Palestinians, such as 
land confiscations and the lack of housing rights. 
These prevent any form of economic development, 
whilst humiliating and disempowering Palestinians 
and making their daily lives increasingly difficult. 
There are highly complex ID and permit systems, 
primarily around movement and access, but even 
for the right to continue living in one’s home. Israel 
operates a coloured ID card system to differentiate 
between Palestinians living in the West Bank 
and Palestinians living in Jerusalem. Those with 
green West Bank ID cards are not allowed on 
the opposite side of the Wall, where Jerusalem 
is located, without going through a complicated, 
humiliating and sometimes Kafkaesque permit 
application process. The process is rarely successful 
except for medical treatment and very occasionally 
to celebrate Christian or Muslim religious rites 
during holidays.
“ In Palestine, we are still 
struggling to get our 
independence, and the 
whole nation is busy in 
deconstructing occupation 
and collecting the pieces of 
our fragmented identity.”
“ My husband was 
able to visit me 
for one day. He 
entered Jerusalem 
illegally because 
he wasn't given a 
permit.” 
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spend more than half their income on food. Whilst 
health security was a recurring issue across the 
territories, the most extreme examples come from 
the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip suffers specifically 
from the Israeli siege, which does not allow for 
even the minimum amount of food to meet the 
population’s needs let alone luxuries such as 
building materials, or chocolate.13
The blockade on Gaza since 2007 continues 
to stifle the local economy and prevents any 
meaningful recovery of the most productive 
sectors. The already dire economic situation was 
compounded in 2013 by the curtailment of the 
unofficial tunnel trade, which meant that low-cost 
products arriving from Egypt are being replaced by 
more costly products arriving via Israel. In addition, 
limits on importing construction materials into 
Gaza have put pressure on employment.  
economic security and livelihoods
Lack of economic security – defined as having stable 
employment and being able to provide for one’s 
family – was one of the main cross-cutting themes 
across the three areas. Economic stability is both 
threatened by, and creates, social instability, and thus 
becomes the lynchpin of progress and development. 
The Palestinian economy cannot provide an 
environment whereby stable employment is 
available for the majority of the population. A lack 
of employment opportunities, whether one has a 
degree or thirty years’ experience, was cited in the 
West Bank as one of the biggest contributors to 
the feeling of a lack of human security. Economic 
security was viewed as even worse in Gaza and in 
Jerusalem. Even education is seen as a hindrance 
rather than a way ahead, as it simply delays the 
moment when people will be able to start earning 
money; financial gains, rather than academic ones, 
are prioritised. Amjad al-Ahmad, in the Ministry 
of Economics in Jenin, says, “Economic security is 
the basis of development, and as long as there is 
no economic security, there won’t be any kind of 
security – whether political, social, or anything else. 
But there are challenges facing economic security  
– for example social challenges, environmental 
challenges, unemployment, poverty and tribal 
conflicts.”
The closure of Gaza has not only affected students 
and recent graduates, but also the vast numbers 
of workers employed in Israel, who used to cross 
the border daily to get to work. In addition, high 
levels of unemployment have decreased the worth 
of education, as a degree is no guarantee of secure 
employment. This has serious long-term implications 
for society as a whole, especially since the youth 
constitutes 70 percent of the population. Many 
are unable to get any jobs at all, with 88 percent 
aid-dependency, and this has led to a desperation 
amongst some to emigrate. A lack of economic 
security was seen as a serious threat to the security 
of the family, possibly resulting in instability, violence 
and fragmentation. If there is a class of disillusioned 
youth who know that they will never work no 
matter how educated they are, they will turn to 
other, perhaps less salubrious means of employment, 
which will surely only cause even less security.
Another consequence of the occupation which 
affects livelihoods is access to natural resources.
Colonel Hilal Abdul Haq, Director of Preventive 
Security in Jerusalem and director of Jericho, says, 
Housing insecurity 
Home demolitions are an example of a 
combination of the visible and the invisible 
violence that Palestinians experience. Because the 
Israeli government rarely grants building permits 
to Palestinians, structures are often built without 
permits, with the inhabitants living in constant 
fear of their homes being demolished. From 
2006 through May 2014, at least 752 Palestinian 
residential units had been demolished in the 
West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), causing 
3,568 people, – including at least 1,712 minors 
– to lose their homes.12 Abdullah Al Khatib, 55 
years old, a plumber in Jerusalem, asks, “Which 
security are you talking about? We have forgotten 
the meaning of this word a long time ago. Every 
couple of weeks we see groups of Israeli forces 
coming to our area to demolish houses. Many of 
our neighbours’ houses were demolished. Israel 
doesn’t give permission for Palestinians to build. It 
takes from two to ten years to receive permission 
and we have to pay very big amounts of money, 
which we cannot afford. […] We pay very high 
taxes and we receive actually none of the services 
compared to what Israelis receive. One of my 
neighbours had to demolish his house with his 
own hands. They told him if he doesn’t demolish 
it in two weeks they will come and demolish 
it for him and he would have to pay for the 
bulldozer as well.”
The broader sense of insecurity this situation 
creates was described by a technical assistant 
from the West Bank, who wished to remain 
anonymous, “I have land near the settlements on 
the Ramallah border, but I can’t build a house 
there because it isn’t safe – there are often 
confrontations between settlers and Palestinians 
– and I can’t even sell it, because no one would 
buy it, because they know the situation. If I ever 
tried to build a house there they would just come 
and demolish it.”
“Israel defines the depth of drilling allowed for 
the extraction of groundwater. They [the Israelis] 
do not allow Palestinian farmers to dig more than 
100 meters of water. But, in the settlements they 
allow them to dig 200 meters and not just 100. 
Not surprisingly, the water is available when the 
settlers dig, while the Palestinians cannot find water 
in their wells. So farmers in areas north of Jericho 
buy water from Israel at a high price despite the 
presence of water on their land. They cannot access 
it as they are banned by Israel from digging artesian 
wells. Therefore many areas of Jericho now suffer 
from the problem of water scarcity and crops are 
beginning to suffer.” A young West Bank Palestinian 
explains, “There is no port, no airport, we don’t 
control our resources, and we can’t even import and 
export without Israel. If the head of the family is not 
provided with security of employment, how can he 
provide security and protection for his family?” 
In East Jerusalem, the economic situation has 
deteriorated sharply for many inhabitants. 
Restrictions on movement, lack of protection from 
violence from settlers, and economic discrimination 
have reduced opportunities for many to maintain 
their traditional livelihoods. Abu Rashad owns 
a shoe store on Salah Al Din street: “This street 
used to be called the ‘shopping centre’ but in the 
last couple of years, especially after the separation 
wall, the market started getting weaker and weaker. 
People used to come from many different places 
to buy from here but now the market is dead. 
Ten years ago and before the separation wall, my 
store used to be one of the best stores. Now I’m 
thinking of selling or renting it. The Israeli market 
is much stronger than the Palestinian market. 
The government is supporting them but for us it’s 
the very opposite. When the Israelis have some 
religious events, the municipality sticks warning 
announcements on the doors of the Palestinian 
stores which say that the stores have to close 
because a big number of Israelis will be passing by 
and might cause violent acts.”
Health and food security 
In Palestine, food insecurity is driven by high rates 
of poverty resulting from unemployment, which 
is in part due to ongoing access and movement 
restrictions, as well as high prices for food and 
economic shocks. Food is available in markets, but 
expensive, so households reduce the variety and 
nutritional value found in their diet. The majority 
of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
“One of my neighbours  
had to demolish his house 
with his own hands.”
In’am abu nada is a field worker for oxfam 
in Gaza.
my husband had hepatitis, and he began to have 
problems with his nerves in his face. The doctor 
was terrible. He didn’t diagnose him properly, didn’t 
really try and investigate what was wrong. We were 
just given cortisone, and my husband took two 
courses. after this his liver failed. We wanted to go 
to Egypt, but we had to treat him in Gaza. all they 
gave him was painkillers. The treatment outside 
Gaza was very expensive – $50,000. We had to 
sell the house. We went to Egypt, and as soon as 
the doctor saw him, he said ‘the treatment of your 
husband is very simple, as long as he has never 
taken cortisone’. I told the doctor that he had taken 
two courses. my husband only lived six months after 
that... He was an engineer at al-azhar university, 
but once he died, that was it, there was no life 
insurance, they didn’t pay us anything... Humans 
have become the cheapest thing – even animals  
are treated better than humans.
“ Humans have 
become the 
cheapest thing – 
even animals  
are treated better.“ 
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Community and community identity are under 
constant threat from the occupation. This was 
strongly reflected by respondents in Jerusalem, 
where the residence permit system drives people 
out of the city and basic public services have been 
absorbed into the Israeli system. In the historic Old 
City of Jerusalem, whole neighbourhoods have 
been taken over and the inhabitants moved, as in 
the Moroccan quarter, which was destroyed in June 
1967. Residents are threatened so much that the 
community and its identity are destroyed.e  
 
The result at the local level is a general sense of 
disempowerment and frustration, especially among 
the youth. The realities of the occupation have had 
a profound impact on people’s sense of dignity. 
e  In ‘Assessing International Peace Efforts in Palestinian-Israeli Affairs: a 
Human security perspective’ (2010), Elena Aoun describes the Palestinians’ 
“world of cumulative exclusions that threaten collective identity and 
individual lives.”
of Palestinian society is reflected in the 
ubiquitousness of small arms, and the spilling 
over of tensions and frustrations into violent 
fights. This cuts across communities and across 
community groups as the tribal loyalties still come 
into play and quickly exacerbate minor quarrels. 
Internal political division is thus exacerbated 
by the physical and psychological effects of the 
occupation. 
Another reason for the lack of social solidarity 
– a major issue in both Jerusalem and the West 
Bank  – is the feeling that people can no longer 
afford to concern themselves with the problems of 
others, as they have so many themselves. People 
are living day by day, surviving without being able 
to think of the future, or how to improve their 
situation. Because people feel that there is no 
hope, there is “no motivation other than just living 
another day." As one participant from the West 
Bank said – or worse, to quote from Gaza – "they 
just want to forget and to escape even if it means 
death." In’am, an NGO employee in Gaza, reflects 
on the psychological effects of the occupation: 
“There is despair and depression, because people 
are insecure, their rights have been stolen, and 
there is no one to turn to. People have just started 
to surrender.” Dr Ismael Abu Zaid a psychologist 
originally from Gaza, says, “There are pressures 
everywhere, all over, and there are only two ways 
to deal with such poverty; to turn to religion or to 
turn to drugs. If you go to the mosque and pray 
you may get extra food.” 
This fragmentation is not along religious or gender 
lines; for instance, the Christian minority has 
always been integrated, and Palestinians have 
been one people. Nevertheless, recent emigration 
of Christians has been high, due to the lack of 
economic opportunities, and the overall lack of 
security. These, coupled with strong networks 
abroad, for instance, in Latin America, and 
more recently, fears from the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism, have led many Christian 
Palestinians to leave.
years. If a citizen had 8 cents for example, and each 
year he spent one cent, now he has nothing. Their 
savings have been totally consumed.” 
The hospitals and clinics in Gaza are generally of 
very poor quality, and people often have to bribe 
the doctors heavily. The alternative is travelling to 
Egypt, where people may end up paying $ 1,000 
simply to be allowed to cross the border. 
Health concerns are also closely linked with the 
armed conflict and with environmental security. 
Because of the large amounts of phosphorus that 
were used in bombs during the attack on Gaza by 
Israel in 2008 and 2009, the past five years has 
seen a sharp increase in the number of people 
suffering from skin diseases and cancer, with many 
children contracting leukaemia – something which 
was almost unheard of in Gaza before the war.d The 
levels of agricultural pollution are high, meaning 
that food produce is not clean, which leads to more 
health problems. The government is not equipped 
to provide solutions or the right facilities to deal 
with such things. The lack of clean water is a serious 
issue in Gaza, and yet another example of people 
not being provided with their basic needs. 
Geographical, political and societal 
fragmentation
An interconnecting threat that cuts across all 
Palestinian society is increasing fragmentation, 
which is part of a vicious cycle of social 
disintegration, polarisation and the easy use of 
violence. The geographic fragmentation caused 
by the occupation is evident in the isolation of 
Jerusalem, the severance and siege of the Gaza 
Strip, the gigantic complex of the separation walls 
throughout the West Bank along with the more 
than 450 military checkpoints. 
In Gaza, societal solidarity is seen to have 
disintegrated totally. Internal divisions in Palestinian 
politics have rent divisions in society at all levels  
–  from politicians to neighbours who were once 
friends but who now, resulting from different 
political affiliations, do not communicate. Along 
with the plethora of Palestinian security services 
and the internal divisions, the militarisation 
d  " White phosphorus landing on skin can burn deep through muscle 
and into the bone, continuing to burn unless deprived of oxygen." Its use 
in civilian areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law – see 
Amnesty International. “Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: Israel’s use 
of white phosphorus against Gaza civilians ‘clear and undeniable’”.  
19 January 2009. http://www.amnesty.org
Hedaya Shamun, Journalist at Women’s 
affairs center, rafah/Gaza:
I took a permit through my work to enter the West 
Bank and Jerusalem. and when I came back to Gaza 
I showed my photos in Jerusalem to my children. 
They couldn’t understand why I went there without 
them. I tried to explain to them that I couldn’t take 
them because of the occupation, the blockade, the 
permits and our situation, but I just saw in their eyes 
that they still didn’t understand – they only thought I 
didn’t want to take them. my children can’t imagine 
that Palestine is Haifa, Jaffa, akka, Jerusalem, 
West Bank, etc. They see Palestine as if it is only 
Gaza, because this is the only thing they have seen 
since they were born. The new generations in Gaza 
have never crossed the borders of the Gaza Strip, 
therefore they aren’t able to understand what 
Palestine is, and what the Palestinian identity is. 
They study in schools about the geography and the 
history of Palestine, but it’s really different to know 
these facts theoretically rather than in real life. and 
this is what I call the loss of identity.
I do not care to put the flags of any political party 
in my house – I only care to put the Palestinian 
flag. The thing I fear most is the future of my 
children. I do not see any prospect for them. I 
always try to raise them as just being Palestinians 
without mentioning any political party, but the 
general political environment in Gaza is the 
opposite. I try to tell them we are all Palestinians 
and this is our identity, we are all the same 
people but after a while, they come back and ask 
me, ‘mum, who is better, fatah or Hamas?’ It’s 
really sad.
“ My children 
can’t imagine 
that Palestine is 
Haifa, Jaffa, Akka, 
Jerusalem, West 
Bank, ...“ 
WeST Bank: area C MaP
The unemployment rate was 40.8 percent in the 
first quarter of 2014, which amounted to about 
180,200 unemployed people – hitting a five-year 
peak.14 Mohammad El Baba, a photojournalist at 
Agence France Presse from the Gaza Strip says, 
“Gaza now is facing the worst blockade in eight 
“ People have just 
started to surrender.”
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yacoub rujoub is a security officer and 
lawyer from Durra, in the district of Hebron, 
who works in Izaroyya in area B on the edge 
of Jerusalem. 
In area B there are Palestinian areas that are 
neither under the authority of Palestine nor Israel. 
Israel refused to give these areas to the Palestinian 
authority. The suburbs around Jerusalem are all 
considered area B. and Israel does not allow 
Palestinian security forces to work there. Palestinian 
security officers could be arrested if they were 
caught in that area with any kind of weapon or 
even just in uniform, unless they take a permit 
from Israel, so we actually face armed force while 
we aren’t in fact armed. This increases the theft, 
crimes, drug dealing and all kinds of insecurity, 
as all the criminals escape to these areas. for 
example a man broke in to al Quds university and 
started shooting in the campus and shot someone, 
“ How could I arrest 
him? I have no 
authority in that 
area.“ 
and after that he just escaped. How could I arrest 
him? I have no authority in that area. The Israeli 
police also do not care about such issues because 
it’s a Palestinian area. They don’t get involved in 
any kind of provision of security, they just practice 
the opposite. They have broken into to al Quds 
university many times and they threw tear gas 
and rubber bullets inside the campus! It’s a very 
insecure area, nobody can be arrested for any 
breach of the law. It’s also very dangerous for the 
Palestinian security and police officers when they 
get attacked in such areas because it’s known that 
they won’t be armed there.
The lack of protection was particularly noticeable 
amongst women, because as one participant said, 
“[women] not only suffer from domestic issues, 
but they are also affected by the wider societal 
issues.” In other words, women often suffer twice 
over – from the occupation itself and also from its 
effects on the society around them - such as the 
humiliation of the Palestinian men. Women often 
bear the brunt of the lack of human security.
human security in Gaza. Whilst the advent of the 
Palestinian Authority should have helped to focus 
national goals, it instead put the focus more on 
money and militarisation. People no longer have 
faith in international or human rights organisations  
– the employees come, take pictures, listen to 
people’s stories and leave. This disaffection with 
such organisations was expressed in the West Bank 
focus groups for almost identical reasons. 
For Palestinians in East Jerusalem and in Area C, 
there are only the Israeli state security forces, who 
are more likely to arrest than to help Palestinians 
in need of security.f In the West Bank, there is a 
multiplicity of often conflicting and/or overlapping 
security and intelligence services, but considerably 
dominated by political factions, and often in 
contradiction with each other.15 The civil police 
do their best but are severely hampered by their 
inability to work in Areas B or C – and they are in 
practice not even fully able to work in Area A. In 
Gaza, it was impossible to get people to talk at all 
about security forces due to their fears about saying 
anything to do with security.
As for the Israeli police, who represent the hostile 
occupying power, many respondents reflected 
the belief that they will use any pretext possible 
to break up and undermine the Palestinian 
family unit. Secondly, there was an awareness of 
the inevitable judgement from the community 
that would befall anyone who had gone to the 
police of the occupying force rather than to their 
family to solve their problem. An abused woman 
in Jerusalem therefore may face an impossible 
dilemma: turn to the Israeli police and risk her 
husband being sent to prison, her children taken 
into care, and being ostracised/perhaps persecuted 
by her own society; or resort to the tribal methods 
of justice, and risk the violent incident being swept 
under the carpet and returning to her husband, 
potentially facing more violence. 
f  In the first five months of 2014, the weekly average of search and 
arrest operations recorded across the West Bank was 86. Since the 
kidnapping and killing of three Israeli youths on 12 June 2014, this number 
went up drastically, with a total of 1,454 such operations recorded, and 
around 2,100 Palestinians arrested in the week of 19-25 August 2014. 
OCHA. “Protection of civilians, reporting period: 19-25 August 2014”. 
OCHA. Web. 29 August 2014. 
Security providers
The complexities of governance are one reason 
why security providers in the Palestinian territories 
are failing to address the basic needs of the 
Palestinians. An NGO worker says, “It is hard to 
find an official body from which to get human 
security, because you are missing something that 
has not been given to you. In order to overcome 
certain problems, one could go to the police, 
tribal methods, the family, the mosque or church, 
political parties and through them human rights 
centres and international organisations.” Although 
theoretically one could turn to such places, 
in reality, people have lost trust in them. The 
various political parties are ridden with internal 
rifts, and are partly responsible for the lack of 
rinad abu Gharbieh is a project coordinator 
in Beit Hanina, Jerusalem, describing a 
scene at a checkpoint between a Palestinian 
woman and a male Israeli soldier. 
She took off her Jilbab [traditional body 
covering] to show him that there is nothing 
under it and to pass without any beeping. 
This drove me crazy! This is really humiliating. 
If it was the Jilbab or her clothes he should 
have asked her to go to a private room to be 
checked by a female soldier!! But he seemed 
to be happy to see an ignorant girl like her who 
didn’t know her rights! This is how much we get 
humiliated every day. This is how they practice 
psychological pressure on people until they feel 
fed up with this situation – either by limiting 
their movement, humiliating them, preventing 
them from having building permits, demolishing 
their houses, taking over their lands, etc…. and 
that’s what we are facing now, a war that is much 
more complicated than any usual war, a war 
that the world cannot see – it’s what is called a 
‘psychological war’.” 
BLOCKADE EFFECTS BETWEEN 
2007 AND 2012 (JUNE 2012) 
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and water, health and education services. But 
when the quality or even the provision of such 
things is not guaranteed, this leads to feelings of 
fear and want, and also a lack of dignity. 
Although there are women’s rights written into 
law, they need both improvement and rigorous 
implementation. For example, obsolete laws which 
refer to honour killings are from the time of the 
Jordanian occupation. 
In a case from Gaza, one participant spoke of how 
after her husband’s death, his family took her to 
court in order to get possession of their house. 
She explained that although there is a law in Islam 
that states that when the son dies, the possessions 
go to the parents, she and her husband had 
worked for and owned their house for twenty-
five years. The fact that it could potentially be 
taken from her, leaving her homeless and with no 
insurance, demonstrates the lack of legal support 
for women. 
The role of the sulha in relation to women, and 
to violence against women, is not always so clear, 
since it is based on tradition, and its judges are 
traditionally all male. Especially in reference to 
women in Jerusalem there could be times when 
there was the dilemma: whether to seek help 
against domestic violence by the traditional sulha 
process? Or by going to the police – in Jerusalem, 
therefore, the Israeli police? In the West Bank, 
while mechanisms for women seeking protection 
from domestic violence are not very reliable, but 
do exist, at least the police are Palestinian.
Another example of the inadequacy of the legal 
framework was in reference to the subject of 
food goods. Because people are using outdated 
Jordanian laws, there is nothing to prevent people 
from selling expired goods, which happens 
regularly. Food is sold past its sell-by-date, with 
people who are unable to read – a separate 
issue in itself – falling prey. Because of a lack of 
monitoring and the absence of an effective legal 
system to punish such actions, these problems 
persist. 
The absence of monitoring and regulating the 
provision of services, whether regarding food, 
medical services or customer services, means that 
people are not held accountable for any lapses or 
shortcomings. The provision of an effective and 
satisfactory service is simply not considered a 
priority. People do not experience security in the 
goods that they buy, and the hospital treatment 
on which they rely are of poor quality. One feels 
secure if the basic essentials are provided for: food 
legal framework and rule of law
Rule of law is only partially effective. There are 
parallel traditional practices, even for instance in 
cases of traffic accidents, which generally have to 
be respected at least as much as official security.g 
The traditional method of justice, known as sulha, 
is still often used to address both individual and  
community level tensions, by facilitating members 
of families to meet and discuss a conflict until they 
reach an agreement. The fact that this approach 
is deeply based in tradition has its advantage in so 
far as it can help agreements to hold; nevertheless, 
there are many issues that do not lend themselves 
to a traditional approach.
Participants especially in the West Bank expressed 
concerns about the lack of an effective legal 
framework that both deterred people from 
committing crimes and punished them if they 
did. Each of the focus groups highlighted that this 
was the case especially for the most vulnerable 
groups in society, such as women and people with 
special needs. But there are also problems with 
out-of-date laws from Jordanian and even British 
Mandate and Ottoman times. This problem of 
outdated laws is compounded by the fact that the 
Palestinian Legislative Council has not been able 
to meet since 2007 because they cannot gather 
between Gaza and the West Bank, and due to the 
detention of members by the Israelis. 
While there are individual women as well as 
women’s groups that work to uphold women’s 
rights, the legal framework was deemed 
insufficient and insufficiently enforced to protect 
women. 
g  This means that if for instance a driver hits a pedestrian, even if there 
are no injuries and the police are satisfied that there is no cause for 
prosecution or complaint, according to traditional law, the driver will still 
have to visit the pedestrian’s family and pay perhaps quite substantial 
compensation.
Salih al-Kurd from Wad al-Jowz is a nurse 
and an entertainer for sick children in 
Jerusalem.
once, when I was on duty, a woman came to the 
hospital who had clearly been beaten; she had 
lots of bruises, but when I asked her what had 
happened, she said that she had fallen down the 
stairs. I think she was afraid that if she told the truth 
I would go to the police. I tried to reassure her, and 
said that I wasn’t going to go to the police, but that 
it was important that she tell me so I knew how to 
treat her. She said that her husband had hit her, but 
that she didn’t want anyone to know. I asked her why 
she had refused to tell the truth, and it was obvious 
that she was scared that the police would find out 
and that her husband would go to prison. also, it’s 
the traditional method of dealing with these sorts 
of issues – women are discouraged from going to 
the police, because the community would blame 
her for her husband’s incarceration. normally the 
community doesn’t let the police interfere in these 
sorts of things. 
mahmoud Qara’een from ra’s al-‘amoud is a 
field researcher in Jerusalem.
The [Israeli] police are only interested in women’s 
issues. In situations not relating to women, the 
solutions according to the police or the measures 
the police take are minimal, and don’t solve 
anything. By focussing only on women’s issues, 
the police are trying to make people believe that 
the arab man is a violent one, who can’t take 
responsibility for his family, and behaves like a 
criminal.
anonymous respondent employed at a 
ministry in the West Bank 
my mother in law came to visit from Jordan, so we 
held a little gathering to welcome her, and I had 
bought some kanafeh [a local sweet made with 
white cheese]. I noticed that people were only 
eating the top and not the cheese. When I tried it I 
could barely smell it, it was so disgusting. 
So I went to the ministry and they sent some people 
to the bakery where we had bought the kanafeh. 
When they got into the kitchen, it was filthy, things 
were rusting and there was a terrible smell, like 
a rubbish bin. They wrote a report on the bakery 
and the case is still going through the courts. They 
closed the man’s store, and I do think that he will 
be punished, but the problem is that there is no 
monitoring of food goods. 
“ The problem is  
that there is no 
monitoring  
of food goods.”
“ Normally the 
community doesn’t let 
the police interfere in 
these sorts of things.”
The Middle east nonviolence and Democracy 
(MenD) is an organisation that promotes active 
nonviolence and encourages alternatives to 
violence among youth and adults throughout 
Palestine. Having built its reputation on a 
holistic and creative approach to violence in 
schools, mEnD has taken this approach further 
to reach the general population. mEnD employs 
innovative methods, especially with the media. 
mEnD is based in East Jerusalem, and has eight 
regional centers for active nonviolence and eleven 
community centers/libraries. It is an active 
member of the middle East and north africa 
Partnership for the Prevention of armed conflict 
(mEnaPPac).
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There are many gaps in the existing security structures in the 
Palestinian territories. The major gaps are due to Israeli control 
and hostile occupation and therefore can only be addressed 
by ending the occupation. Internally, there are gaps in the 
enforcement of the law and in the laws themselves. While there 
is some progress on this front, the confusion around the laws 
themselves leaves too much leeway for abuse and criminality. 
Without even a legal government, rule of law is hardly enforceable. 
creating and arming more and more security 
services, has had a strong adverse effect on human 
security. Even for instance on happy occasions, 
such as weddings or celebrations of exam results, 
people are killed through the irresponsible use of 
guns shot in the air. 
▪  Uphold and enforce civil laws as a clear 
reference point for justice and rule of law. This 
should ensure the fair and equal treatment of all 
Palestinians, including the protection of women. 
▪  Educate throughout the school and university 
system regarding human responsibilities 
and rights. This should be based on a charter 
that would promote a value-based society, and 
encourage nonviolent approaches to conflict 
and the primacy of respect, including reciprocal 
respect and respect for difference. With such 
a bottom-up approach that would encourage 
the participation of all in building a value-based 
society, internal human security issues, such as 
domestic abuse and corruption, would be pushed 
into the realm of the non-acceptable.
recommendations
▪  Take a broad and overarching human security 
approach, focussing on the Palestinians (as well as 
the Israelis), to be explored as an option towards 
the solution of this long-standing conflict. Ideally it 
would be the foundation for a new approach that 
would be based on reciprocal dignity and would 
therefore negate some of the gross inequalities 
of power and economy that currently make real 
negotiations impossible. The focus on the official 
peace process itself – even on details such as dates 
for its prolongation or non-prolongation – should 
not take precedence over what people need as 
components of peace.
▪  Ensure the immediate implementation of 
international law, such as in particular the Fourth 
Geneva Convention as it applies to territories 
occupied by war, and UN resolutions that pertain 
to Palestine. A proper adherence of Israel to 
international law would immediately improve the 
situation of Palestinians. For instance, it would halt 
Israel’s settlement expansion in the West Bank, 
which is illegal under Article 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which states that “The 
Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer 
parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies” (Articles 33 and 53). 
▪  Focus on a participatory, bottom-up human 
security approach towards the achievement 
of human rights for all, in such a way that it 
encourages the contribution of all to the process 
of state-building and community building. Such 
a process is essential to assure that individual 
security needs, including those of women and 
girls, are fully understood and met. It is also an 
essential part of the empowerment process that 
is necessary to overcome the profoundly negative 
experience of constant humiliation. This should 
also be done in a way that overcomes the ’culture 
of dependence‘ that has been built up in recent 
years by the international community – however 
well-intentioned. A participatory approach 
will also generate a strong locally directed and 
oriented civil society. 
▪  Work towards demilitarisation of the region 
and Palestinian society, as the militarisation 
brought about by the influx of former fighters, 
along with small arms and the insistence on 
whether by angry and disaffected Palestinians or 
by others exploiting the Palestinian cause.
The contributions of the Palestinian perspectives 
add up to an urgent need to focus on Palestinian 
security and empowerment. An interconnecting 
threat is the absence of a state and therefore state 
protection. The stories that contributed to this 
chapter fuel the argument for a human security 
approach towards a solution, so that the real needs 
and interests of the Palestinian population can 
be addressed. Human security needs to be taken 
seriously as the essential ingredient for peace. 
Israel has overwhelming military and economic 
advantages over the Palestinian population. People 
who are frustrated and fragmented and unable 
to see a positive future are far more likely to be 
violent, especially against those who they see 
as immediately responsible for their condition. 
Since the root cause of the conflict and of the 
absence of human security (including freedom 
from fear, want and indignity) for Palestinians is 
the Israeli occupation, in place since June 1967, 
the occupation needs to be brought to an end. 
This would restore a level of dignity to the lives of 
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
who have by now lived for so long under hostile 
and humiliating occupation, that humiliation has 
become internalised and barely figured in the focus 
group discussions and interviews. While there might 
be considerable risk from factional disagreements 
or from the far from perfect Palestinian security 
services, if these services were able to focus on 
the protection of the Palestinians, individuals 
would begin to feel safer. Therefore, to ensure the 
longterm human security also of Israelis, granting 
human security to the Palestinians is key to paving 
the way for true peace.
At the national level, there is a need for forms 
of security that can unite rather than divide 
the population, and for efforts that build social 
cohesion and revive disintegrating values. While 
traditional practices can be oppressive in some 
cases, they also have their cohesive and positive 
side, insofar as they help to solve internal disputes. 
Palestinian society also has strong traditions of 
openness in relation to women and to different 
groups of all kinds, from Gaza to Jerusalem and 
Ramallah, to villages and refugee camps. 
Another national need is for the protection of 
natural resources and for the development of the 
economy via control of borders and full human 
rights. This includes freedom of movement, which 
is one of the most ubiquitous of Israeli abuses 
of Palestinian rights. Palestinians are not able 
to travel freely within or outside the occupied 
territories. There is no control of borders for 
Palestinians – the Israeli state has to approve all 
entries and exit.  Not only are visas granted by 
Israel, but so-called Palestinian passports also have 
to be approved by Israel. 
The primary international implications are that 
the human security threats against Palestinians 
undermine international law. The history of the 
conflict, at least since 1948, has been an example 
of the continuous violations of international law.h 
This indicates a need for far more advocacy and 
awareness raising to encourage the application 
of international law. Both regionally and 
internationally, the absence of human security for 
Palestinians increases the risk of global terrorism, 
h See for instance International Court of Justice: Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wu11, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004 and UN General Assembly, GA/11317:  
‘General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to accord Palestine ‘non-member 
observer state’ status in United Nations’. UN. Web. 29 November 2012. 
Conclusion  
and recommendations 
Human security needs 
to be taken seriously 
as the essential 
ingredient for peace. 
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" We decided to leave 
the feelings of frustration 
and impotence behind 
and we took over the 
streets on our bikes." 
Empowerment  
in Practice 
Mexico, the Philippines, Zimbabwe
Along with another set of human security analysis, this section presents an 
additional dimension of how human security is put into practice through 
empowerment strategies. Local community members, leaders and activists in 
Mexico, the Philippines and Zimbabwe reflect on how citizen action, advocacy, 
and community and multi-stakeholder dialogues have led to the empowerment of 
local actors towards collective human security strategies. They also demonstrate 
the importance of collective action and social movements in influencing security 
policy, and the important role that knowledge of human and civic rights plays in 
empowering civilians to protect themselves.
Chihuahua en Bicicleta sin Miedo, Mexico
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Decreasing 
Violence  
in Mexico 
through Citizen 
Participation
Sylvia Aguilera | Nadjeli Babinet | Luis Gómez Chow | Centro de Colaboración Cívica (CCC)
” ...the idea was to bring together 
the different groups and help them 
generate a common agenda  
to address the security crisis.”
The past decade has seen a wave of criminal and state violence in Mexico, broadly linked to the rise 
of violent organised crime and human rights violations. Since 2006 between 47,000 and 70,000 
people have been murdered and more than 25,000 people have been victims of enforced or involuntary 
disappearances.1 Reflecting the government’s inability to enforce the law, the situation has galvanised a 
number of citizen initiatives. High-level, multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms have influenced public policy 
and legal frameworks. Local groups have reclaimed public spaces, and victims of violence have organised 
social movements demanding the improvement of security and justice institutions and the recognition of 
victims’ rights. These efforts have pressured the government to abandon its militarised approach towards 
crime in favour of strengthening the institutions of rule of law through justice system reforms. Yet violence 
persists and much remains to be done.
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“The military response led to more fear and the 
suppression of activities in the public space. A lot 
of soldiers took over civilian positions related to 
law enforcement in the local government. Marines 
and soldiers started patrolling the streets and we 
witnessed an unprecedented increase in human 
rights abuses, including torture and enforced 
disappearances.” 
Some groups have been more vulnerable than 
others, “[Enforced disappearance] victims belong 
to the poorest and most marginalised strata of 
Mexican society.” An interviewee from the la 
Laguna region in northern Mexico comments, 
“insecurity was particularly intense for youth; armed 
attacks caused lots of deaths of young people.”
In 2012, newly elected President Enrique 
Peña Nieto (PRI) promised a completely new 
strategy to address insecurity and violence in 
the country, focusing more on crime prevention 
and reconstruction of the social tissue, and less 
on the territorial deployment of police officers 
and military and navy personnel. The strategy 
was formalised in the administration’s 'National 
Development Plan 2013-2018'; the government-
opposition coordination mechanism known as the 
‘Pact for Mexico’ and ultimately in the National 
Program for Crime and Violence Prevention. 
The announcement of the new strategy was 
applauded as a much needed shift from the one 
privileged by the previous Calderón government. 
National, regional and international policies to 
reduce both the demand and supply of drugs have 
increasingly been accused of having failed, with 
Mexican drug cartels today bringing in $19 to $29 
billion USD annually.8 
Although several positive developments have 
taken place during the current administration, 
much remains to be done. Continued and 
systematic human rights violations, the 
ever-growing presence of violent criminal 
organisations, the emergence of civilian armed 
groups, and rampant government corruption and 
impunity still threaten human security in the 
country. 
decided to carry out military operations to tackle 
organised crime and drug trafficking. 
insecurity and violence in Mexico
The country has since experienced an alarming 
increase in levels of crime, violence, and impunity. 
Since 2006 between 47,000 and 70,000 people 
have been murdered and over 25,000 people 
have been disappeared.6 There are many different 
perspectives on the causes of increased violence. 
According to the International Crisis Group, the 
end of the legislative ban on high calibre assault 
weapons in the United States in 2004 marked 
the beginning of increased violence in Mexico.7 
The Mexican government and some civil society 
representatives believe that the violence is caused 
primarily by armed confrontations between drug 
cartels. 
Others emphasise factors related to inequity that 
has never been addressed by the local or federal 
authorities. For example, in the case of Ciudad 
Juárez, an interviewee says, “The city had a 
great number of youths with social resentment, 
without any real education, employment, and 
development opportunities. For a long time, crime 
and violence in the city were quite stable, so we 
did not perceive this factor as a serious threat, but 
it was.”
Other nongovernmental organisations and 
grassroots community members, including many 
interviewed for this publication, suggest that the 
government’s territorial deployment of military 
forces to combat violent drug cartels, coupled 
with the weakness and corruption of the security 
and justice apparatuses, directly contributed to 
the unprecedented increase in human rights 
violations, violence and crime. As an interviewee 
from Nuevo León in northern Mexico said, 
” Insecurity was 
particularly intense 
for youth; armed 
attacks caused lots 
of deaths of young 
people.”
Background
The united Mexican States, commonly known as Mexico, represent 
the world’s 14th largest economy. The country is home to 120 
million people, making it the 12th most populous country in the 
world. The country is a member of the organisation for economic 
cooperation and Development (oecD) and the World Trade 
organisation (WTo), and is one of the eleven emerging powers 
of the Group of Twenty (G20).2 However, according to the World 
Bank, the distribution of wealth in the country remains skewed, 
and Mexico’s overwhelming economic and social inequalities 
undermine its people’s standard of life.3 80 percent of Mexicans 
live in urban areas, and 50 percent of the population is living in 
poverty according to national standards.4 The Human Development 
index of the united nations Development Programme ranks Mexico 
71st globally, which is well below other economies of its size in 
Latin america.5
“ The military response 
led to more fear and  
the suppression  
of activities in the 
public space.”
During most of the twentieth century, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
dominated Mexico’s political landscape, holding 
an overwhelming majority in both chambers 
of the Federal Congress and most of the state 
governments. In 1997 the PRI lost its majority 
in Congress and in 2000 opposition candidate 
Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party 
(PAN), won the presidential election, ending 70 
years of uninterrupted rule by the PRI. 
Despite the change in the federal government, 
many claimed that little was done to address 
the myriad of problems afflicting the country, 
including corruption, impunity, economic and 
social distress, and the increase of organised 
crime. Illegal drugs had been produced in Mexico 
and then smuggled to the United States as early 
as the 1960s. In the 1980s, smugglers in South 
America shifted their routes from the Caribbean 
to Mexico, a more direct and easier pathway 
to the United States. As the drug cartels grew 
wealthier, they amassed power. 
In 2006, President Felipe Calderón (PAN, 2006-
2012) announced tough action on the increasing 
rates of violent crime. Mexico’s security situation 
had deteriorated to the point that criminal gangs 
had assumed de facto territorial control in some 
areas. However, rather than addressing these 
important threats through strengthening the local 
or state police and the justice apparatus, Calderón 
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An interviewee from La Paz in the state of Baja 
California Sur says that even in his city, where 
the crime rate is below the national average, 
“citizen panic has created an ‘exodus’ from 
the streets.” Common criminal offenses are 
frequent, and organised criminal groups and 
gangs have established strong territorial control. 
In several communities they function as a ‘parallel 
government’, as they demand money in exchange 
for protection and exercise ‘justice’ on those 
who do not obey their laws. The authorities have 
been known to allow this, in many cases being 
complicit. A young Mexican woman described 
this phenomenon: “They have permission to act 
with complete impunity […] I feel as if I have 
my hands tied, there are too many economic 
interests.” 
The rise of violence in Mexico
Violence and crime started to rise during Vicente 
Fox’s presidency. This happened because criminal 
organisations, especially in western Mexico and 
on the border with the United States, saw power 
vacuums that they could fill. The ineffectiveness of 
the Fox government was the breeding ground for 
criminal groups to emerge and flourish. But it was 
Perspectives on citizen  
security in Mexico
government to demonstrate that the frontline fight 
against crime was working. Any fatal victim of a 
violent episode was presented and 'counted' as a 
fallen criminal. Even students and children killed 
by crossfire or by mistake by army or navy officials 
were accused of being criminals. When there was 
public uproar, the government justified its actions 
by saying that the fight against crime had some 
necessary 'collateral damage'.
Responsibility for the current situation must in part 
be borne by the international community, who 
supported Calderón and his frontline strategy at 
the beginning of his term. For example, there was 
a very public and direct support from the U.S. 
government with the Mérida Initiative, through 
which the Mexican government obtained financial 
and military resources.a
The lack of human rights and insecurity 
Politically motivated illegal detentions, extrajudicial 
killings, and enforced disappearances persist. 
Also, there have been some legislative changes 
that criminalise social protests and the authorities 
are starting to abuse the term 'terrorism'. Now, 
everyone that protests is a potential terrorist. It 
is quite obvious that these reforms are further 
limiting our rights. 
a  The Merida Initiative was set up as a partnership between the United 
States and Mexico governments to fight organised crime and associated 
violence: www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ 
In the alleged interest of guaranteeing security, 
we have witnessed a limitation of our rights. We 
are witnessing the creation of states of emergency 
outside the rule of law. This discourse led to a 
war dynamic in the country where the objective 
of war was not to investigate and prosecute 'the 
enemy', but to eliminate it. Calderón justified all the 
violence and deaths – over 100,000 – by saying 
that he was fighting a war against crime and that 
every victim was a criminal. 
Apart from the abuses committed by government 
officials, there is also a debate on whether private 
actors can be held responsible for violating human 
rights. In Comité Cerezo we say that only the state 
can be held responsible for human rights abuses, 
while private actors commit crimes, they violate 
the law. One of our main concerns is that the state 
is not only committing abuses, but it is not even 
enforcing the law. 
Concerning drug trafficking, it is true that the state 
has to do something to tackle this crime; but its 
strategy must conform to human rights norms and 
avoid torture and other illegal procedures. Sadly, 
the government sees human rights as an obstacle to 
guaranteeing security. This explains the increase in 
human rights abuses. 
The objective of the state should be to guarantee 
security and the rule of law; but it could be argued 
that the state has only focused on going after the 
criminals (drug traffickers, kidnappers, etc.), while 
ignoring the rampant corruption and impunity of its 
own agents and institutions.
when President Felipe Calderón decided to carry 
out an aggressive, militarised strategy to contain 
rising crime rates that violence and insecurity really 
began increasing exponentially in 2006 and 2007. 
Calderón and his cabinet chose the use of force 
over a preventive approach. They saw the 
corruption, ineffectiveness, and neglect of law 
enforcement institutions at the municipal and 
state levels and decided to rely on the army and 
navy to go after the criminals. But no real effort 
was made to address the structural causes of such 
deficiencies. 
I believe that the government’s aggressive strategy 
caused the criminal organisations to respond in 
the same way. Also, at least in the beginning, 
the capture of some criminal leaders generated 
tensions inside the cartels, and many ‘second-level’ 
leaders started fighting each other to get control of 
the organisations.
The impact of violence
Violence is now coming not only from criminals, but 
also from the people and institutions in charge of 
maintaining order: the police, the army, and the navy. 
One of the main consequences of this shift has been 
an alarming increase in grave violations of human 
rights, specifically torture, enforced disappearances, 
and extrajudicial killings. There has also been an 
increase in the use of some legal strategies that 
I would say are incompatible with human rights 
standards, like arraigo (pre-charge detention). All 
this was bound to happen because army and navy 
personnel are not trained to carry out public security 
duties, let alone human security strategies.
 
Apart from the human rights violations, there was 
a very aggressive communication strategy from the 
” All this was bound 
to happen because 
army and navy 
personnel are not 
trained to carry out 
public security duties, 
let alone human 
security strategies.” 
The diverse views shared in the making of this article demonstrate 
that violence, crime, and fear have become part of the Mexican 
context. Human rights defenders recount how the situation has 
restricted freedoms, broken social relationships, and damaged 
public confidence in governing institutions. 
THe HuMan RiGHTS acTiviST
antonio cerezo
antonio cerezo founded comité cerezo in august 
2001, an nGo that protects human rights 
activists, after he and his brothers alejandro 
and Héctor were illegally detained, tortured, and 
confined in maximum-security federal prisons. 
THe HuMan RiGHTS DefenDeR
Paulina vega
Paulina vega is a human rights attorney and vice 
President of the international federation for Human 
Rights (fiDH). She reflects on the rise of violence in 
Mexico in the past 15 years.
” Violence is now 
coming not only from 
criminals, but also 
from the people and 
institutions in charge 
of maintaining order.“ 
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Forming the Dialogue Programme
The Dialogue Programme on Citizen Security 
is a dialogue and consensus-building platform 
between representatives from different civil 
society organisations and academic institutions. It 
was launched in 2009 by a group of NGOs and 
academic institutions. Now, over 160 organisations 
are part of this platform.
At the time of the launch, there was growing 
polarisation between organisations and individuals 
that were demanding more security through 
harsher punishments, more police officers, and 
'quick justice,' and others that were concerned 
with increasing human rights abuses and the 
implementation of violent measures to tackle 
insecurity. These two groups were accusing each 
other of worsening the dire situation. At the same 
time, the government was taking advantage of the 
division within civil society to carry out its own 
strategy without transparency or accountability. 
In this context, the idea was to bring together 
the different groups and help them generate a 
common agenda to address the security crisis while 
respecting the human rights of all people. 
Citizens and representatives from the three levels 
of government participated in Mesa de Seguridad. 
It was a true multi-stakeholder dialogue. The basic 
assumption was that civil society and government 
acting together could better identify the priority 
areas, generate and implement concrete proposals, 
and follow-up and evaluate the results of those 
proposals. This committee was so effective in 
generating trust and carrying out different strategies 
that it is still in place, even though the Todos somos 
Juárez initiative officially ended in 2012.
Today, the Mesa de Seguridad has several 
subcommittees that address access to justice, 
immediate response to threats, violent theft, human 
rights, and performance indicators. All three levels 
of government continue to participate in the Mesa 
de Seguridad.
Accomplishments of Mesa de Seguridad
Mesa de Seguridad has fostered sincere dialogue 
between citizens and authorities and it has 
contributed to developing trust among different 
stakeholders from civil society and between 
them and the authorities. It has also fostered 
collaboration between different levels of 
government and different authorities.
Thanks to the pressure of the Mesa de Seguridad, 
the federal government had to change its strategy 
from 'territorial control' – the massive deployment 
of soldiers, marines and police officers – to 
strengthening the investigation and intelligence 
capacities of the authorities. Through the Mesa 
de Seguridad we citizens were able to tell the 
president that we did not want 5,000 more police 
or army officials, but 200 public prosecutors. 
In the end he accepted our request and sent 
40 public prosecutors to strengthen the state 
attorney’s office (he told us he did not have 200). 
He also sent an anti-kidnapping group and an anti-
extortion group.
Mesa de Seguridad has become an informal 
communication channel between citizens and 
public officials. It has brought the government 
closer to ordinary citizens. It has also contributed 
to transparency and accountability, because the 
citizens that participate in the subcommittees 
and the plenary sessions can evaluate what the 
authorities are doing.
Citizen empowerment 
and security
The crisis of insecurity, violence and human rights 
violations that exists in Mexico has led to a myriad of 
responses from the population. As one interviewee 
from Ciudad Juárez describes, “People were outraged. 
Everyone knew what was going on and how law 
enforcement institutions were in part responsible 
for the increase of violence. But we were also very 
scared.” Citizen responses range from individual 
strategies – avoiding going out at night, installing 
alarm systems in homes, armouring automobiles, 
hiring private security – to collective responses. 
Some citizens have resorted to non-functional, 
semi-legal responses that perpetuate the cycles of 
violence.9 The main non-functional response is the 
self-arming of civilians, a growing phenomenon 
in western Mexico. As an interviewee said, “If 
the state cannot guarantee my safety I must do it 
myself, and the easiest way of doing that is getting a 
gun. This logic explains the recent emergence of the 
autodefensas [armed civilian groups or vigilantes] in 
some parts of the country.” 
Others have initiated functional collective 
responses that both complement and/or monitor 
the state. Two types of collective, functional 
responses to insecurity stand out: multi-
stakeholder dialogue platforms that enable citizens 
and civil society to influence public policies and 
legislation, and national social movements whose 
“ If the state cannot guarantee 
my safety I must do it 
myself, and the easiest way 
of doing that is getting a 
gun. This logic explains the 
recent emergence of the 
autodefensas [armed civilian 
groups or vigilantes] in some 
parts of the country.”
emergence has drawn national and international 
media attention and forced the government 
to start a dialogue with those affected by 
violence. As stated by an interviewee, “These 
movements have expressed their weariness of 
the government’s ineffectiveness, yet they are not 
asking for ‘iron fist’ policies that could generate 
more violence or abuses. They are asking for 
integral solutions.”
THe STaTe-civic PaRTneRSHiP 
Hugo almada
Hugo almada is the dean of the graduate program 
on Humanist Psychotherapy and Peace education 
of the autonomous university of ciudad Juárez. He 
is also a social activist and one of the members of 
the Mesa de Seguridad initiative, which originated in 
ciudad Juárez, chihuahua, which was classified as 
the most dangerous city in the world from 2008  
to 2010.10
THe civic MeDiaToR
Dolores González
Dolores González is a conflict resolution professional 
and human rights activist. She serves as the 
executive director of Services and advice for Peace 
(Servicios y asesoría para la Paz, or SeRaPaZ) an 
independent, non-profit Mexican organisation that 
provides services for the peaceful transformation of 
social conflicts. SeRaPaZ was founded to support 
the mediation work of the “comisión nacional de 
intermediación” a civil society initiative to find a 
peaceful solution to the armed rebellion of 1994  
in chiapas in southern Mexico.
The origins of the Mesa de Seguridad
This initiative emerged because of three different 
factors. The first one is the security crisis itself, 
which prompted the participation of different 
stakeholders: universities, nongovernmental 
organisations, and business groups. Second, several 
civil society efforts were already in place when the 
violence escalated, like the 'Citizen Observatory for 
Security' and the 'Juarenses for Peace Group', which 
were both groups of citizens that met regularly to 
discuss the security situation in the town. Finally, 
the third factor has to do with Calderón’s idea to 
invite civil society to participate in an initiative 
called Todos somos Juárez (We are all Juárez) to 
address the seven most urgent issues of the city, 
including insecurity and violence. The Mesa de 
Seguridad is the committee that was created within 
the Todos somos Juárez initiative to discuss issues 
regarding insecurity and violence and to identify 
solutions in a collaborative way.
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Beyond the discourse
The situation is quite dire. There are thousands 
of people killed in the context of the fight against 
drugs and crime. It is true that the discourse has 
changed, the new government no longer uses a 
war discourse, and it no longer refers to victims 
as ‘collateral damage.’ But we do not see a real 
change in the strategy to tackle crime. It is a 
paradox that the new government is putting in 
place a system to attend to the needs of victims, 
while nothing is being done to avoid additional 
victims.
During the past administration we counted over 
25,000 enforced disappearances. We do not 
have the official data for the first year of this 
new administration, but it is quite possible that 
the trend continues. Some institutions have been 
created, like the Specialised Unit for Missing 
Persons within the Attorney General’s Office. 
However, the Attorney General himself has 
recognised that they are overwhelmed by the 
number of cases and that his office does not have 
the capacity to respond. The situation for the 
families of victims continues to deteriorate.
emergence of the victims' movement 
Given this context, there have been many types of 
responses from society. One of the most notable 
has been the organisation and empowerment of 
victims. In the seventies, the families of victims 
of politically motivated enforced disappearances 
of the so-called ‘dirty war’ began to organise 
themselves. During the nineties other victims’ 
organisations and movements emerged, especially 
in northern Mexico due to the femicidesb in 
Ciudad Juárez and the increasing levels of 
enforced disappearances. 
One movement that has drawn a lot of national and 
international attention is the Movimiento por la Paz 
con Justicia y Dignidad (MPJD) a national victims’ 
movement started by Javier Sicilia – the Mexican 
poet whose son was murdered on March 28, 2011 
with six other people. He called for a national 
protest and denounced the results of the security 
strategy of Calderón. The movement made visible 
the unacceptable costs of the militarised strategy. 
Apart from giving a voice to victims and demanding 
the government to find disappeared persons, the 
MPJD has urged the government to change its 
militarised strategy to a more integral approach. 
The MPJD advocates a human security approach, 
with a special focus on prevention and public 
policies for youth: health, employment, education, 
etc. They have also asked for an improvement of 
the democratic institutions and practices in Mexico 
and the end of the monopoly over media outlets. 
So the movement is not only focused on victims, 
but on deep and meaningful transformation of the 
country.
b  Homicides of women began increasing in 1993 and grew to crisis 
proportions from 2006 to 2012. A report issued in 2012 by the Nobel 
Women’s Initiative documented “alarming increases in violence against 
women over the past years, with evidence of the negligence of governments 
in protecting its citizens and direct participation in acts of violence.” See 
http://nobelwomensinitiative.org 
leave the feelings of frustration and impotence 
behind and we took over the streets on our bikes 
to reclaim the public spaces. Those who saw us 
were amazed; they couldn’t believe that, given the 
violence and insecurity, a group of people could 
have fun, could be free of fear. Other groups 
and collectives approached us and we became 
Chihuahua en Bicicleta sin Miedo [Chihuahua on 
bikes without fear].”
Chihuahua en Bicicleta members believe that 
“organised crime feeds on fear and uncertainty 
from the people. We don’t want that, no one wants 
that. We want to change perceptions, to create a 
sense of respect for one another. We are those that 
share public spaces, those who greet a total stranger 
out of courtesy and sympathy just because he or 
she rides a bike, and those that act on conviction 
and use the bicycle as an instrument of change. The 
authorities’ response was to close their eyes, but we 
have figured out that it is only us, the citizens, who 
are in charge to solve the situation.” 
Reclaiming public spaces 
In the city of La Paz, the biking organisation 
BCSicletos, “has helped the state attorney’s office 
to implement a project called ‘pedaling for crime 
prevention,’ which promoted the use of bikes to 
recover the public space. This year we are carrying 
out several other projects, which include outdoor 
movie projections, theater, and storytelling.”
David, from Pueblo Bicicletero recounts, “Violence 
had a huge impact on groups promoting the use 
of bikes as a means of transportation because 
of the collective fear of violence. People opted 
to reduce biking at night, especially in zones 
considered ‘hot’ because of violence and crime 
levels. There were also changes in the type of 
routes taken to avoid areas where shootings were 
frequent. At Pueblo Bicicletero we are trying to 
promote peace and non-violence through civic 
participation. For us, the bike is an instrument for 
peace, for conviviality.”
In la Laguna region, Ruedas del Desierto (Wheels of 
the Desert) “started as a group of people whose 
main objective was to reclaim the public spaces 
through night tours on bikes. These tours had a 
lot of impact on the local media and they have 
contributed to overcome fear. Nowadays lots of 
people join us on each night tour. We are indeed 
reclaiming what’s ours: the public space, the streets, 
the parks.”
Achievements of the Dialogue Programme 
It has contributed to building trust relationships 
and capacities for dialogue and collaboration 
between actors with diverse perspectives and 
agendas. It also engaged government officials and 
legislators in a productive dialogue at a time of 
great social and political polarisation. I think it 
was a huge success just because of this. Another 
accomplishment was the establishment of an 
inclusive, coordinated, and effective coalition able 
to overcome differences and advocate for security 
and human rights issues. 
Some concrete proposals became legislation or public 
policy; for example, the General Law for the Social 
Prevention of Violence and Crime, the General Law 
on the Rights of Victim, and the executive decree to 
include five citizens as permanent members of the 
National Council of Public Security.
” It is a paradox that the new 
government is putting in 
place a system to attend to 
the needs of victims, while 
nothing is being done to 
avoid additional victims.”
emergence of the biking movement 
During the escalation of violence, according to a 
young activist in Monterrey, Nuevo León, “people 
felt really vulnerable; many stopped going out, they 
didn’t want to leave their homes.” In Chihuahua, 
another interviewee says, “Parks and public spaces 
that once were filled with kids were no longer 
safe. There were a growing number of victims 
of kidnappers. Violent car thefts were rampant; 
also, many restaurants were burned down. Cops 
colluded, and those who we once considered 
protectors were no longer of any help.” 
 “Our movement began about four years ago in 
this violent context. Despite it all, we decided to 
THe vicTiMS’ RiGHTS acTiviST
Ximena antillón is a psychologist working with 
victims of violence and human rights abuses, 
and a researcher at fundar: centro de análisis 
e investigación, one of Mexico’s leading think 
tanks. 
THe cYcLinG acTiviSTS
The following stories are from citizen groups based 
in northern Mexico. They are united in their aim to 
transform their cities into inclusive communities 
by promoting the use of bicycles and sustainable 
transportation systems, respecting life, equality, 
inclusion, and conviviality. 
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Recommendations 
 
▪  National and international organisations 
such as the UN should help build and 
strengthen an inclusive and pluralistic civil 
society in Mexico. Civil society has a key role 
in promoting a human security approach in 
both social and official initiatives. Civil society 
organisations help to strengthen the trust between 
various stakeholders and empower citizens 
and those affected by violence to participate in 
policymaking. Mexico’s civil society is smaller than 
that of other regions and needs greater support 
and capacity building.  
▪  Civil society organisations should promote 
pluralistic and inclusive spaces for multi-
stakeholder dialogue and the construction of 
agreements on violence reduction strategies 
and national security policies. It is vital to 
reinforce participation in productive multi-
stakeholder dialogues in order to create spaces 
for deliberation and coordination that foster 
information exchange, generate new proposals, 
and promote the development of collaborative 
advocacy strategies. The complexity of roots 
and causes of violence in the country cannot be 
engaged from a single perspective or discipline.
▪  The government must allow for NGO-
facilitated initiatives that engage citizens 
in monitoring authorities’ implementation 
of laws and policies. The government should 
be accountable to the people through oversight 
strategies such as publicised public opinion polling. 
This would help ensure laws and policies are 
implemented efficiently and transparently, as well 
as with respect for human rights. 
the enactment of the National Code on Criminal 
Procedures, an important instrument needed to 
enable the new criminal justice system.
It is important to note that these legislative 
and judicial reforms were widely promoted 
by social movements, experts and civil society 
organisations. Thus, civil society played a 
significant role in influencing public policy and 
promoting a more human approach to security 
challenges in Mexico. 
Continuing challenges
Although the new administration has made some 
progress, academics and civil society members 
continue to debate the depth of changes in the 
national security strategy. While victims’ movements 
have succeeded in getting the attention of the 
President, their impact on policy has been less 
evident, according to Ximena Antillón, “Thanks 
to the strength and international visibility of the 
movement, the government had to open a dialogue 
with the victims. During these dialogues, the 
President made a lot of promises; sadly, deep down 
nothing changed. It was just a media strategy from 
the presidency.” 
Continued human rights violations, the presence 
of violent criminal organisations, and rampant 
government corruption and impunity still threaten 
human security. One interviewee said, “There is 
no official strategy to tackle impunity, nor is there 
any serious commitment to bring to justice those 
responsible for the human rights abuses.” The 
security and law enforcement apparatus still has 
numerous deficiencies and lacks the trust of the 
population, while the military operates without 
proper civilian controls. The emergence of armed 
civilian groups in different parts of the country also 
represents a serious threat to human security. 
At an institutional level, experts believe that 
reforming the system of public security and 
criminal justice, to ‘restructure the public security 
institutions, transform the criminal proceedings 
and professionalise criminal defense’, is still one of 
the most important pending issues.16 Constitutional 
reforms in 2008 called for a transition of the justice 
system to an accusatorial system by 2016. Nearly six 
years later, constitutional reform still lags. Reforms 
to the public security system are also still pending, 
especially those concerning the police and the prison 
system. As long as this is the case, individual citizens, 
civil society and social movements will continue to 
seek to fill this gap – for better or for worse. 
participation are necessary for legitimate security 
policies because they promote resiliency and 
accountability. 
Since the federal administration changed in 2000, 
several key institutions have been reformed. Those 
reforms intended to promote a more democratic 
and transparent regime capable of decreasing 
impunity. President Calderón’s administration made 
significant institutional changes to reduce violence. 
In 2008 the Constitution was reformed, deeply 
changing the criminal procedures and courts in 
order to promote a greater access to justice, the 
presumption of innocence, and the respect of 
human rights.14 In 2011, a constitutional reform 
on human rights was approved, which recognised 
the pro homine principle, and the preeminence of 
international treaties on human rights.c
In 2012, President Peña Nieto announced 
a new security strategy, summarised in the 
‘National Development Plan 2013-2018’ and the 
government-opposition ‘Pact for Mexico’. Among 
the government’s new priorities are strengthening 
the legal framework on the rights of victims, 
implementing changes in the new criminal justice 
system, launching a new model of public security 
and law enforcement to create greater capacities for 
investigating and prosecuting offenses, and creating 
a National Program for Crime and Violence 
Prevention.15
Experts and civil society interviewees highlight 
some key achievements of the first year of the 
new administration and the sessions of the Federal 
Congress in 2013. As an interviewee stated, “the 
new government’s discourse is a little bit more 
open concerning human rights. Some measures 
have been taken. For example, thanks to social 
pressure the new government published the 
Law on the Rights of Victimsd and appointed a 
Federal Prosecutor for Enforced Disappearances.” 
Another example mentioned by interviewees is 
c  The pro homine principle emphasises providing broad as opposed to 
limited protections for individuals and human rights. The presumption of 
innocence requires the state to prove defendants are guilty in court. The 
constitutional reform also requires the Mexican government to abide by 
international treaties on human rights.
d  The General Law on the Rights of Victims was approved by chambers 
of Congress in April 2012. After the general elections, the President sent 
observations to the text approved by Congress, delaying the enactment of 
the law; however, Congress considered that the period to send observations 
had expired and ordered the law’s publication. The President filed a lawsuit 
in the Supreme Court. The enactment of the law remained uncertain during 
the lawsuit, until the new President, Enrique Peña, withdrew the lawsuit.
Impunity is a key challenge to building a peaceful 
social environment and trust in public institutions. 
For example, the public prosecutor agencies solve 
only 13 percent of the preliminary investigations 
initiated.11 In 2011, less than 20 percent of 
reported murders were solved.12 The failure of 
the state to enforce the rule of the law generates 
even more illegal behaviors. As one interviewed 
community member said, “impunity is an incentive 
to act outside the law.” De facto powers, both 
criminal and official, that act above the law, 
further weaken the ability of institutions to deter 
crime. Impunity is closely related to concerns 
about corruption and the lack of transparency 
and accountability. Interviewees from different 
sectors agree that corruption is rampant in all 
levels of government. In a vicious circle, corruption 
and impunity feed crime and empowers de 
facto powers, all of which weaken government 
institutions. 
These failures of the state to guarantee human 
security and human rights impact public 
confidence in government institutions. According 
to México Evalúa, one of Mexico’s leading 
think tanks, the rate of non-reported crimes has 
increased in recent years. In 2004, it was 80 
percent and in 2007 it increased to 87 percent; 
and in 2010 it reached 92 percent. Two out of 
three people have little or no confidence in the 
police. Only 10 percent of respondents said they 
were very confident in the public prosecutors.13 
This shows growing public mistrust of the 
institutions responsible for providing security  
and justice.
openings in government reforms
The human security approach expands people’s 
capabilities and freedom of development. From 
this perspective, it is necessary that institutions 
and public policies protect the security of all 
persons through the rule of law and human rights. 
Human security also emphasises the importance 
of empowering citizens. Democracy and citizen 
as the perspectives here demonstrate, many citizens view impunity, 
corruption, the presence of de facto powers outside the law, and 
human rights violations as the main obstacles to improving human 
security in Mexico. from a ‘top down’ perspective, institutions, 
procedures, and rules face several challenges in adequately 
protecting citizens from threats to their safety.
Conclusion  
and recommendations 
The authors work for the Centro de 
Colaboración Cívica (CCC), is a non-partisan, 
non-profit civil society organisation that aims to 
promote a culture for dialogue, collaboration, 
and peaceful resolution of conflicts and to 
enable processes that strengthen democracy, 
sustainable development, and the rule of law in 
Mexico. ccc is a member of the north america 
network of the Global Partnership for the 
Prevention of armed conflict (GPPac) and of 
Partners for Democratic change international. 
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Located in the southern region of the Philippines, Mindanao has been the site of 
armed conflict for decades, if not centuries. Complex patterns of conflict as well 
as attempts at fostering peaceful coexistence have evolved among and between 
Mindanao’s ‘tri-people’: the native indigenous peoples (IPs), the Islamic 'Moro' 
communities, and the predominantly Christian Filipino settlers from other regions. 
Against the backdrop of an internationally acclaimed peace process, this chapter 
presents the reflections of experienced civil society and indigenous leaders on the 
efforts to bring human security to Mindanao and its diverse peoples.
 Tri-people 
Voices on  
Human Security 
in Mindanao
Raul Antonio A. Torralba, Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) 
” We now see that peace does not 
come from high above, but from 
within ourselves.” 
PEOPLE KILLED IN 
MINDANAO CONFLICT 
ESTIMATED DISPLACED PEOPLE  
100-150
THOUSAND   
(PLOUGHSHARES 2014)
2 MILLION
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(PLOUGHSHARES 2014)
PRIMARY SCHOOL 
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IN 2012 
(WORLD BANK 2014B)
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PhiliPPines
the Philippines is a 7,100 island archipelago in southeast Asia 
with an estimated population of 100 million. Its population 
is made up of diverse ethno-linguistic groupings of primarily 
 Indo-Malay and sino origins. Its colonial past under spanish and 
American influences gave birth to the prevailing socio-cultural, 
political and economic dynamics today. 
Historically serving as a trading hub between 
Asia, Europe and later the Americas, the country 
is divided into three geographical regions. The 
northern and central Luzon region is home to 
the capital, Manila, and is the site of the country’s 
industrial production. The island-filled mid-
archipelago region of the Visayas is dominated 
by agricultural production and trade, while the 
southern Mindanao region remains the frontier of 
the country, with resources and territories opened 
for exploitation and development as late as the 
1950s. A government-sponsored resettlement 
programme that in part sought to open the south to 
resource development for the industrialising north 
brought a wave of settler migration. 
Coupled with the government’s pacification efforts 
through resettlement, this contributed to much 
of the insecurity in the Mindanao region which 
prevails today. 
History of conflict, subjugation and insecurity
Before the arrival of European explorers in the 
1500s, the Philippine islands already hosted an 
indigenous population that shared a common 
tribal ancestry, gathered under different groupings 
and clans. Intertribal wars and conflicts were 
part of tribal life along with traditional peace 
and brotherhood agreements celebrated with 
ceremonies, offerings, and celebrations. Islamic 
missionaries passing via the southern corridors 
of Malaysia provided the toehold for the Islamic 
faith in the islands, and some Indigenous Peoples 
(IP) tribes converted. With the opening of the 
southern corridor, slavery became an economic 
opportunity for Islamised traders and their 
communities, spurring attacks on non-Islamised 
IPs for captives. Conversion to Islam was at times 
enforced on captive IPs, though more peaceful 
attempts at harmony and co-existence, based on 
acknowledgment of the ancestral links between 
Islamised and non-Islamised IPs, also remained in 
collective memory. This was the norm and way of 
NPA experienced a similar ideological splintering, 
which diminished its support base. The Mindanao 
region remained a theatre of dissident operations, 
split among the NPA in the northeast sections of 
the island, the MILF in the south-central region, 
and the MNLF in the southwestern peninsula of 
Zamboanga down to the southern island provinces 
closest to Malaysia. 
It is estimated that the Moro conflict has cost the 
government at least 100 billion pesos (US $2.3m) 
since 1970. It has claimed the lives of more than 
100,000 people and displaced over 2 million, some 
repeatedly.3 Meanwhile, decades of violent conflict 
have also undermined economic development 
and left millions in poverty. The lack of economic 
opportunity and legal protection for women 
and children has spawned widespread human 
trafficking. Despite the constant state of insecurity 
brought by conflict, the region’s oppressed 
populations exhibit an admirable level of resiliency 
and perseverance.
 
A promise as yet unfulfilled
In 1986, the People Power-EDSA Revolutiona  
toppled the Marcos dictatorship in a near-bloodless, 
civilian-led uprising. The newly established 
democracy led by President Corazon C. Aquino 
enshrined its vision for the future in a revised 1987 
national constitution that sought to ensure greater 
freedoms, representation and parity for all. It 
provided openings for greater civil participation in 
governance, enhanced guarantees for human rights 
and dignity, and recognised a national identity. 
In an eventual peace deal with the MNLF, it also 
established the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) as an acknowledgment of 
Muslim Mindanao’s desire for self-governance.
However, more than a quarter century since, 
the Philippines has yet to consistently and 
comprehensively live up to the spirit and intent of 
this landmark agreement. Entering the millennia, 
the country has had a second president overthrown, 
a former president investigated and arrested for 
plunder, its electoral process cast into doubt, a chief 
justice impeached and its legislature embroiled in 
corruption and financial scandals. 
On the other hand, this history of repression and 
resistance generated strong popular advocacy 
a   The revolution is named for the main thoroughfare in Manila, the 
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, or EDSA, which was the site of the main 
protests that ended the Marcos regime.
and a rich civil society, which has nurtured 
Mindanao’s tri-people perspective, advocating 
equal rights and respect for settlers, the Moros, 
and IPs. Furthermore, the country has high hopes 
for the end to a 16-year peace negotiation process 
between the Philippine government and the 
MILF, which seeks comprehensive and equitable 
resolutions to key issues.4 The peace process has 
led to the ongoing drafting of the Bangsamoro 
Basic Law (BBL), which aims to describe a vision, 
identity and formation process for the proposed 
Moro homeland, to be known as the Bangsamoro. 
The Bangsamoro would supplant the ARMM 
and be enabled with greater socio-economic 
and political powers than any of the previous 
frameworks. A plebiscite will be held in the 
region to ratify the BBL once it is passed through 
Congress.
While it is hoped that the development of the 
BBL will address many of the demands for greater 
self-governance and autonomy of the Moros, many 
feel that it does not comprehensively address 
the concerns of IPs in the proposed Bangsamoro 
territory, most of whom allege to have been largely 
excluded from the peace process. As a result, IPs 
fear that they will continue to face displacement, 
killings, and the subversion of their rights to their 
ancestral domains and lands. 
life for many of the island’s inhabitants until the first 
wave of European colonisers. 
Beginning in the 1500s and continuing for over 
300 years, the Spanish Catholic colonisers carried 
out multiple pacification campaigns on the Muslim 
“Moros” of Mindanao, then a pejorative term they 
used mainly for the Islamised tribes they found in 
the south, who they perceived as savages. After 
the Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War 
of 1898, U.S. forces assumed forced control of the 
islands, committing massacres and displacing the 
population in the south. These historical injustices 
form part of the Moro people’s long-simmering 
resentment toward the colonisers and eventually 
the Philippine government, which is perceived to 
continue similar policies. 
From the 1970s through to the mid-1980s, martial 
law under President Ferdinand Marcos fuelled 
repression in the region. Desaparecidos, or those 
forcibly ‘disappeared,’ numbered in the thousands. 
Practices such as the introduction of a ‘low intensity 
conflict’ pacification strategy, which the Philippine 
military patterned after the U.S. military campaign 
in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, rendered rural 
villages ghost towns, turned communities and 
neighbors against each other and wrought havoc 
on the area’s simple economies and socio-political 
systems.1 Local grievances were further fuelled by 
perennial conflicts between business conglomerates 
expanding their access and control over the region’s 
rich resources and the rural populations already 
living there.
Intensifying repression and human rights violations 
perpetrated under martial law gave rise to 
secessionist and separatist movements. To this day, 
these movements continue to pursue their causes 
in armed struggle. Two of these armed movements, 
the Communist Party of the Philippine’s-led New 
People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), were established more 
than forty years ago. At its peak during the martial 
law years, the MNLF claimed a force of 45,000 
armed men, while the NPA claimed a number close 
to half that.2 
The two armed movements outlived the Marcos 
regime, but eventually splintered due to internal 
divisions. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF), an offshoot from the MNLF, declared itself 
a fundamentalist Islamist movement fighting for 
‘Bangsamoro’ (Moro Homeland) independence. The 
This history of repression  
and resistance generated 
strong popular advocacy and 
a rich civil society .
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Three Mindanao Perspectives 
on Human Security
of Moro and IP territorial claims over Muslim 
Mindanao. The proposed plebiscite on the 
Bangsamoro – to ratify the BBL after it is passed 
in Congress – is an opportunity for both sides to 
decide on the final delineation of the Bangsamoro, 
and whether a joining of the people will take place. 
At the same time, it shows us that we are all living 
in the same house. The history and changing of it is 
now in our hands.
Traditional conflict resolution and governance
We found value and merit in community 
mechanisms like having a council of elders, where 
we are all linked by a common tradition and history, 
working together to resolve conflicts peacefully. 
We advocated joining these together into common 
mechanisms, and now into common support for the 
peace process through joint statements. 
With the revival of traditional methods of conflict 
resolution, the cases of violence have dropped. 
We are now lobbying for barangay officials of the 
Local Government Units (LGUs) to recognise the 
councils that have proven themselves capable so 
they can become part of local governance systems 
and structures. 
By emplacing simpler and accessible systems we 
actually show that there is no need for complicated 
and diverse structures or mechanisms. 
We’ve also realised that frameworks introduced 
from the outside usually don’t work, since conflicts 
and realities are context-specific and localised. 
The respect for culture, traditions and beliefs, 
particularly for community people, should be 
observed, as this has time and again proven to be 
effective.
Transitioning towards peace
To accomplish normalisation, it is necessary to 
attain peace. Many of us now have to prepare 
ourselves to shift from MNLF-MILF combatant 
status to civilian or even peace advocate. We must 
move from foe to brother, from intolerance to 
tolerance. It will take a long and phased approach 
to reintegrate all of us back into community life as 
equal civilians.
After having been conditioned over the past 40, 
and even 500 years of constant armed conflict, 
there is a need for substantial social transformation, 
as well as personal transformation and maturation, 
to lead us all back to a peaceful and normal life. 
There is a need for a sustained effort both by the 
government and the rest of us, to recondition and 
disabuse those who have been exposed to constant 
conflict. We need to ensure this shift, from the 
current abnormal being seen as normal, to a truly 
normal and peaceful situation.
Fully realising human security
Our sense for human security was markedly 
awakened under martial law. Now there is this 
push for normalisation, towards peace of mind 
and domicile becoming part of the Bangsamoro 
life. Resolving this requires a massive five to ten 
year transformation and education campaign, 
supported by the consistent application of justice 
by the government. Rido is fed by the lack of justice 
delivery by the prevailing system. It is the weakness 
of the current government that prolongs insecurity 
that in turn fosters violence.
 
The challenge for now is that honouring human 
security principles will be difficult with people 
hardened by a long history of conflict. From the 
immediate armed response provided by rido, 
we now have to shift its adherents to a more 
legalised and structured justice response, which 
also requires capable government structures. Such 
changes will not be attained in the blink of an eye. 
On our end, what we have started is the process 
of people coming together and talking, particularly 
at community levels. In over ten years of work, the 
communities have now reached the point where 
they don’t need us to monitor them. The work 
is now seen more as a community responsibility. 
They’ve reached maturation, allowing them to 
become empowered through our facilitation. We 
now see that peace does not come from high 
above, but from within ourselves. We must leave 
the final resolution with the people.  
The consultations we have done across the 11 
barangays (villages), the smallest units of local 
governance, have shown that the government may 
also perpetuate conflicts. In its drive to counter 
the Moro insurrection, the military has been 
known to arm settlers and IPs as paramilitary 
forces in Moro territory. With the state’s apparent 
stamp of approval, paramilitary forces such 
as the Barangay Self Defense Units continued 
human rights violations and helped perpetuate 
the conflict between peoples. This has caused 
bad relationships to fester and propagated the 
conflict for decades. When strategic MILF and 
IP areas have overlapped and escalated, pulling 
in the MILF and government forces, these small 
clashes oftentimes turned into ideological conflicts 
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 
the Moro fronts. 
identity and rediscovering bonds 
Even now, there is a continuing debate on the 
perceived problem of identity. Is there a clear 
definition of the ‘Moro’? In defining the Moro, do 
we go with the 13 ethno-linguistic groups where, 
historically, even IPs participated in the conflict 
against the Spaniards, earning them the moniker 
of ‘Moro’ as well? Through time, the definition of 
Moro as Islamised has become divisive. 
The core to resolving these conflicts has been 
the common roots we share. Despite some of us 
having been Islamised, we stress the common IP 
roots and blood we all shared at some point in our 
common history. The Dyandi kinship reaffirmation 
ceremony we have been working towards is a 
traditional renewal of relationships between major 
groupings of IPs in Mindanao, both Islamised and 
non-Islamised, who trace their lineage to a common 
Manobo ancestry. Through consultations, summits 
and ceremonies with key leaders, this effort has 
established 11 peace covenants with the various 
tribes and government units in the conflict-affected 
areas of Muslim Mindanao. This has helped resolve 
festering feuds and provided a mechanism for 
resolving disputes. 
It was primarily with colonisation that our 
differences and the sense of separateness 
between our tribes became emphasised. Now, 
the Bangsamoro must try to involve and include 
the non-Islamised to stop the cycle of conflict and 
violence that has split us apart. The reality of our 
common bond is clearly seen in the patchwork 
tHe Moro PeACebuILder 
Ismael G. Kulat 
” We must leave  
the final resolution  
with the people .” 
” The core to resolving 
these conflicts has 
been the common 
roots we share .” 
Ismael “Mike” G. Kulat was a self-described child combatant 
during the early years of the MnLF and later of the MILF. He 
became a peace advocate and works with various nongovernmental 
organisations (nGos) and community-based organisations (Cbos). 
He is currently the Administration officer of the Consortium of 
bangsamoro Civil society (CbCs), the largest network of Moro 
Csos engaged in peace and development in the bangsamoro. one 
of CbCs’s flagship efforts over the last decade is their kinship 
reaffirmation project that seeks to end clan war between and among 
Moro and IP communities through rekindling and strengthening lost 
and fragmented ties with the Moro’s non-Islamised ‘brothers.’
living with intertribal violence 
The culture of war has been our norm. You could 
say that over the past forty years, our normal 
life has actually been quite abnormal, with guns 
always an option for settling conflicts. So the Moro 
rido (clan war) response prevails; it has become 
the quickest and accepted response to perceived 
wrongs and injustice. 
But the notion of ridos as exclusively localised also 
needs to be corrected. True ridos are sudden and 
short-term in nature. A long-running rido would 
require a stable support base, which makes it likely 
that there are backers to these pseudo-wars, usually 
either politicians or as part of the pacification efforts 
of the government. 
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When forced to make a choice, those in power 
will likely follow the mainstream process of 
implementation such as the Local Government 
Code, rather than the traditional structure and 
mechanisms allowed for by the IPRA. All this 
prevails because higher politics dictates this 
arrangement. Again, IPs are made powerless 
because of the uneven application of the law. 
“like logs floating in the sea” 
We are not secured by our government. Even 
with the international declaration of IP rights, the 
national declaration of such rights or laws and 
their regional promulgations, all of these are just 
recognition and declarations. In reality, there is no 
actual implementation in our areas. 
We are not secured in many aspects of our lives, 
such as our sustainable development, which has 
no support, and our ancestral domain, another 
issue that remains floating. We feel we are like logs 
floating in the sea, visible to all but unable to anchor 
ourselves onshore. 
The bottom line here is that the state can’t protect 
our people. In fact, when we asserted our rights to 
the local authorities, we actually experienced more 
attacks on IPs as a result. By declaring our stand, we 
became targets of other vested groups who saw our 
legal claims as a threat to their own interests.
IPs are under constant pressures from the outside 
and we are often forced to make impossible choices 
that split communities apart, forcing some to fight 
back with arms, or others to pursue legal means. Yet 
guns need bullets. The legal system is pro-rich – you 
need to pay for every action. More often, the IPs last 
choice is to flee conflict. In our case for now, we still 
prefer setting up a new community, our “safe zone” 
where we can have peace, rather than fighting. In 
these instances, it is the women’s negotiating skills 
that are brought into play. 
IPs don’t have a clear or accessible method of 
documenting their histories and experiences 
other than their traditional ways of oral recall. 
We have realised that we need to document the 
incidents we’ve endured, and we need a clear and 
defined mechanism for reporting such violations 
that guarantees action. The judicial courts have 
jurisdiction over such acts, but historically for IPs 
these have moved so slow that witnesses have died 
waiting to testify or for filed cases to move forward.
Cultural respect and external intervention
NGOs who help and introduce technologies, 
such as using chemicals or varieties new to the 
area, need to gauge their impact on traditional 
practices. Non-IP organisers organise along non-
tribal lines, like forming umbrella organisations 
entrusted to speak for all the clans within a given 
territory. This runs counter to the ancestral domain 
principle, which recognises the clan rather than the 
organisation. These organisers sometimes insist on 
their methods, consolidating power among a few 
instead of collectively. Such organisations might 
ask IPs to join political rallies and burn flags and 
effigies, but do not address IPs’ own right to self-
determination, nor help IPs reclaim lost territories 
or reestablish traditional plant varieties as an 
assertion of IP identity and territory.
To strengthen the tribes, you have to strengthen 
the basic units, the clans. The common territory is 
what the tribes build their alliances on, their basis 
of strength, as well as the basis on which they make 
their decisions. In any situation with IPs, it is best 
to be consultative rather than rushing in with offers 
of resources, services and whatnot. Otherwise, 
you will be taken advantage of for your mistake, 
and your efforts won’t garner you any respect or 
support. You must consult the leaders and honour 
what they say.
The indigenous People’s Rights Act (iPRA)  
and governance
We were amongst the first to push for the 
institutionalisation of IP governance. The 1997 
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) itself was 
drafted and passed as the mechanism to reconcile 
the social injustices of the past, as well as dealing 
with IP matters and their territory. IPRA is about 
governance, a smaller government run along IP 
lines, similar to what the Bangsamoro desires. As 
such, it has as much right to be implemented for IPs 
as the BBL that is envisioned for the Bangsamoro. 
The government has basically surrendered IP rights 
to the Bangsamoro, or its precursor, the ARMM 
through 16 years of non-enforcement of the IPRA 
within the ARMM. There was no political will or 
mechanism. This is a clear case of abandonment. 
In the IP areas, governance is very fragmented. You 
can have as many as three local governance units 
functioning in parallel: the official one run by the 
government, another by the NPA, and the third 
as asserted by the IPs through their right to self-
determination. 
us. Human security is comprehensive and it is a 
given right to us as well as an obligation. I give it 
and I expect it at the same time. What we IPs are 
basically saying is that in the same way that all 
things are interconnected, anything you demand or 
any privilege you ask for requires a corresponding 
obligation on your part.
In tribal history or lore, there are lineages that are 
historically blessed with leadership. In the areas 
where the traditional leaders still prosper, there 
is a capacity to relate the traditional ways and 
means to current realities. For example, there are 
traditional folk leaders, who also serve as very good 
church leaders, and they perform these tasks with 
equal respect for both sides. They also help in a 
rediscovery of the traditional ways, or at least show 
the merit in these practices and beliefs.
In our culture, the highest women leaders are 
the ones we call Bae. They have authority in the 
community that even men must respect. Women 
play an important role as culture-bearers, nurturers 
of peace and the essential cultural elements of a 
tribe. With the absence of security, stresses that 
affect women ultimately have a negative effect 
on almost all aspects of IP life such as continuing 
education, on traditional cultural practices and on 
the life rhythms of the communities overall. 
‘Pretender’ Datus picked to represent IP 
communities by the NPA, the mayors, governors 
and politicians do not last because their lineage 
does not have the required blessing from the 
Magbabaya or Creator, a God-given blessing granted 
to their lineage and ancestry. Communities will not 
fully support someone like this. Political actors find 
it difficult to penetrate and sustain their call among 
the IPs, as they basically deny the spiritual aspects 
important to the IP way of life. 
Threats to identity, challenges to security
Nowadays, traditional beliefs, our interconnectedness, 
our need to care and share as a result, are no 
longer honoured. This leads to insecurity for many. 
The trend is more to acquire and exploit without 
responsibility or accountability. Many have forgotten 
that human security, particularly for IPs, emphasises 
that all is interconnected.
The strongest of forces now dominating this 
discussion is driven by the need to secure economic 
rights. Historically, IPs survived and prospered in a 
non-cash economy. But they failed in dealing with 
the introduction of a cash-based economic system, 
where what had been interconnected was reduced 
to commodities and their value pegged in cash. 
Caught in the middle
It would be fair to say that IPs have reached the end 
of their patience, or their boiling point. They feel 
anybody can take advantage of them with impunity. 
How can IPs feel secure when they are the ones 
being killed in their own territory because of the 
struggle of forces they are not part of? The army 
and guerillas were accepted as guests, yet wound up 
killing and marginalising their hosts. 
In a 2010 meeting of some 17 IP leaders and 
organisers, we noted the number of IP leaders and 
key persons killed since the 1997 promulgation 
between the government and the NPA [meant 
to ensure adherence to human rights principles 
and international humanitarian laws, and protect 
civilians during the conflict]. By our count, we 
tallied more than 500 individuals killed from 1997 
to 2010. These killings were purportedly done by 
military forces, the NPA as well as unidentified 
killers, and for various reasons.  
Ironically, as many as 70 percent of the NPA in our 
territories are IPs, and 80 percent of those were 
recruited from the youth. Why? Because they never 
had the opportunity to go to school. These conflicts 
are just reflections of these realities and the lack 
of attention given to root causes. To establish our 
security, we need to be educated – in our culture, 
in our rights, in our identity. But the reality now 
is that there is little access to that education. Who 
should provide it for us? 
Traditional spirituality and leadership
Among lumads or IPs, we treat all things as 
interconnected; nothing exists on its own. Our 
history, our territories and the land interconnect 
” IPs are under constant 
pressures from the outside 
and we are often forced to 
make impossible choices that 
split communities apart.” 
A tAPestry oF IP VoICes
the text below is a synthesis of the viewpoints of many IP leaders, 
including traditional leaders such as datus, (IP leaders) and bae, 
(traditional women leaders), who wish to remain anonymous for 
safety reasons. It includes perspectives from such people as C. b., 
an IP woman in her forties working as a volunteer organiser in the 
hinterland communities of various IPs. Her work brings her in contact 
with IP realities and issues from poverty, hunger, land-grabbing and 
conversion, to illegal resource extraction, counter-insurgency and 
arbitrary killings. While staying true to their words, the narrative below 
paints a composite picture of the complexities facing IP communities.
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Local Government Unit at the lowest levels. 
Many of our population have no access to the law, 
another factor for insecurity. People will be more 
willing to defend their environment, their livelihood 
sources, even their homeland if they know what 
they can legally do. This situation provides another 
venue to educate the people, learn about laws, legal 
options, securing necessary writs and orders. It 
teaches people how to go up against the rich even 
in the big and developed countries. It teaches them 
about their legal options and the mechanisms they 
can use to protect themselves through legal writs, 
injunctions and orders. 
Even now, I continue to look at all factors causing 
or impacting poverty. I see the value of education 
such as family development sessions. They have led 
to better discipline, and taught members the value 
of education, health, family and children. I have 
learned that people begin to address value issues 
only after they are able to establish a more stable 
way of life with less insecurity.
looking to the future
I think we all need to rethink globally the issues 
that require global intervention. Some things can 
be addressed locally, but other dimensions, like 
trafficking in persons, require all our attention. 
There must be a strengthening of our global-wide 
response mechanisms to address unfair global trade 
rules for example, which in turn affect other issues. 
We must begin to discuss how the global dynamics 
are influenced by various forces, and in so being 
become unfair to the rest of us.
I find it ironic that some countries that come across 
as rich and abusive on the one hand, continue to 
provide development aid on the other. We have 
donors who are strong on gender here, but in 
their home country there are mining concerns 
that exploit women as well as communities. 
Despite this, we still need to engage them; our 
intent is to challenge them on their inconsistency. 
Overall, we must realise that issues like trafficking 
themselves are not solved by simply removing the 
trafficker. There are many connected points as to 
vulnerabilities and insecurities of the people. It is 
our responsibility to expose and link these.
point of awareness wherein they were raising issues 
on sexist language, work hours and the like, within 
the legislative branch. 
Our legislative work also prepared us to work even 
with the opposition. The practical benefit of linking 
with the opposition is a smoother process. By 
having them informed on the issues and processes, 
we got a better grasp of the questions they’d raise, 
and where they were coming from. Such work 
emphasised the need to always be consultative 
and meet with people and allow them to make the 
decision themselves.
Public participation and empowerment
Ultimately, people should be involved in the 
solution. They should know the dimensions of their 
situation and enabled to act for themselves. The 
purpose is not to make them angry but to seek and 
develop solutions to the issues. We saw the need 
to demystify the lawmaking process to the people 
and educate them. We had the people attending 
sessions and consultations and showing them the 
details that were important.
In our legislative advocacy we made use of 
other methods of educating people, such as the 
audio-visual presentation entitled ‘WE ARE SO 
SYNDICATED’, a video tape used to educate and 
raise general consciousness on women trafficking 
overall. Such innovative processes, for those times, 
helped spark initiatives to address these issues on a 
larger scale, and educated a wider audience. Such 
efforts stressed the importance of involving the 
insecurity we continue to feel about society overall. 
There is too great a push to ‘unrich the rich,’ for 
society to take back some of the excess they now 
have; instead there should be a greater effort to 
‘unpoor’ the poor, to concentrate more on uplifting 
them from their present condition. 
I am also frustrated with the military protecting 
vested interests like businesses, particularly in the 
remote areas. But I am supportive of the ongoing 
efforts with security sector reform. We can see 
some results of this, but the fear of the military 
remains dominant. There is still a distance between 
security forces and the people. Ideally in a secure 
society, there should be no need for any marked 
police or military presence.
lessons in anti-trafficking and gender advocacy 
Some of the insecurities we women had long 
faced were addressed through legal reform. We 
learned how difficult it was to work with the 
male-dominated legislature. The need for closer 
networking with like-minded NGOs became more 
pronounced. So I also got involved in organising 
NGO/CSO networks, both local and national. 
As long as our work was guided by our coalition 
work, we persevered, even if it was a difficult 
struggle. 
Aside from legislative work, we needed lobbying 
to get support in solving the insecurities we 
addressed. We lobbied and advocated and won 
victories by having sexual harassment declared a 
crime. We also undertook the further detailing 
of Violence Against Women (VAW) laws, 
lessening the opportunity for the male-dominated 
judiciary to interpret these details by themselves. 
We basically made clear to them what the key 
definitions, issues and roles concerning women 
were.  
Even within Congress, we began with defining 
a common understanding of trafficking when 
we worked on drafting and passing the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act. We organised gender and 
development committees. We involved the rank 
and file of the House, to check and monitor the 
mainstreaming of gender concerns in legislation and 
even the processes within the legislature.  
These internal groupings and mechanisms became 
the driving forces within the committees and 
the House. In a microcosm of organising, we 
strengthened these groups until they knew the 
issue, they were educated and finally reached the 
interconnected insecurities
Through my work [as an advocate and 
Congresswoman], I have begun seeing the factors 
affecting society, the many dimensions of true 
poverty. Many of my old assumptions about 
poverty changed. I began to learn more about the 
root causes of poverty in the Philippines. People 
had no education, many were marginalised, and the 
two were interconnected. Through the work I got 
to see how these realities were affected by political 
decisions, even global trends. All were connected 
with the various processes and systems, even the 
business world. There were connections to these 
sources of insecurities. 
Poverty is a manifestation of the complex problems 
faced by the poor. Then, once poor, they spawn 
more problems that manifest in further social ills. 
This population has no access to opportunities 
or any enabling mechanisms with which to 
change their fate. The poor will continue to have 
more children, building pressure on our social 
infrastructure. This perpetuates the imbalance and 
Andrea Maria Patricia “Pat” M. sarenas prefers to be described 
as a retired grandmother who remains involved and noisy with 
her advocacy. “Pat” as she is simply known was a party list 
Congresswoman for the 11th and 12th Congress from 1998 to 
2004. she continues to sit as Chair of the Philippine national 
nGo platform, the Caucus of development nGo networks 
(Code-nGo), and the Mindanao Coalition of development 
networks (MInCode). she is the only party list representative 
who championed the passage of three landmark laws in Congress 
covering the trafficking of persons, violence against women and 
children and support for single parents.
” Many of my old 
assumptions about 
poverty changed .”
” I find it ironic that 
some countries that 
come across as 
rich and abusive 
on the one hand, 
continue to provide 
development aid on 
the other.” 
tHe AdVoCAte
Andrea Maria Patricia M. sarenas
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▪  Push the call for federalism. Ensure that this 
call sustains the identity and recognition of IPs 
under the law. This initiative can make use of 
the IPRA because this is already a nationally and 
internationally recognised law and ratified for full 
implementation.   
▪  Utilise the United Nations’ recognition of the 
universal rights of IPs that in turn acknowledges 
how IPs predate Christianity and Islam. Given 
that the Philippines is a signatory to the UN 
declaration on IP rights and has promulgated the 
IPRA, this can be used to bolster the IP position for 
recognition. 
▪  The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples 
(NCIP) should take up the cause for IPs and ensure 
their best interests are protected at every level 
of the negotiations and preparation towards the 
establishment of the Bangsamoro. 
▪  The integration of the IPRA provisions into 
the BBL should be ensured. It may be easier to 
incorporate the IPRA law into the BBL rather than 
the BBL developing its own expression of its IPRA 
elements. IPRA is already a law whereas the BBL 
will still need to go through the legislative process. 
▪  Proponents may pursue recognition of certificates 
of ancestral domain titles of IPs within the BBL as 
well as the proposed territory. Proponents could 
file a mandatory injunction with the Supreme 
Court calling for the full implementation of the 
IPRA, national and international laws pertaining to 
IP rights, including domain, territory and identity, 
before the BBL is ratified.
▪  As a fallback, efforts should ensure that the 
BBL provisions for equal rights applies to all, 
particularly those who have expressed their desire 
to not be a part of the Bangsamoro territory.
▪  Engage the younger generation. Help youth 
to develop their advocacy for shared as well as 
emerging issues. Utilise appropriate media – micro, 
mass, social – to engage and inform them. Aim for 
goals that span generations, not just years. 
▪  Develop comprehensive, globally oriented and 
forward-looking advocacy programs. Advocacy 
programs must emphasise the interconnected 
nature of human security concerns and engage 
the global dimension of issues such as human 
trafficking and economic parity. 
On government engagement
▪  Guarantee and deliver essential rights, services 
and entitlements, and consistently pursue a 
foreign policy based on beneficial support and 
development rather than competitive advantage. 
Government consistency and constancy to these 
tenets allows communities to realise their growth 
and development potentials more fully. 
▪  Rationalise and harmonise legislation and 
policy. Consistency and coherence of socio-
economic-political agendas is necessary to ensure 
no overlap or marginalisation of interests. Legal 
instruments such as laws, orders and promulgations 
need to be rationalised and made consistent with 
other laws. This reduces occasions of conflict and 
insecurity due to varying or conflicting levels of 
appreciation and interpretation of such laws. 
▪  Ensure transparency of policymaking through 
representative participation and multi-
stakeholder engagement. By building trust-based 
relationships and engaging a broad spectrum 
and number of stakeholders, there is a greater 
appreciation of the message and less doubts about 
its desired outcomes. Reducing suspicions and 
doubts through transparency encourages greater 
participation and involvement.
Recommendations from Datus on iPs and the 
Ongoing Peace Process 
Our most pressing security issue as IPs is how 
our territories will be administered as part of the 
identified Bangsamoro territory. This has ramifications 
for our identity, our governance, our territory and our 
opportunity to develop as a distinct people.
There are several actions that we might take to 
ensure that IP interests are safeguarded in the 
Bangsamoro delineation processes. We have several 
recommendations to make this happen:
communities appreciate mechanisms that they 
themselves engage, understand, and are linked to 
existing or traditional practices. Such mechanisms are 
effective and convey respect for local communities.
Recommendations
On engaging traditional communities
▪  Prioritise traditional and community-based 
practices, such as traditional governance 
mechanisms, which promote human security as 
effective solutions. The best-crafted laws must fit 
the local context. Include affected communities 
as a critical partner in the implementation 
mechanisms crafted. Communitarian processes 
and decision-making, oftentimes based on 
traditional and/or existing practices, continue 
to resonate strongly with local communities, in 
turn making their adoption and practice realistic, 
participative, representative and sustainable. 
▪  Be attuned and sensitive to local realities and 
sensibilities. When seeking to assist IPs, respect 
traditional leadership customs and lineages and 
cultural values. 
On developing successful advocacy 
▪  Hold governments accountable and 
responsible for implementing laws that 
protect local communities, such as IPRA. Hold 
governments to the higher standard of ensuring 
human rights.
 
▪  Refer to history and the past in plotting a 
direction for the future. A clear understanding of 
the history, sources and relationships of the roots 
of prevailing insecurity issues is necessary to craft 
an effective response. 
▪  Sustain education as the cornerstone of all 
advocacy efforts. Advocacy must incorporate an 
education component to build awareness that leads 
to popular action. Later stages of advocacy should 
ultimately be aimed at enabling and empowering 
people to act as their own advocates. 
▪  Engage women as change agents in traditional 
and non-traditional roles. Support the 
development of women in both traditional roles 
as healers, educators, and leaders and in expanded 
roles as peace-builders, negotiators, and political 
leaders. 
Failure of governance and its mechanisms remains a 
pressing problem. The incapacity of government to 
provide the stable superstructure and mechanisms 
for good governance is sounded repeatedly in 
the discussions from all three perspectives. The 
prevailing politics of patronage, power and favour, 
the inefficiency of the justice system in providing 
accessible redress measures, the inability to ensure 
stable peace and order and even the cases of security 
forces committing human rights violations are 
failures in governance.
The marked inequality between the rich and poor 
is both a result and cause of the marginalisation 
of IPs, women, and the poor, and contributes to a 
perception of an imbalance in how human security 
is addressed. The proportion of the population in 
poverty continues to grow but there are diminishing 
resources to address the needs of the poor. Without 
active advocacy and actions for their rights and 
entitlements, these same peoples and sectors are 
further marginalised. This is linked to the state’s 
perceived incapacity to respond comprehensively  
to issues, particularly safeguarding the welfare of  
the most disadvantaged. 
High-level legislative advocacy is only successful if 
new laws are effectively implemented. Legislative 
advocacy has proven to be only part of resolving 
security issues. The marked success of introducing 
landmark legislation such as the IPRA or the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 is seen as a 
positive yet incomplete step. Guaranteeing effective 
implementation mechanisms of such mandates 
remains necessary. Some laws remain constrained  
by mechanisms that are ineffective, inappropriate  
or incapable of delivering on their mandate. 
Successful governance systems and mechanisms 
require access and familiarity with their operation. 
Implementation mechanisms that involve the 
affected communities have greater chances of 
being accepted, effective and sustainable. Local 
the perspectives shared show just a fraction of the genuine 
efforts to protect and empower the populations at risk, however 
they continue to lack a comprehensive and cohesive approach. 
this is evident in the examples of nGos introducing specific 
technologies into IP communities for agricultural production 
without matching these to community capacities, agrarian reform 
that is too focused on land redistribution and not production, and 
the vagueness of ongoing peace talks with regards to the state of 
non-Islamised IPs and their territories. 
Conclusion   
and recommendations 
the author works for initiatives for international 
Dialogue - iiD, a Philippines-based advocacy 
institution promoting human security, 
democratisation and people-to-people solidarity. 
IId conducts policy advocacy and campaign 
programs on burma, Mindanao, southern 
thailand, West Papua, and east timor. In 2000, 
it established the Mindanao Peoples Caucus 
(MPC) – a platform and network of grassroots 
organisations, communities and nGos affected 
and engaged in the conflict in Mindanao. 
together with other peace networks, IId led the 
establishment of the Mindanao Peaceweavers 
(MPW), the broadest peace network for 
Mindanao in the country, and currently serves 
as its secretariat. IId coordinates the southeast 
Asia network of the Global Partnership for  
the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).
ZIMBABWE
POPULATION
URBAN-RURAL DEMOGRAPHIC
GLOBAL PEACE 
INDEX 2014
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX 2013
40%  Urban population (2013)
(WORLD BANK 2014B) 
60%  Rural (2013)  
(WORLD BANK 2014C)
 
 
14.15  MILLION IN 2013 (WORLD BANK 2014A)   
148
162
156
187
(UNDP 2014)(IEP 2014A) 
=10.000.000
83
Zimbabwe’s government and people face challenges today that range from 
development to economic sustainability and livelihoods. Combined with the 
aftermath of a violent past, these challenges impact on Zimbabweans’ sense of 
security in more than one way. As religious and traditional leaders, politicians and 
other community members reflect on sources of insecurity, national healing and 
reconciliation emerges as an important priority. Community-driven Local Peace 
Committees that combine traditional and contemporary governance structures have 
contributed to fostering a stable and inclusive political atmosphere.
Community-
Based 
Healing and 
Reconciliation 
in Zimbabwe
Bishop Emeritus Dr Ambrose Moyoa, Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF)
” Local Peace Committees build peace 
in their communities through dialogue 
spaces where people engage each 
other in search of solutions.”
a This chapter was the product of team work of several ECLF colleagues, coordinated by the author, Executive Director of ECLF.
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Zimbabwe gained independence from Britain in 1980 after 
years of wars and struggles, the impact of which is still felt 
today. During the pre-independence war and episodes of 
violence in the post-independence era, the country experienced 
displacement of people, loss of life, and conflict among 
communities, leading to a traumatised society.1 in the post-
independence era, Zimbabwean citizens have been repeatedly 
divided by violent conflict and political polarisation. though 
outright conflict officially ended with a unity agreement 
between the main political parties in 1987, lingering hostilities 
remain to this day. 
After a decade of economic shocks and decline, 
marked by peak inflation at 231 million percent 
in July 2008, the introduction of a multi-currency 
regime in 2009 began to stabilise the economic 
environment. The GDP growth rate grew as high 
as 11.4 percent and 10.6 percent in 2010 and 2012 
respectively, though it dropped to 3.4 percent 
in 2013.2 As a result of this macro-economic 
instability, citizens felt an overall deterioration in 
their quality of life, with 62.6 percent of households 
remaining below the poverty line, with the highest 
concentration of poverty in rural areas.3 The state 
of the economy has caused a sharp decline of 
standards in other fields such as education, social 
and health care. 
Environmental factors including climate change 
and deforestation have affected food security and 
As the country moves towards a national healing 
and reconciliation process, the emphasis has 
been on collaborative efforts not only among the 
government, ONHRI and civil society organisations, 
but also with traditional leadership. It is widely 
acknowledged that the complexity of Zimbabwean 
society and politics must be understood within the 
contexts of historical struggles, and this requires 
finding a balance between modern and traditional 
conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms at 
community levels. However, a communication 
and knowledge gap exists between national 
policymakers and long-standing community 
practices, posing challenges in implementing 
a nationally-agreed peace and reconciliation 
programme that is truly representative of all 
Zimbabweans. 
caused acute malnutrition in the country. Drought 
has struck communities dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture, and 63 percent of people use firewood 
as fuel for cooking.4 Millions of hectares of land 
have been destroyed due to serious veld fires, 
leading to plant and animal species decline.5 
Moreover, in 2005 nearly 700,000 people 
lost their homes as a result of a government 
programme code named Murambatsvina (‘remove 
the dirt’), to rationalise the construction of urban 
dwellings and to remove shacks which had been 
illegally constructed. The housing crisis continues 
today, as there is a severe lack of affordable shelter. 
This political and socio-economic background 
provides insight into some root causes of human 
insecurities in Zimbabwe. Long-lasting grievances 
and the poverty prevalent in communities 
threaten social cohesion and peace at the local 
level. The minimal research in this field shows 
that conflicts in communities are rooted in deep 
structural and policy issues that have not been 
addressed. 
As part of the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) in 2009, the Government of Zimbabwe 
recognised the need for healing and reconciliation, 
and established the Organ for National Healing 
Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI). More 
recently, the constitution of Zimbabwe, adopted 
in 2013, makes provision for the establishment of 
a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission 
(NPRC), acknowledging the importance of national 
healing and reconciliation in fostering peace,well-
being and development in the country.6 
A communication 
and knowledge 
gap exists between 
national policymakers 
and long-standing  
community practices.
Background
As a result of  
this macro-economic 
instability, citizens 
felt an overall 
deterioration in  
their quality of life.
Long-lasting 
grievances and  
the poverty prevalent 
in communities 
threaten social 
cohesion and peace 
at the local level.
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others in other areas. Water is a human right. We rely 
on a sand abstraction system and this means that 
when there have been poor rains, which is usually the 
case, water dries up quickly and we have nothing. 
We can’t even embark on small income-generating 
projects. 
When i was growing up there were a lot of rivers with 
water flowing throughout the year, but today there are 
hardly any such rivers. in the past if one dug a well 
one did not need to dig very deep before reaching 
the water table. But today one has to use a drilling 
machine to find water and it will not be everywhere. 
for me, the issue of climate change has become a 
human security challenge as it is also responsible for 
movements of people crowding in areas where they 
can find water. it is also an environmental issue as 
livestock also have to walk long distances in search of 
water and green pastures, and in the process some die 
and are left to rot in open spaces, polluting the air. 
Community perspectives  
on human security
interviews with a number of community representatives, including 
political leaders, church leaders and traditional leaders provide 
first-hand testimonies of the way that human security is perceived 
at the community level.b these present perceptions of people 
predominantly from the nkayi District in matabeleland in 
Zimbabwe’s north province, but also from other regions across the 
country. 
“ Water is a  
human right.” 
b Given the sensitive subject matter, the testimonials have been kept anonymous and the names 
provided are pseudonyms
c  Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front party
tHe PoLitiCAL LeADer 
nicholas sibanda is a senior political leader of 
ZAnu Pfc in the nkayi District, matabeleland north 
Province, as well as a lay church leader, and Vice 
secretary of the Local Peace Committee. 
the first, perhaps the most important, personal 
human security concern i have is the slow pace of 
development in the area, which almost everybody 
in the district feels. i would have loved to see the 
economy performing better and everyone rallying 
around the plans and programmes that were set by 
government after the elections. 
i am an old man now and naturally fear that i may 
pass on and not have done enough to secure the 
future of my dependents. Lack of development poses 
a threat to human security. Without development 
there can be no peace. in nkayi, we are disgruntled 
because the necessary infrastructure for education, 
health, transport, etc. is very inadequate especially 
when compared with developments taking place in 
other parts of the country. Children have to travel long 
distances to go to school. the same applies to the 
long distances people have to travel to ferry patients 
to the nearest clinic or hospital. some have died 
on donkey or ox drawn carts before they got to the 
nearest hospital. 
one of the biggest problems here is the water 
shortage due to the sinking water table. People are 
unable to have the standard of living enjoyed by 
It hurts when we read in the paper when some 
political leaders describe us as lazy and failing to 
take advantage of government programmes when 
they are the ones who are failing to lift us up by 
addressing our water challenge.” Water is not an 
issue to be politicised. It has to do with human 
dignity and is therefore a human security concern 
for the people of Nkayi.
A traditional leader from the Nkayi district 
underlines the same issue: “As a traditional leader, 
my major concern is that of water and that is the 
complaint I get from my subjects every other day. 
We only have one water pump in the area and 
it is hardly enough for domestic use and other 
livelihood purposes.” In Nkayi district, another 
respondent adds that as a result of the poor rains 
and inadequate farming inputs, the harvest was 
poor, resulting in food insecurity. In Chivi, on 
the other hand, the Secretary to Chief ’s Advisory 
Council laments that: “Livelihoods are a problem as 
in some areas there was too much rain and farmers 
lost their produce. We have not been able to assist 
people who have lost their crop and it is troubling 
us as traditional leaders.”
A village head in the Chivi district points out the 
connection between livelihood, employment and 
social tensions: “Many young people in the area are 
unemployed thus they are idle and end up involving 
themselves in socially unacceptable behaviour. I 
would want to see those who are interested being 
allocated agricultural land or being assisted to 
embark on livelihood projects such as nutrition 
gardens and irrigation schemes.” Similarly, another 
respondent in Bulawayo adds that: “The major 
human security threat that I may dwell upon is 
the closure of industries and the increased rate of 
unemployment in the city of Bulawayo [which] has 
also fuelled the increase of burglaries and muggings 
by unemployed individuals.” 
Sources of insecurity
The accounts shared here demonstrate that 
human security encompasses a wide range of 
factors linked to development, social cohesion and 
peaceful coexistence. The concerns identified by 
community leaders and members refer for instance 
to the pace of development, issues of poverty, 
access to water, food security, environmental 
degradation and economic opportunities. They 
also emphasise the importance of women’s 
empowerment and women’s participation 
in decision making at the community level. 
Domestic violence and a history of violence within 
communities are mentioned. Concerns are raised 
when it comes to service delivery, health services 
and education as well as shelter and housing. 
Finally, some of the interviewees also mention the 
issues of witchcraft and tribal tensions which affect 
their community. 
These responses came from various areas and 
there is a growing view that their communities 
are deliberately marginalised and segregated. The 
feeling of social ostracism on development, access 
to water, food security, environmental degradation 
and livelihoods opportunities resulting in poverty 
is taking on an ethnic and or regional slant. All 
the threats to human security mentioned by 
interviewees could potentially become causes of 
serious conflicts given the economic challenges 
faced by the nation. 
Resource management and livelihoods
Access to natural resources, and hence livelihood 
and employment, is central to most interviewees’ 
concerns. These are linked to social tensions and 
anti-social behaviour, but also to loss of dignity and 
disempowerment. 
For a senior Movement for Democratic Change 
– Tsvangirai (MDC-T) political leader and ward 
Councillor in Nkayi district, the issue of water is 
very high on his list of human security concerns. 
As a community leader he is aware and very 
much concerned that: “Most people have no water 
for domestic use and for subsistence agriculture 
programmes like irrigation.” Food security is very 
much connected with water. For him “water is life.” 
This critical shortage of water “has weighed down 
heavily on our personal dignity as people when we 
compare ourselves to other people in other areas. 
“ Shortage of water 
has weighed down 
heavily on our 
personal dignity.”
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houses and stands, some in the wetlands and 
others in areas that were not fully serviced. 
The problem is that now the local authority is 
threatening to demolish the houses as they are 
either on unsuitable or unauthorised land or 
irregularly built. These are ordinary people who 
invested their life savings in building homes but 
are now faced with the threat of homelessness. 
Some have used their entire life investments 
to build beautiful and comfortable houses on 
those stands. They are now threatened by the 
local authorities with demolition, resulting in 
homelessness and poverty.” 
Related to this housing challenge is the issue of 
political abuse. “I feel that this housing crisis is 
triggered by some politicians who, at election times, 
go out of their way to promise things that they are 
not really in control of. In the heat of the political 
moment, they by-pass procedure and we are the 
ones who bear the brunt at the end of the day. It 
is really distressing for people to be stressed about 
shelter and where the next meal will come from 
and it is shared across Chitungwiza.”
On health care, the secretary to the village head 
and local farmers’ organisation in another Nkayi 
ward is concerned for his area: “There is only one 
hospital in the ward and it is located at the very 
end. We wish there were clinics to support the 
hospital that are located centrally so that everyone 
can access them.” The lack of drinking water 
compounds health insecurities: “There is only 
one water pump in the area. This has caused the 
festering of diseases such as diarrhoea and cholera, 
which are minor and preventable.” His community 
is experiencing many water-borne diseases. 
The interviews reflected on the issues caused by 
the importation of labour. There are a number of 
companies that operate in Bulawayo and employ 
people from the outside. This is a security concern 
to most residents: “The main question is why the 
government allows the transfer of human capital 
across provinces rather than focusing on reducing 
the unemployment rate at every province.” The 
manager of a guest house in Nkayi highlights the 
increased rate of unemployment caused by foreign 
companies’ ownership of the timber industry. 
According to her, they do not employ locals but 
they bring their own people, and this negatively 
affects the economy in the area. She notes that 
there are a number of backyard industries such 
as carpentry, welding, and hairdressing, that, if 
strengthened, could provide people with an income. 
A respondent in Silobela added that, “there is 
capacity for income-generating projects, but there is 
no money for start-up capital. Women are running 
money-lending schemes but they generate very little 
from them.” 
A respondent in Bulawayo points out that: “In order 
to earn a living, many people resort to various ways, 
such as trading in second-hand clothes imported 
from Mozambique. Some resort to illegal border 
jumping in search of jobs in neighbouring countries 
with better economies, such as Botswana and South 
Africa. Some have died in the process swimming 
across crocodile infested rivers and playing hide and 
seek with security forces guarding the borders.” He 
further points out that because of the economic 
hardships, corruption is rampant in the country and, 
“What seems to be lacking is the political will to 
face it head on.” 
Economy 
Zimbabwe’s financial troubles and the effects 
of the economic challenges is a frequently cited 
source of insecurity. The following testimonial from 
a respondent in Bulawayo illustrates this: “I am 
scared to think about the future of my children. I 
have nothing to bequeath to them as I lost every 
penny that I had saved in the crisis of 2007 to 
2008. No matter how much education I might give 
them, chances of their being employed are very 
slim with such a high unemployment rate. In 2007 
to 2008 the challenge was the hyper-inflation that 
led to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar, but 
today the challenge comes from deflation. Unlike 
last time, goods are available on the market but 
there is very little money in circulation. Those who 
have money seem to be afraid of keeping it in 
the bank for fear of a repeat of the 2007 to 2008 
experience, where their funds were confiscated 
by government and up to today have not been 
returned. This has left many people hurting and 
angry. They would rather keep their monies hidden 
elsewhere. The vast majority of people are living 
from hand to mouth and therefore fear for their 
security and that of their children.  
I live in fear.” 
Public services 
A number of issues raised relate to the provision 
of public services such as housing, health and 
social welfare. On housing, the authorities’ recent 
attempt to enforce building standards and remove 
unauthorised housing, whether for legitimate 
reasons or not, has resulted in a housing crisis. A 
respondent in Nkayi postulates that: “The local 
authority intends to destroy homesteads that are 
surrounding the growth point. It has been said 
it’s for the purposes of expansion. But this will 
create a lot of other issues such as homelessness 
and destruction of people’s livelihoods. This is 
exacerbated by resource exploitation by foreign 
companies.” 
A female traditional leader in the Nkayi District 
highlights that “education is a serious matter in 
our area as there is very little infrastructure. Many 
times we have had to rely on well-wishers and local 
businesspeople to build facilities. It is only recently 
that the first crèche was built in our area, and it had 
to be donated by a local politician. The shortage 
of resources and infrastructure within the area has 
caused the community to be worried that it is not 
a good area for our children to learn, due to the 
absence of learning facilities, and that this will in 
turn lessen their life chances.”
In Mashonaland East, another respondent says: 
“The major human security issue where I reside is 
shelter and housing. Many people were allocated 
“ I am scared to think  
about the future  
of my children.”
d The Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the 
armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).
refLeCting on Community tensions 
A number of interviewees in the nkayi district 
discussed the issues of tribal or political tensions, 
which affected the sense of security and the 
community relations. 
“my area is predominantly populated by the 
ndebele people. it is one of the areas that was 
perceived as sustaining the ZiPrAd dissidents 
shortly after the attainment of independence 
and mostly shona-speaking soldiers were sent to 
flush these out. But i feel that the methods used 
created a great deal of animosity on the part of 
the ndebele against the shona people. After the 
unity Accord, many of those who were believed to 
have been involved in committing atrocities then 
settled in silobela. the tension between the two 
communities has been very intense and they hardly 
ever mix in social gatherings.” 
“some youths in makhaba Ward perpetrated 
violence due to political differences. they burnt 
houses that belonged to their political opponents 
and caused major disturbances in the Ward and 
it left scars on families and community members. 
this explains the slow pace of development and 
the fear of participating in any initiative that comes 
from outside the Ward. the fear arises from the 
perception that those who come from outside the 
Ward can only be enemies trying to influence locals 
to rise against government so as to once again get 
them into trouble.”
”general peace has always been a challenge 
in nkayi. you will know that some of the worst 
political violence has taken place in this district. 
that concern will remain with us for a long time 
though things have been stabilising of late. there 
is also a concern on matters of domestic violence 
and other instances of violence on the social 
front. if you read the papers, nkayi is known for 
some of these violent crimes like physical fighting, 
stabbing, axing and abuse of women.“ 
“ These are ordinary  
people who invested  
their life savings in  
building homes but are  
now faced with the  
threat of homelessness.”
“ Some of the worst 
political violence 
has taken place in 
this district.”
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Traditional leadership
Traditional leaders, today referred to as chiefs, 
were the rulers and custodians of the land and 
tradition before colonialism. British colonial rule 
drastically reduced the powers of the traditional 
leaders to eliminate traditional forms of leadership 
and replace it with a ‘modern’ system.  
This has failed to date as the traditional leadership, 
particularly the chiefs, continue to wield a great 
deal of power and influence over all their subjects 
despite legislation and efforts to reduce it. Over 
the decades, traditional leaders have insisted on 
keeping their role as the custodians of the land 
and the traditions of their people. The attainment 
of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 did not do 
much to change their status as legislated by the 
colonial powers.
Many Zimbabweans, particularly among 
rural residents who form the majority of the 
population, believe that traditional leaders are 
responsible for the safety of their subjects and 
must ensure that all their subjects live in peace. 
Modern political systems have undermined the 
institution of traditional leaders. One of the few 
female traditional leaders in Zimbabwe says: “As 
traditional leaders, we are usually divided along 
political party lines as a result of interference by 
political parties in our traditional duties, and many 
of us find ourselves unable to serve our people 
objectively. Some of our subjects feel insecure in 
their areas especially if they are viewed as hostile 
to the political persuasion of the local traditional 
leader.” As traditional leaders they are supposed 
to be non-partisan in order to command the 
respect of all their subjects in the community. 
Given the influence traditional leaders wield in their 
Security providers 
and empowerment
In coping with sources of insecurity, Zimbabweans 
look to the state, to their community and to 
traditional leadership, with varying expectations 
and results. On the question as to who people look 
up to for their security, one female respondent 
says “The community has tended to provide 
its own security working with community-
based organisations, various non-governmental 
organisations and local peace committees.” Another 
interviewee in one of the urban suburbs echoes 
the same sentiments: “I rely on my community for 
support. For example, in my community we have 
what we call neighbourhood watch committees. 
These work on the protection of inhabitants of my 
suburb. Unfortunately, the police are not doing a 
good job in terms of protecting civilians; they abuse 
people and they delay in responding to crime, 
which makes people vulnerable. The local authority 
is not giving my community adequate lighting 
services, and it is when we experience power 
cuts that the thieves pounce on innocent people.” 
Another respondent who expresses distrust in the 
police says: “they are not an institution that one 
may turn to, to provide security for an individual. 
They are more public enemies than people that 
may be confided in.” 
In the absence of a strong security infrastructure 
provided by the state, community-based human 
security strategies have emerged, building on 
traditional roles and networks of faith and 
community leaders. Although these roles are not 
without their own challenges, they also present great 
potential to contribute to human security through 
their deep-rooted presence in Zimbabwe’s diverse 
society. The following sections elaborate on the role 
of traditional leadership and explore the potential of 
community-based local peace committees. 
In Mutare, Manicaland province, a counsellor 
talks of how poor health services affect the 
most vulnerable in society: “I do counselling for 
orphans in the area who have been left destitute 
or in the care of elderly grandparents. Most of 
them lost their parents to HIV/AIDS and now 
have to head households or go to orphanages. 
This weighs down on the community as most of 
these children need to be schooled.” Last but not 
least are the issues of poverty and corruption: 
“There is a problem of corrupt local officials 
who solicit bribes from widows to process their 
claims. I feel that what drives their behaviour is 
that the local authority has been failing to pay 
their salaries for more than six months now and 
they then have to resort to unscrupulous ways of 
earning a living.”
Traditional and gender roles
The interviews highlight the sometimes negative 
effects of traditional or conservative views on 
human security. On gender roles, some of the 
interviews illustrate that many men have not as yet 
accepted equality with women; for many, women 
must remain subservient to men. The national 
media often report on women battered regularly 
by their husbands and some of them are eventually 
killed. Many women cannot take leadership 
positions because they believe men are superior to 
them. Women need to be empowered so that they 
can claim their rightful place of being equal to men 
and demand equal treatment and respect for their 
human dignity. The absence of that recognition 
should be seen as a human security issue in many 
communities.
In the Nkayi district, a MDC-T political leader and 
ward councillor speaks of the problems caused by 
traditional beliefs in witchcraft. In his community 
it is “a major source of conflict.” He points out 
that: “I was once involved in defusing one such 
incident. The local soccer team which played in 
the ECLF peace tournament was involved in a 
conflict with a local entrepreneur over payment 
for a service. Their failure to pay led to the 
businessman threatening them with witchcraft 
and other unspecified action and our Local Peace 
Committee, of which I am a member, was called 
upon to quell the situation.” Issues of witchcraft 
feature very prominently at the chief ’s courts. It is 
illegal in Zimbabwe to accuse or threaten someone 
with witchcraft but such beliefs continue to prevail 
and are indeed a human security challenge.
“ The community has 
tended to provide its 
own security.”
refLeCting on Women’s seCurity
Both male and female respondents raised the issue 
of the role and security of women.
“ our area is still a patriarchal community and 
women seem to fear to venture into areas 
of leadership. i think the problem is now 
psychological as there are no real barriers in their 
way. We encourage them but maybe culture is a 
hindrance.”
“ gender is a serious human security factor in the 
community. out of 33 traditional leaders in the 
area, only three of us are women. men traditionally 
take us for granted and many are not even pleased 
that we were made traditional leaders though it has 
been improving slightly. such a patriarchal attitude 
is not good for the dignity of women and it sidelines 
them in playing an equal role in community 
development.” 
“ Women in our area are not responsive to taking 
up leadership positions. if you are an outsider you 
might get the wrong impression that women are 
oppressed or undermined here but that is not the 
case. for some reason they shy away from taking 
the lead and prefer to be led by the men. We try 
very hard to push them to participate in community 
platforms.” 
“ there are many instances of violent cases like 
assault, public nuisance and domestic violence.  
i feel that some of the issues are to do with 
endemic disrespect for women. the traditional 
courts are always inundated with such cases. i also 
deal with some of the cases personally at home.” 
“ i work with widows and these are some of 
the most insecure and vulnerable people in 
the community. they face a lot of problems 
in accessing their pensions or those of their 
deceased spouses. most of them are elderly and 
struggle to gather the paperwork. some struggle 
to transfer their deceased spouses’ properties 
into their names. Commercial sex workers are also 
vulnerable as they are arrested all the time. even 
innocent women are arrested in leisure centres  
for alleged prostitution.” 
“ Some of our subjects feel 
insecure in their areas 
especially if they are viewed 
as hostile to the political 
persuasion of the local 
traditional leader.”
“ Out of 33 traditional 
leaders in the area, 
only three of us are 
women.”
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Another example is the Mutasa for Peace 
Committee in Manicaland, which involves various 
stakeholders across the socio-economic, political 
and administrative landscape of the Mutasa 
district. The committee was set up as a purely 
community initiative to address the specific 
peace challenges in the community. In recent 
testimony, Munodawafa Dube of the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police said that the committee had seen 
a noticeable change in police records thanks to 
the LPC’s work on mitigating political conflicts: 
“The Mutasa for Peace Committee has made 
our policing work easier. In the run up to the 
elections last year we hardly got any serious cases 
of politically motivated violence as compared to 
previous elections due to the peace work of this 
committee. The more common cases these days 
are domestic violence, boundary disputes and 
public nuisance cases. I think we have reached 
a point where we can refer some cases to the 
committee. I urge them to set up a reference desk 
in a public area. We work very well with them and 
they never do anything without the involvement of 
the police.” 
A spokesperson from the Ministry of Health and 
Child Welfare in Mutasa also noted the decrease 
in injuries caused by politically motivated violence 
at the district referral hospital: “At the hospitals in 
the district we had become accustomed to treating 
people with axes in their heads. We have seen 
some of the ugliest wounds caused by all sorts of 
dangerous weapons, mainly due to political violence 
towards the 2008 elections. This has changed 
drastically in the community as we have been 
seeing fewer cases of politically motivated violence. 
People say that this committee, with members from 
various parties, has played a role in bringing down 
the violence.”8
constitute a committee. The composition of LPCs 
varies but includes civil servants, church leaders, 
traditional leaders, state security sector actors, 
political party leaders, women, youth and other 
stakeholders such as organisations operating at 
the community level. LPCs build peace in their 
communities through creating dialogue spaces 
where people engage each other in search of 
solutions to their challenges. They also facilitate 
peacebuilding sessions. In some situations, they 
mediate conflict and act as early warning systems 
and work towards addressing human security 
concerns in their areas. 
Aaron Chimiti, a member of the Kraal Head’s 
advisory committee who chairs the ward Local 
Peace Committee, says the LPCs have helped to 
keep the Kraal Head’s advisory committee intact. 
Through the conciliatory work he has been doing, 
drawing on the skills he acquired from the trainings, 
he has been able to resolve community conflicts: 
“It has changed the way we do business in the local 
traditional court. If it were not for this programme, 
there are people who could have been expelled 
from the chief ’s advisory committee. I played a 
conciliatory role to block the expulsion.” Chimiti 
adds that that he has learned to respect the law 
through the peacebuilding trainings: “[They] taught 
me never to take the law into my own hands as 
I am not a lawyer, a magistrate or other trained 
officer of the law. People in the community know 
that I am a trained peacebuilder and I am seconded 
to most cases that require conciliation in the 
community.”7 
A respondent in Chivi reflects on how the LPCs 
have helped address the challenge of peace: 
“There have been a lot of violent conflicts between 
political parties, particularly towards election 
time. We are only starting to manage it now 
that we have structures such as the Local Peace 
Committee. After attending the training, we 
agreed to form an LPC consisting of members of 
our community from different backgrounds and 
political persuasions. It is through our committee 
that we are now able to manage some conflicts. 
There are also incidents of domestic violence 
that we deal with as LPCs as well as traditional 
courts.” Police in Nkayi have reported a significant 
reduction of crime and violence since the launch 
of the programme in the district. The interviewee 
is an active member of the LPC which was 
established by the community itself.
‘infrastructure for peace’ which has the potential of 
complementing and feeding into the National Peace 
and Reconciliation Commission.
  
LPCs are structures established by community 
members to be responsible for peace within their 
community. As a practical response to ensure that 
peace prevails, communities choose members to 
communities, it is not surprising that the political 
parties, in particular the ruling party, put a great 
deal of pressure on leaders to become members 
and to influence their communities against the 
other parties. This compromises their impartiality 
when dealing with all their subjects, thus posing a 
serious threat to human security.
Nevertheless, the traditional role of these leaders is 
that of uniting people through conflict resolution 
at a community level; their justice system is meant 
to build relationships rather than simply punish the 
offender. The feeling among some interviewees 
is that some of the traditional leaders no longer 
provide human security as was the case in the 
past. They are deprived of their power to deal with 
criminal cases and their judicial role is confined to 
civil cases. This issue is being raised as a human 
security issue because the chiefs continue to 
challenge the modern system and wish to have their 
traditional roles restored. It is also a human security 
issue when it leads to conflict on the ground when 
party politics begin to influence the role and 
activities of the traditional leader.
Although the powers of the chiefs have been 
reduced, there still remains great potential and 
opportunity embedded in the institution of 
traditional leaders insofar as it relates to conflict 
resolution and community cohesion. These leaders 
are custodians of decision making at the community 
level. This potential can be used effectively to build 
peaceful communities. 
Local Peace Committees
The engagement of traditional leaders alongside 
other forms of leadership at the community level 
– such as politicians, civil society activists and local 
authority representatives – has been harnessed 
in the development of Local Peace Committees 
(LPCs). These arose from a community outreach 
and capacity building programme run by the 
Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF). 
The training methodology, which encompasses 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution 
and Transformation (CPMRT), speaks to the 
inner person so that peace begins within an 
individual. The CPMRT training sessions challenge 
communities to own the programme and ensure 
its continuation. The programme has been 
supported by international and regional partners, 
as well as some local donors, and has increasingly 
been highlighted as an important community 
Community ‘infrastructures for 
peace’ have the potential of 
complementing and feeding 
into the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission.
tHe CHurCH LeADer
mkhululi ncube is a pastor in the Brethren in 
Christ Church and is based in gwanda in the 
matabeleland south Province. 
We are afflicted by drought almost every year in 
our area. this leads to general hunger and poverty. 
People are unable to feed their families and to take 
the children to school because they are unable to 
earn a livelihood. i think what is required is the 
construction of dams and boreholes. People in 
the community also need to be capacitated with 
agricultural knowledge and expertise. this will 
also enable the young people to have livelihoods 
and [make it] difficult for them to be abused by 
politicians for violent missions. 
gwanda is an area which is populated by various 
ethnic groups including the ndebele, the sotho, 
Venda, and the shona people. i usually witness 
clashes of interests among these groups. each of 
these communities wants to assert their authority 
in their areas where they are influential. 
many people in the area feel that we are 
marginalised with regards to national development 
programmes. they feel that because they are 
from matabeleland, we do not matter much in the 
national picture. We have poor road networks and 
generally we lag behind in development. We hear 
about loans for youth – we assist our youth to  
apply but we hardly ever get the loans. 
“ Many people in  
the area feel 
that we are 
marginalised with 
regards to national 
development 
programmes.“ 
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Human security issues facing many Zimbabweans are multifaceted 
and ever more complex, as they have economic, socio-political, 
historical and environmental aspects. Addressing these issues 
through a national healing and reconciliation approach enables 
local communities to actively engage and seek solutions alongside 
authorities and security providers.
▪  Implement community-based activities 
such as income-generation projects to empower 
vulnerable populations through which the 
communities can benefit from economic 
empowerment as well as cohesion-building.
▪  Increase collaboration between civil society, 
faith-based organisations, development 
partners and government departments around 
human security issues.
While there is no one-size-fits-all solution, 
strengthening the existing national peacebuilding 
efforts is one way to address various human 
security issues, as the integrative and cross-cutting 
nature of peacebuilding addresses almost all the 
issues discussed in this report. Recommendations 
to national policymakers and their partners are as 
follows:
▪  Operationalise the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission to ensure a 
nationally-agreed healing and reconciliation 
process, with particular attention and measures 
to include marginalised groups such as women, 
youth, people with disabilities and ethnic 
minorities. 
▪  Launch advocacy and sensitising campaigns 
not only to ensure consistent and strategic 
collaborative plans among key stakeholders, but 
also to inform the general population of current 
peacebuilding mechanisms and the importance of 
further collective efforts for peace. 
▪  Strengthen the peace architecture’s building 
blocks such as the Local Peace Committees 
(LPCs). LPCs represent the diversity of their 
communities and include participants such as 
civil servants, church leaders, traditional leaders, 
state security sector actors, political leaders, 
and most importantly women and youths. 
Further strengthening community-based conflict 
resolution forums can positively increase the 
political participation of all of these groups in their 
communities. 
▪  Implement community-based disaster risk 
management mechanisms in order to prevent 
and mitigate the risk of natural and/or manmade 
disasters in order to build community resilience 
against potential conflict and shocks. This could 
be done for instance through the Local Peace 
Committees. 
Conclusion  
and recommendations 
the authors work for the ecumenical Church 
Leaders Forum (eCLF), which is a grouping 
of Christian leaders from Zimbabwe’s church 
umbrella bodies that brings together a variety 
of church leaders at all levels, both clergy and 
lay, male and female from all denominations. 
eCLf’s mission is to contribute towards the 
creation and sustenance of a peaceful, just 
and democratic nation by capacitating and 
empowering the entire Church leadership for 
peacebuilding through dialogue and constructive 
engagement with the motto ‘Church and 
community working together for peace’. eCLf is 
a member of the southern Africa network of the 
global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (gPPAC).
LPCs represent the 
diversity of their 
communities;  
Further strengthening 
community-based 
conflict resolution 
forums can positively 
increase the political 
participation of 
all groups in their 
communities. 
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A  
Methodology 
for Human 
Security 
Gabriëlla Vogelaar
It is worthwhile to look more closely at the ‘how’ 
of applying the human security approach towards 
the local and individual level. Drawing from the 
experiences of producing this publication, this 
section reflects on the relevance of a methodology 
for human security. First, a brief description of the 
process to develop this publication is provided, 
including our approach to developing a common 
yet flexible method to capture the individual 
experiences of people in all the featured countries. 
In the second section, the authors and the 
organisations involved share how they conducted 
the interviews, and some of the challenges 
they faced in their respective contexts. Their 
observations regarding methodology are revealing 
about the levels of fear associated with discussing 
‘security’ or human security issues. It shows that 
human security concerns are also part of the 
process, and not merely an outcome. 
In the third section, we elaborate on why a focus  
on methodologies for human security is important. 
It has the potential to lead to a better understanding 
of how to operationalise the human security 
approach in research, policy and practice. 
The range of different types of security, from freedom 
from fear to freedom from want and freedom 
from indignity, are unique to each individual and 
context. This publication does not aim to provide a 
comprehensive overview of all the human security 
threats in the featured countries, nor does it attempt 
to describe all the country facts. It tries to build on the 
existing efforts of others and on the experience of the 
participating organisations. Given the flexible approach, 
the sample size and limited scale, the findings of these 
studies cannot be interpreted as representative. Instead, 
it aims to reflect a snapshot of lived experiences of 
insecurity, and to inform recommendations from a 
civil society perspective, which can counter-balance 
dominant top-down narratives.
A small number of statistics and figures were featured 
in the country chapters to relate to the relevant 
themes and connect the stories to existing larger scale 
indexes and quantitative data. However, it should be 
noted that statistics are also subject to interpretation 
and inaccuracies, and, in some cases, contested 
between the discordant actors. They were used here 
only as background information. 
If applied consistently 
with its underlying 
principles, methodology 
can pave the way 
towards operationalising 
human security from a 
theoretical framework 
towards a practical 
approach.  
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A ‘terms of reference’ was developed in 
collaboration with the editorial board, to guide 
the overall process, including methods, objectives 
and style for each study. It included guidelines 
from the 2009 UN Human Security Unit’s 
Handbook on Human Security, which addresses 
issues of planning and design as related to the 
human security approach. In addition to the terms 
of reference, participating members were also 
provided with a template for consent forms for 
participants. The purpose of the consent forms 
was to ensure that any name attribution or use of 
photographic material in this publication was done 
only with explicit permission of the participant. 
Participants could also choose to only show their 
name and not their picture. Those who preferred 
to remain anonymous have been featured without 
any associations. Therefore, all the persons that 
are featured by name or picture in this publication 
have given their consent. Finally, the terms of 
reference also included a template – to be adapted 
and translated by participating organisations as 
appropriate – describing the concept of human 
In some countries, prevailing human security 
concerns affected the ability to gather diverse 
and representative accounts. From the inputs we 
received from our contributors, we found that their 
observations regarding the process of interviews 
and methodology were insightful in their own right 
about the level of fear associated with discussing 
‘security’ or human security issues.
We felt it pertinent to bring that out in this section, 
as it shows that human security concerns were 
part of the process, and not merely an outcome. 
This underscores the importance of a process that 
is informed by human security principles. In the 
following sub-sections, the authors described the 
methods used in their respective country chapters. 
In some cases, the subject matter was deemed 
too sensitive to link to a specific country , and are 
discussed separately below. The sections below are 
presented by the authors themselves. 
Afghanistan
A series of stories were collected from Kabul, 
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kandahar, and Kunduz 
provinces to form a narrative of how locals view 
human security in Afghanistan. Face to face 
interviews, off-the-street interviews and telephonic 
surveys were conducted. Twenty-three interviews 
were conducted with representation from the 
Pashtun, Hazara, and Tajik ethnic communities. 
While the Afghanistan Justice Organisation tried to 
balance the gender representation by incorporating 
the participation of women in street interviews, 
face-to-face conversations and telephonic 
surveys, only seven women were interviewed 
for the chapter. This is often a challenge faced 
by researchers in Afghanistan because societal 
sensitivities and pressure prevent women from 
participating. As acknowledged in the chapter’s 
title, the interviewees were predominantly from 
an urban setting, mostly from Kabul, and should 
therefore not be understood as representative of 
Afghanistan’s vast rural population. Nevertheless, 
a focus on urban areas, where many residents 
originate from other provinces and rural areas, 
contributed to revealing the urban-rural divide in 
the country. 
security and explaining the purpose of the project 
to interviewees and focus group participants. 
Variations in method and data collection
For each country study, authors and their 
organisations followed the guidelines as set out 
in the terms of reference to ensure a level of 
consistency. These guidelines allowed flexibility 
for them to choose the specific methods of 
interviewing and gathering information as suitable 
to the local contexts and to the type of expertise 
and approach of the respective organisations. It is 
important to allow human security concepts to be 
locally defined and realised.
The data collection methods used were mainly 
face-to-face interviews and focus groups, supported 
by survey-style questions in writing or by phone. 
Sample selection was done in different ways, 
including group discussions and workshops, with 
snowball sampling and street interviews. For the 
composition of the sample, the aim was to have 
a diverse demographic in terms of age, gender, 
and employment status, and including minority 
groups. It was an attempt to capture how different 
sources of insecurity interact, how it is experienced 
by different segments of society and what the 
implications are for communities. 
While guidance was provided on open-ended 
interview questions, the actual questions posed 
were adapted to the context and circumstance 
of the interviews. To understand how elements 
of protection and empowerment are manifested, 
people were asked not only about their perception 
of safety and threats to their security, but also about 
their security providers and their coping strategies 
to deal with insecurities. The prioritisation of issues 
as presented in the chapters is based on outcome 
of the interviews, not by a predetermined set of 
indicators or issues. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in different periods for each country, 
between December 2013 and June 2014. 
Our approach  
and process 
Country chapters  
and security concerns 
To better understand how people experience human security, 
and perceptions of empowerment and protection, we asked six 
GPPAC member civil society organisations in different countries 
to conduct a small-scale study in each of their contexts. Together 
with several authors we formed an editorial board to guide peer 
review and support the editors with input on content.
This section describes how the authors gathered information 
in each of the countries. Most based their analysis on personal 
accounts described in interviews and focus groups, aiming for a 
balanced demographic composition, often combining accounts of 
community or civil society leaders with those of ‘ordinary’ citizens. 
Observations regarding the 
process of interviews and 
methodology were insightful 
in their own right about the 
level of fear associated with 
discussing ‘security’ or human 
security issues. The purpose of  
the interviews was  
to give people a chance 
to talk about what is most 
important to them.
AJO interview in Kabul
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Gaza. The Palestinian people are so fragmented that 
many are not even aware that they share the same 
concerns.
While we filmed the groups in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem and received detailed quotes from them, 
we only obtained summaries of the work of the 
three focus groups in Gaza. There were very high 
levels of fear connected with any kind of discussion 
on security among the people from Gaza. People 
were afraid they might lose their income or their 
slight chance of obtaining a permit to leave the 
strip, due to the occupation. They need to have 
permits from the Israeli side to travel between Gaza 
and West Bank. For example, a facilitator told us: 
“Sorry for my late answer, it was really very hard to 
find people from Gaza to participate in the focus 
group for many reasons. They were afraid to talk 
about any case [because they think speaking about 
it could cause problems due to Hamas and because] 
they are afraid of the [Israeli] occupation. Also, 
some of them are working with the Palestinian 
Authority [so they do not want to participate].” 
A doctor, originally from Gaza, also tried on our 
behalf to interview some of the people who had 
come from Gaza to the West Bank for medical 
treatment in a hospital in Nablus. He told us, “I’m 
really sorry, I tried my best. I went to the Nablus 
Alnajah Hospital to find people who can talk but 
they refused. I even asked my colleagues in Gaza to 
do it but they refused.”
Due to these difficulties regarding Gaza, we had 
to work with summaries of the three focus groups 
that were organised there, and held additional 
interviews with an NGO worker and with a 
psychiatrist. Very few participants were willing 
to share personal stories, worried that doing so 
would have implications for their families if certain 
people found out that they had been critical of 
the situation in Gaza. This in itself speaks volumes 
regarding the possibility of freedom to live without 
fear in Gaza. 
The methodology thus reflects some of the 
difficulties and divisions and absence of human 
security for Palestinians, as well as the higher sense 
of fear in Gaza as compared to the other areas. 
There are fears of retaliation if people speak openly 
about security issues.  
The Philippines
The respondents identified were primarily opinion 
leaders from the community, NGO, CSO and 
network levels who were involved in development 
and peace advocacy in the region. They represent 
Mindanao’s tri-people perspectives of the native 
Indigenous Peoples, the Moros (Islamised IPs), 
and Christian Filipino settlers from other regions, 
primarily through the work that they do in their 
communities. They were interviewed individually 
and as a group. The IP leaders including the Datus 
(Indigenous People’s traditional leaders) wished to 
remain anonymous for safety reasons. 
In addition, the analysis and recommendations are 
based on countless public gatherings, civil society 
and community meetings facilitated by Initiatives 
for International Dialogue (IID) in our ongoing 
work for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
Notably, IID’s Human Security and Peacebuilding 
Programme involves partnership building, policy 
de Colaboración Cívica (CCC), which is part of 
several international peacebuilding networks. The 
interviews/conversations were conducted between 
December 2013 and February 2014 by the authors. 
All interviews were conducted in Spanish and 
translated by the authors. When explicitly permitted 
by the interviewees, we have used their real names 
and personal information. 
While having a limited sample, it is important to 
note that we intentionally selected the interviewees, 
to cover the different angles of the security and 
human rights situation in Mexico. Interviewees 
include an attorney that has litigated human 
rights cases in the Inter-American Commission 
and Court of Human Rights; members of several 
nongovernmental organisations that promote the 
use of bikes as a means to recover public space 
in northern Mexico; a conflict transformation 
professional close to indigenous rights and other 
social movements; a university professor and social 
activist from Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua – one of 
Mexico’s most violent cities; and a psychologist 
working with victims of violence and human rights 
abuses. 
In addition, the key findings of stakeholder and 
conflict assessments carried out by CCC over 
the past two years were integrated to identify the 
primary concerns regarding human insecurity. 
These assessments cover the topics that the 
interviewees linked to human security. We 
considered it pertinent to include the findings of 
these assessments because all of them are based 
either on in-depth personal interviews, sectorial 
focus groups, and/or multi stakeholder dialogue 
sessions.
Occupied Palestinian Territory
Focus groups were organised in the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and Gaza, with around six female and six 
male participants in each group. The participants 
came from a variety of backgrounds: cities, 
villages, and refugee camps spread across different 
geographical areas. Twelve additional interviews 
were conducted with individuals from Jerusalem 
and the West Bank, and two in Gaza. There were 
almost 70 participants in total.
It is a reflection of the situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory that it was logistically 
impossible to hold focus groups that united 
Palestinians from East Jerusalem, the West Bank and 
The purpose of the interviews was to give people 
a chance to talk about what is most important to 
them, to share their perspectives or stories, and to 
allow them to freely state how they define human 
security. They were asked a series of questions 
which tried to identify the issues they saw as main 
contributors to their insecurity, where they felt 
these issues originated, which issues are the most 
important in driving their insecurity and how that 
played out in their daily lives. In contrast, they were 
also asked to identify local issues that contributed 
to their sense of security and to highlight which 
ones they considered most important and why. 
Additionally, interviewees were also asked if they 
felt that one group of people or ethnicity was 
affected by them more than others, and why.
Mexico
This chapter was based on in-depth interviews 
and/or conversations with stakeholders from 
different sectors, and an analysis of stakeholder 
and conflict assessments carried out by Centro 
Focus groups were 
organised in the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem  
and Gaza.
Capturing Palestinian perspectives on human security
The data collection 
methods used, were mainly 
face-to-face interviews and 
focus groups, supported by 
survey-style questions in 
writing or by phone. 
MEND focus group in Ramallah, OPT
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The analysis of this information involved grouping 
the responses into the main categories of issues 
that people raised, and may be read as a collective 
statement on what people fear, how they cope 
and the adequacy of the state. On issues related to 
poverty, the authors point out that both Kyiv and 
Simferopol have better employment and income 
opportunities than other areas of the country. 
To assess the relevance of freedom from want 
as a human security factor in Ukraine in general, 
specific research would need to be conducted 
in other geographic areas with higher levels of 
poverty such as Ternopil, Rivne, Sumy regions, and 
Northern Crimea. 
Zimbabwe
The Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF) 
team collected the data through in-depth 
interviews with community individuals. The 
interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
positions of leadership and influence in the 
community, to provide insights on the views 
of community members. A total of 153 people 
were interviewed. To guarantee a variety of 
responses and to capture the different experiences, 
the respondents were selected amongst both 
employed and unemployed people (with 
different employment sectors represented). Both 
consideration of gender and age were taken on 
board. Interviewees included ordinary members of 
the community, community leaders, chairpersons 
of residence associations, as well as traditional 
leaders, village heads, church leaders, political 
leaders, chaplains, peacebuilders, and government 
workers amongst others. To avoid sensitivities 
and ensure that participants felt free to share 
their views, the ECLF team chose to conduct 
direct interviews – instead of having focus group 
discussions – starting by building confidence and 
trust with the participants. Due to sensitivities, the 
research team met some challenges in accessing 
the interviewees, some refusing to have their 
picture taken, or to sign the consent forms, 
while others wanted their testimonies to remain 
anonymous. It was therefore decided that the 
identity of the interviewees will be protected in 
this report.  
Before starting the field interview research, it 
was critical that the ECLF team had a common 
understanding of human security before delving 
into an in-depth discussion on the subject. A 
number of areas which needed investigation 
advocacy, awareness raising, multi-stakeholder 
dialogues and direct actions. These are done in 
partnership with grassroots communities, civil 
society organisations and networks, non-state  
actors, and multilateral and state bodies. Within  
and across these contexts, core issues such as armed 
conflict, impunity, culture, ethnicity and identity-
based marginalisation, culture of peace, citizens’ 
participation, peace process, and people-centred 
security are addressed.
Ukraine 
A total of 71 people were interviewed in two 
culturally and geographically distinct localities: 
Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, with a population 
that together with the commuters and incoming 
labour migrants is an estimated 4 million, and 
Simferopol, the administrative centre of Ukraine’s 
southernmost region of the Crimea with a 
population of slightly below 400,000. Fifty-five 
people were interviewed in Kyiv and sixteen in 
Simferopol. The interview samples are based on 
the best local demographic estimates available 
for both research sites, and, at least in the case 
of Kyiv, were also deemed to be proportionally 
representative. Interviews included three 
questions: 
regarding human security were identified. The 
concept of human security was understood as a 
broad issue and not limited to violence or politics 
or food security only. With this background in 
mind, interviewees were encouraged to explain 
what they consider human insecurity factors, be 
it at home, at their workplaces, or in the wider 
community, both collectively and individually. 
1.  What are the situations that could happen in Kyiv/
Simferopol that you would call insecure?
2.  Did any such situation ever happen to you, your 
friends, people you know? 
3.  Whom can you turn to for help in such situations?
Challenges faced by the interviewers
Practical challenges were often related to 
people’s sense of insecurity, and in some cases, 
a direct result of them. Specific issues that 
were sensitive in some contexts were ethnicity, 
political parties, and historical references to 
conflict dynamics, which could not be mentioned 
in some of the country chapters as such. It is 
important to be aware of the need to be especially 
careful when working with local organisations in 
this regard. From this point of view, the studies 
and recommendations are primarily aimed at 
supporting the participating organisations to 
use human security as an entry point for ‘insider 
strategies’ for constructive dialogue, to help 
them change things from within their respective 
contexts.
The degree to which people were comfortable to 
talk about security varied, also influencing the 
methods and processes to gather the results. 
The process revealed the negative connotations 
with the word ‘security’ and misunderstandings 
about the purpose of the study. Evidently, the term 
‘human security’ needs more explanation and has 
not yet ‘landed’ at the local level. This is relevant 
because the idea of thinking beyond traditional 
security paradigms can encourage people to tackle 
their problems differently, and deal with security 
issues through more collective and empowered 
responses. Furthermore, the issue of translations 
of the term into local languages and the possible 
change in meaning is often not considered. For 
instance, in Latin America, the term citizens’ 
security is a more widely used concept which is 
in line with, but not strictly the same, as human 
security.
To enable these discussions, it was important to 
create an environment where people felt they could 
safely express themselves, which civil society 
organisations that are rooted in local communities 
are often well-placed to do, as trust is key. This 
process can be seen as also indirectly contributing 
to awareness-raising on human security. This 
suggests that safe spaces are needed to debate 
human security issues, while ensuring the 
relevance of the concept in the specific context. 
These challenges highlight the need for further 
investment into human security methodologies.
Specific issues 
that were sensitive 
in some contexts 
were ethnicity, 
political parties, and 
historical references 
to conflict dynamics.
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relevant resources that inform policy responses. In 
other words, when research or projects on human 
security are developed on assumptions which are 
still based on traditional notions of security, how 
can they effectively contribute to the applicability 
of human security in practice? That said, it remains 
challenging to devise practices and policies that are 
consistent with human security principles without 
it being superficial. It needs to be highlighted in 
the international security discourse that this shift 
is essential to operationalise the concept, if it is 
going to effectively drive policy. To increase the 
policy relevance, new methods would require 
moving towards the subnational level to capture 
and monitor threats to human security which are 
manifested locally. It can be an important way 
of ensuring that human security is meaningful 
beyond the global policy level and in academic 
circles.
As argued by some, human security is both a means 
and an end. Even with human security principles 
applied to methods and processes, it comes with its 
own challenges. Nevertheless, if applied consistently 
with its underlying principles, methodology can 
pave the way towards operationalising human 
security from a theoretical framework towards a 
practical approach.  
people’s experienced level of freedom from fear 
or freedom from want – which underpin notions 
of human security. ‘Feeling’ secure is important 
in this regard, as it affects communities’ sense of 
empowerment or disempowerment. 
Bottom up, context specific
While proponents of the human security approach 
agree that a bottom up, localised approach is 
important and can be more effective, it is often 
not sufficiently addressed in the development of 
strategies or methods. This results in a lack of local 
ownership in the process. Individuals and local 
populations are more than the passive referent 
object of security; rather, they should be active 
agents of efforts to improve human security in 
their respective contexts. This is also related to the 
notion of empowerment, as human security should 
reinforce peoples’ ability to act on their own behalf. 
Consulting local researchers after a process is 
already in place is not the same as working together 
on equal terms in the design of the research or in 
the drafting of policy and advocacy strategies. 
Relevance for practitioners and policymakers
To adequately measure insecurity at the local 
level, the notion of human security measurement 
must be (re-)defined, time and again, by local 
actors themselves. Applying a human security 
lens to processes and methodology is important 
to reach a better understanding and locating it 
in the field. It influences choices, approaches and 
There has been a lack of attention on the 
methodological implications of the shift from 
traditional notions of security, to one that is 
localised and focused on the individual. In their 
recent article on this very issue, Mary Martin and 
Denisa Kostovicova assert that, “while critical 
thinking about security has sought to change 
understandings and produce new analytical 
perspectives, it has relied largely on methods of 
inquiry and decision-making which are rooted 
in established conventions about the nature of 
security, its objects and goals.” A critical first step 
towards making the concept useful is therefore to 
incorporate this referent shift into the methodology 
and design of human security efforts and initiatives.  
Methodology should be considered carefully as 
a way to give meaning to the human security 
approach in processes that influence policy and 
practice.
Subjectivity
Ideally, a study would combine both qualitative 
and quantitative methods and analysis. However, 
this is not without its own challenges, and there 
is no ‘perfect’ model. There are several different 
types of human security methodology, based on 
very narrowly chosen indicators or a broader set 
of threats. The studies featured in this publication 
were mainly based on qualitative approaches, in 
order to focus on capturing individual experiences 
of a broad set of threats and contributors to 
security. According to Martin and Kostivicova, 
qualitative approaches “capture both the breadth 
and depth of insecurities experienced ‘on the 
ground’, in contrast to data collection carried out 
by surveys.” While this is also subject to a degree of 
political and cultural bias of the interviewers, some 
argue that ‘geographically referenced determinants’ 
are the most useful way of dealing with human 
security methodology challenges. As individual 
experiences are subjective, perceptions may at times 
not correspond to more quantitative or ‘hard’ data. 
However, perceptions are intrinsic to understanding 
To increase the 
policy relevance, 
new methods 
would require 
moving towards the 
subnational level to 
capture and monitor 
threats to human 
security which are 
manifested locally.
Methodology challenges us to consider our basic assumptions 
about what we study and the techniques adopted by the 
researcher. The underlying methods and assumptions of the 
human security approach influence their outcome and effect. 
Methodology is important as it can to a certain degree address 
the critique on human security as too  all-encompassing and vague 
to be put into practice. 
A case for human  
security methodology 
Methodology should 
be considered 
carefully as a way 
to give meaning to 
the human security 
approach in processes 
that influence policy 
and practice.
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People interviewed in the six diverse contexts presented in this publication give a picture 
of human security from the ground up. Respondents demonstrate an acute awareness 
of the ways various aspects of security are interrelated. Human security is described 
as a subjective experience with economic, health, environmental, food, personal, 
community, and political dimensions. The stories offer insights into the key role of the 
state in ensuring individual security through public goods and the rule of law. They 
also demonstrate how states can undermine human security through weak capacity, 
corruption, and abusive behaviour. Local human security strategies demonstrate that 
people-powered initiatives are needed to complement and transform the role of the state. 
The citizen-state relationship emerges as a primary tool and indicator of human security, 
where context-specific protection and empowerment strategies go hand in hand.
Human 
Security  
and the 
Citizen-State 
Relationship
Kristen Wall
The first part of this chapter is rich in context. 
Across the diverse regions portrayed, people paint 
a paradoxical picture of the state as both a main 
provider of security and a key source of insecurity. 
While governance contexts vary greatly, the case 
studies highlight the necessity of rule of law in 
protecting people from state predation, including 
corruption and abusive or negligent security 
forces. They also demonstrate the importance 
of collective action and social movements in 
influencing security policy, and the important  
role that knowledge of human and civic rights 
plays in empowering civilians to protect 
themselves. Throughout these stories, intangible 
factors such as cultural integrity, values and 
social trust hold an essential place in individual 
experiences of security. 
The second part of the chapter examines the 
implications of these findings for the further 
development and use of human security as a 
tool for conflict prevention. Human insecurity is 
heightened in situations where the state is absent, 
weak, or unaccountable to its citizens. The stories 
presented demonstrate that human security is not 
only an outcome but a process of dialogue and 
Human security is not 
only an outcome but a 
process of dialogue and 
relationship-building.
relationship-building, both among social groups and 
between people and governing authorities. Human 
security strategies are those that transform the 
social contract towards greater state responsiveness, 
accountability and representation on the one hand, 
and increased citizen empowerment and participation 
on the other. 
The chapter concludes by exploring avenues for 
‘scaling up’ human security approaches, by examining 
two global security processes: the implementation of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security (and related resolutions), and the 
New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Though 
still in development, these initiatives can serve as 
models for designing future human security policies, 
and could themselves benefit from a more explicit 
focus on human security. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the challenges, 
limitations and unintended consequences of a 
human security approach. This includes the challenge 
of reconciling diverse priorities and individual 
perceptions of conflict contexts, and the sensitive 
question of the role of the military and security forces 
in ensuring human security. 
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Holistic experiences of security 
Across contexts as different as Afghanistan, 
Zimbabwe, and the Philippines, people’s 
perspectives on security show complex, diverse 
understandings of human security that encompass 
far more than survival or freedom from fear. 
Respondents view their security and the 
security of their communities as a multi-faceted, 
interrelated experience that includes physical 
safety, access to education, livelihood, government 
protection, health care, the right to residence, and 
development. At the same time, intangible factors 
such as trust in others, being treated with dignity, 
and protection of cultural identity and community 
are just as integral to perceptions of security. 
The interviews clearly reflect the broader notion 
of human security adopted by the UN in 2012, 
encompassing freedom from want, freedom from 
fear, and freedom to live in dignity. 
Environmental security
Environmental insecurity threatens individual 
survival and economic opportunities. In Zimbabwe, 
the government’s inability to address water 
shortages and support development in rural areas 
leads to economic insecurity and endangers 
educational rights, according to a church leader: 
“[Due to the drought] people are unable to feed 
their families and take the children to school 
because they are unable to earn a livelihood […] 
what is required is the construction of dams and 
boreholes.” In the West Bank, barriers to water 
and land access fuel economic insecurity, as a 
respondent in Jericho explains: “Farmers in areas 
north of Jericho buy water from Israel at a high 
price despite the presence of water on their land, 
as they are banned by Israel from digging artesian 
security. Some indigenous peoples (IP) leaders in 
Mindanao trace the loss of their traditional world 
view with greater intertribal conflict. In contrast, 
many Afghan respondents see cultural norms as 
a source of insecurity and refer to ‘old ways of 
thinking’ and illiteracy as causes of discrimination 
and violence against minorities and women in 
particular. A housewife in Kabul describes the 
discrimination against girls and women, violence 
against women and the constant violations of 
women’s rights as “issues that originate from lack of 
opportunities for youth, elders’ way of thinking, and 
illiterate people.”
Symbolic disrespect of cultural norms is a source 
of community insecurity. A respondent from 
the West Bank recounts the humiliation he felt 
seeing a young Muslim woman remove her body 
covering, or jilbab, in public at an Israeli checkpoint. 
In Crimea, an elderly communist expresses his 
distress at demonstrations of Ukrainian nationalists 
at the graves of Russian veterans of World War II: 
“How could the state and the government allow the 
fascists to march by our holy places? Confrontation 
is brewing.” These stories demonstrate the ways 
that cultural humiliation can foster greater conflict 
and generate future insecurity. People’s experiences 
of security encompass both tangible and intangible 
dimensions.
Women's security 
Women’s security emerges as a distinct problem 
with similar characteristics across the six diverse 
contexts featured. Direct violence against 
women often exists within a larger cultural 
context in which a lack of social respect and 
equality reduces women’s freedom of movement, 
economic and educational opportunities, political 
participation, and recourse to justice. In Zimbabwe’s 
Matabeleland, a women’s rights activist highlights 
the economic vulnerability of women in accessing 
pensions or in exercising their inheritance 
rights, as well as the discrimination felt as “even 
innocent women are arrested in leisure centres for 
alleged loitering for prostitution.” In Mexico, the 
phenomenon of femicide, the deliberate murder of 
women, is one of the more extreme examples of 
the chilling security threats women face. Cultural 
norms in many societies inherently undermine 
women’s human security. 
Traditional security providers – law enforcement, 
their communities, and their families – often do 
not address the specific security threats faced 
by women, and in too many cases contribute to 
women’s victimisation and deny them avenues 
of recourse or self-protection. One woman in 
Afghanistan highlights the security dilemma she 
and other women face: “Those who are supposed 
to ensure our security like the government and 
police turn out to be the ones who jeopardise it.” In 
East Jerusalem, a Palestinian nurse explains that in 
cases of domestic violence, women are discouraged 
from going to the police, as the community tries 
to protect men from Israeli arrest. Ensuring the 
security of the community can compromise the 
security of women. In these and other examples, 
women face human security threats that are 
uniquely related to their social inequality, exposing 
them to greater security threats and simultaneously 
limiting their sources of addressing them. 
Human security and the state
While human security emphasises the security of 
the individual, people’s views of security confirm 
that the state plays a central role in providing their 
security. Many of those interviewed see provision 
of public goods and the rule of law as the state’s 
greatest contributions to their security, rather than 
referring to state military strength as protection. 
Rule of law and public goods affect political rights, 
cultural preservation, economic opportunity, 
environmental access, and health and food safety. 
While citizens highlight the importance of the state 
as a main provider of security, they often do so in 
the context of describing the state’s failure to live up 
to its responsibilities. The state can foster insecurity 
indirectly, through its inability to provide necessary 
public services such as education, water, or policing 
against crime. It can also directly threaten civilian 
security through military campaigns, predatory 
policing, or discrimination against its own citizens. 
Inadequate policing or prosecutorial power, 
whether due to incompetence, corruption, or the 
wells – [due to the water scarcity] the crops are 
beginning to suffer.” Natural resources are a 
determinant of economic opportunities, which 
in turn affect many other dimensions of human 
security. 
Economic and political security
Economic insecurity is both a result and a cause of 
other forms of insecurity, and is intimately linked 
with political security. One shop owner in Kabul 
clearly equates his education and the opportunity 
to run his own business with increased security: 
“Education and employment have put me in a 
position to fight for my rights.” In Zimbabwe’s 
Matabeleland, respondents are concerned with a 
lack of development that they see as linked to their 
political marginalisation and the legacy of severe 
historic conflict that still feeds community tensions. 
A Filipino respondent draws the connection 
between political power, economic opportunity, 
and security by pointing to the lack of opportunities 
of poor people to change their fate, perpetuating 
an overall sense of insecurity in society. Poverty, 
political marginalisation, and insecurity go hand in 
hand.
Youth and employment
Many respondents see economic opportunity for 
others as an important element of security. They 
describe work as an important way to empower 
vulnerable people, particularly youth, who 
otherwise could be recruited for violent causes or 
become socially disruptive. A respondent in Mexico 
links the violence in Ciudad Juárez to a lack of 
opportunities for youth. A respondent in Zimbabwe 
feels that education and livelihoods of young 
people is key as it “becomes difficult for them to be 
abused by politicians for violent missions.” Part of 
respondents’ emphasis on work is the perception 
that it keeps people busy and less likely to engage 
in violence. An interviewee in Kabul is relieved 
that “everybody is so busy with their own work, 
that they do not interfere or disrupt the lives of 
others.” However, in other areas of Afghanistan, 
“unemployment has pushed people to join the 
insurgency.” In Ukraine, one mother laments the 
lack of economic opportunities for her son: “The 
state doesn’t provide for our kids.”
Cultural norms:  
source of protection or insecurity?
Cultural values are less tangible factors seen across 
regions as influencing personal and community 
People’s perspectives  
on human security
The interviews clearly reflect 
the broader notion of human 
security adopted by the UN in 
2012, encompassing freedom 
from want, freedom from fear, 
and freedom to live in dignity. 
Poverty, political 
marginalisation,  
and insecurity  
go hand in hand.
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rates as the biggest source of insecurity. Police were 
not seen as sources of protection – instead, citizens 
felt vulnerable to police abuse of state power and 
saw police as threats to security rather than as 
protectors. With security forces unaccountable to 
citizens or the law, the state was at best negligent 
and at worst a predator. 
Corruption undermined the legal system and 
deepened insecurity. In place of a predictable 
system of rules and their enforcement, the state 
acted in ways that were perceived as arbitrary and 
personality-dependent: “When you see people 
wearing uniforms, you a priori perceive them as a 
[source] of danger. You don’t know what to expect 
from them.” As a result, citizens had very low trust 
in state institutions, and fell back on themselves and 
their personal networks for security. In some cases, 
citizens had withdrawn all social trust: “Count on 
yourself. That’s all.” 
While many Ukrainian respondents seemed to 
express resignation in the low performance of the 
state, some respondents believed the state’s duty 
was to provide security. One respondent explicitly 
called for regime change, which is indicative of 
the mass unrest in Kyiv at the time. While the 
state was maligned as a source of insecurity, the 
expectation that it should provide security still 
prevailed.
In Mexico, respondents similarly describe a state 
in which weak and corrupt law enforcement and 
justice systems have resulted in citizen insecurity 
and violence perpetrated by both non-state and 
state actors. The weakness of the justice system 
and law enforcement capacities, compounded by 
corruption and collusion of the state apparatus in 
illegal activities, leaves the state unable to protect 
citizens against the twofold threat of drug cartels or 
predatory state behaviour. 
Insecurities resulting from the weak rule of 
law intensified when the Mexican government 
initiated a militarised campaign to stop drug 
violence in 2006. Devastating violence against 
citizens grew exponentially. According to an 
interviewee of Nuevo León in northern Mexico, 
“[a militarised approach] led to more fear and the 
suppression of activities in the public space.” With 
the rule of law already weak, the militarisation of 
the conflict left citizens with few avenues for state 
protection or redress. 
A citizen security approach developed by civil 
society in collaboration with government has 
proven more effective in protecting citizens from 
violence. By aiming to strengthen the accountability 
of local officials to their communities, many of the 
reforms that have been instituted to address the 
violence have focused on rule of law reforms. This 
has included reform of the legal framework, the 
judicial system, and strengthening law enforcement 
mechanisms. Strengthening citizen voices in security 
policymaking helped to demilitarise the conflict in 
Mexico, increasing human security.  
In both Ukraine and Mexico, the absence of state 
services and state protection has left citizens 
vulnerable to violence from crime, and the 
impunity and negligence of police forces and 
the ineffectiveness of the justice system are also 
significant threats to security. Citizens’ efforts to 
develop greater security involve strengthening the 
rule of law and making the state more accountable 
and responsive to citizens. 
Indigenous societies and the state: the 
Philippines and Zimbabwe
In Mindanao, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe, 
the existence of traditional tribes presents a 
different relationship between the rule of law 
and human security. The role of the state vis-à-
vis indigenous governance structures is complex 
and simultaneously a driver of conflict as well as a 
potential source of security. In traditional societies, 
establishing contemporary rule of law can impose a 
foreign and sometimes hostile system of governance 
that complicates or destroys traditional customs 
and identities. Yet if used to carve out legal space 
for traditional governance structures and leadership 
within the state, it can be a source of community 
security.
are serving the population, referring to self-interest 
and political dynamics. The contrast between 
the security derived from a system of law versus 
the insecurity from unaccountable leaders and 
weak governance was most clearly stated by a 
respondent in Kabul who felt that: “The current 
government is the most important driver of my 
insecurity because it is a collection of warlords. I 
fear this country will go back to the old times. But 
the presence of a system in Afghanistan makes me 
feel secure […] now there is a system in place for 
everything even though it doesn’t work.” While 
the presence of a new system is better than a total 
lack of governance, its incomplete application is a 
source of insecurity. 
The ability of the government to provide 
protection against direct violence remains a key 
source of citizen security or insecurity. Those 
who do not feel protected by the government will 
seek physical protection where they can find it. 
According to another respondent, people were 
often heard saying that life under the Taliban 
regime, though it was difficult, was physically 
safer. 
Citizens in Afghanistan highlight the central 
role that the existence of a state plays in their 
experiences of security. Most essentially, citizens 
refer to the rule of law and provision of physical 
protection as the basis for their perceptions of 
security or insecurity. When political leaders and 
security forces are not accountable to the law, 
ordinary people are more vulnerable. 
Rule of law: Ukraine and Mexico
In Ukrainea and Mexico, two states with a history 
of one-party rule, people’s concerns about 
insecurity stem largely from a perceived lack of 
state ability or political will to establish and enforce 
the rule of law. The rule of law protects citizens 
against external threats, such as organised and 
petty crime, and against internal threats from the 
arbitrary use of state power against its own citizens. 
In Ukraine, respondents in late 2013 described 
weak rule of law as a key source of insecurity. 
A lack of police accountability resulted in lax 
enforcement of laws, impunity, and rising crime. A 
majority of Kyiv respondents reported high crime 
a  Interviews were conducted in Kyiv and the Crimean capital of 
Simferopol in the period preceding and during escalating street protests 
that resulted in the removal of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. 
politicisation of security instruments, leaves citizens 
vulnerable to violence from non-state actors or the 
state itself. 
People’s experiences of the state vary considerably 
according to the state’s capacity and structure, and 
the identity and histories of communities living 
under it. The following section outlines four types 
of governance contexts reflected in the respondent 
stories: a newly formed democratic constitutional 
system, transitional states, indigenous communities 
within states, and statelessness. In each of these 
contexts, we see the paradoxical role of the state in 
both ensuring and undermining human security.
A newly formed democratic constitutional 
system: Afghanistan 
The importance of an existing state and justice 
system is most evident in Afghanistan, where 
many respondents refer to the newly established 
democratic constitutional system and functioning 
government as an important source of security. As 
an NGO worker in Kabul notes, “The factor that 
contributes to my sense of security is the presence 
of a government, even if it’s weak. A few years ago 
we didn’t even have a government.” Specifically, the 
legal system is seen as an important guarantor of 
security – while the courts and police are unreliably 
effective or protective, their presence contributes to 
a sense of security. 
The new democratic constitutional system exists 
alongside a political order that many respondents 
see as a source of insecurity. Many citizens express 
scepticism that political leaders or security forces 
 The rule of law protects 
citizens against external 
threats, such as organised 
and petty crime, and against 
internal threats from the 
arbitrary use of state power 
against its own citizens. 
Strengthening citizen voices in 
security policymaking helped 
to demilitarise the conflict in 
Mexico, increasing human 
security. 
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residents’ of Israel. In theory, these territories are 
also governed by international humanitarian law 
(IHL), but in practice, international rule of law 
is weak and provides little protection and few 
operational mechanisms to which Palestinian 
individuals can appeal. Palestinians in Gaza, the 
West Bank, and East Jerusalem suffer from an 
overwhelming list of insecurities. These can be 
attributed in large part to a lack of international 
capacity to enforce international law under the 
Israeli occupation, and the occupation’s preclusion 
of a sovereign Palestinian state capable of 
promulgating and enforcing domestic rule of law. 
Violations of international law create multiple 
experiences of insecurity. In the West Bank, the 
continued building of Israeli settlements, which 
violate IHL prohibitions against settling occupied 
territory, limit access to land and water and directly 
endanger Palestinian livelihoods. Periodic Israeli 
military action compounds the sense of insecurity. 
In Gaza, even before direct hostilities in 2014, 
the closure of borders and naval blockade had 
diminished many aspects of human security, chief 
among them economic opportunity. The blockade 
has made medical care difficult to obtain, and daily 
electricity cuts, a lack of clean water, and poor 
health care facilities compromise civilian health. The 
blockade limits freedom of movement, cutting off 
Gazans from their families and cultural peers in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem, 
Palestinians’ permanent resident status can be 
revoked and their homes demolished, leaving them 
stateless or homeless.
As a result of the ongoing occupation and internal 
political divisions, Palestinian territories have 
been unable or unwilling to form functional 
governance structures. Although the Oslo 
Accords delegated some governance tasks to the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel retains ultimate 
authority. The PA lacks authority over its borders 
and the autonomy to establish security, regulate 
and develop the economy, and ensure the free 
movement of Palestinian civilians. A resulting lack 
of a functioning state affects food quality and safety, 
health care quality, and government responsiveness. 
Similarly, while the Oslo Accords created 
Palestinian security forces, they have limited 
jurisdiction and autonomy to protect Palestinians in 
the West Bank or Gaza. This has led to an increase 
in theft, crime, and a growing drug trade. A lack 
of governance is compounded by deep, sometimes 
of IPs and is a threat to their cultural identity and 
dignity. IP leaders have sought to engage the legal 
process through the Indigenous People’s Rights Act 
(IPRA) of 1997, as a way to balance preservation of 
their own governance structures within the rule of 
law. While IPs seek representation in the state, they 
uniquely request state recognition and inclusion 
of their own distinct governance structures and 
traditional territorial rights. 
By contrast, the Moros have achieved fuller 
governance autonomy through the 2014 
Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro, and 
expect to develop their own culturally derived 
systems of governance. While the Moros have 
gained greater cultural representation through the 
peace process, the security of IPs in the same region 
is less assured. IP leaders fear that IPRA will not 
be implemented under Moro governance. Both 
communities seek culturally congruent systems of 
governance, and express the need for the Philippine 
state to enforce the implementation of laws that 
preserve order and grant greater cultural autonomy 
and protection. 
In Zimbabwe, ancestral leadership structures 
continue to play a significant role in rural life. 
Traditional courts take community violence cases, 
dispensing justice in a way that is meant to build 
and repair social relationships rather than punish 
offenders. The chiefs and village heads respond to 
community grievances such as domestic violence, 
lack of access to healthcare, food insecurity, and 
health concerns. Violent conflict in the recent 
past has left a legacy that traditional leaders must 
address: “The tension between the [Shona and 
the Ndebele tribes] has been very intense with 
[the Shona] continuing to vie for supremacy in 
their spaces of influence.” Security in traditional 
communities is at risk from political conflicts 
that trace their roots back to the colonial era and 
Zimbabwe’s war of independence.
Traditional leaders have historically been impartial 
and expected to serve all of the people in their 
area. However, they have been heavily courted by 
political parties for their influence and some have 
been co-opted by political interests. One traditional 
leader explains that: “Some of our subjects feel 
insecure if they are viewed as hostile to the political 
persuasion of the local traditional leader.” Politicised 
traditional leadership creates unrest and provokes 
grievances over unequal treatment at the grassroots 
The conflict in Mindanao is partially a nested set of 
disputes about governance systems, including justice 
mechanisms, leadership representation, and forms 
of administrative government. While the conflict 
between the armed Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and the Philippine government has been 
the focus of international peacebuilding efforts, the 
perspectives shared by indigenous peoples (IPs) 
reveal a less visible side of the conflict. Rule of law 
as understood from a liberal, statist perspective is 
a system that is distinct from and often in conflict 
with the traditional governance structures of IP 
communities, which pre-date the Philippine state. 
As one IP leader notes: “The government has used 
its legal platform and authority to reduce and even 
remove the presence of our tribes.” IP leaders talk 
about their communities’ preferences for traditional 
governance systems that are based on longstanding 
traditions, leadership lineages, and tribal values and 
customs.  
IPs characterise the state as a negligent or 
destructive force that encroaches on their land and 
endangers community members. The Philippine 
government has not adequately acknowledged 
tribal leadership, but instead appoints its own IP 
representatives who are not seen by IPs as authentic 
or legitimate. Lack of authentic representation in 
the Philippine state has increased the vulnerability 
level. Political polarisation has negatively influenced 
traditional sources of community governance.
For indigenous cultures, the role of the state is 
complex. The state may carry the legacy of colonial 
era practices and social divisions that continue 
historic repression or marginalisation of indigenous 
groups. A lack of indigenous influence on state 
behaviour or the co-optation of traditional leaders 
can leave traditional communities vulnerable to 
state violence and exploitation from commercial 
actors. Rule of law can undermine cultural integrity 
and the freedom to dignity or community security 
if imposed on traditional cultures. But if it is used to 
protect traditional values and governance structures, 
it has the potential to be a source of human 
security. 
Without a state: 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Insecurity is heightened for a population when 
they lack a state that legally or functionally 
represents them. Extended military occupationb of 
Palestinian territories has meant that generations of 
Palestinians have lived without state representation 
or protection. Instead, Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza are governed by Israeli military 
law, with some local governance provided by the 
Palestinian Authority and Hamas respectively, while 
Palestinians living in East Jerusalemc are ‘permanent 
b  Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories since 1967, when it 
captured the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan and Egypt, respectively. 
International humanitarian law (IHL), which governs situations of armed 
conflict or occupation, obliges occupying powers to protect occupied 
populations. 
c  Israel unilaterally annexed portions of East Jerusalem in 1967, a 
violation of IHL, which prohibits such annexation by occupying powers.
Rule of law can undermine 
cultural integrity and the 
freedom to dignity or 
community security if imposed 
on traditional cultures. But if 
it is used to protect traditional 
values and governance 
structures, it has the potential 
to be a source of human 
security. 
Insecurity is 
heightened for a 
population when 
they lack a state that 
legally or functionally 
represents them. 
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The other side of empowerment:  
arming civilians
Citizen empowerment strategies are not always 
nonviolent. The chapter on Mexico distinguishes 
between functional empowerment strategies such 
as lobbying and holding the state accountable 
to human rights standards, and dysfunctional 
empowerment strategies such as forming armed 
militia groups. The latter might solve immediate 
security problems but create larger problems in 
the future. Similarly in Mindanao, in the face of 
ongoing violence and few avenues for protection 
or recourse, IPs have armed themselves, sometimes 
forming small militia groups. Empowerment in the 
short-term may lead to greater insecurity in the 
long-term.
Disempowerment
There are also varying level of empowerment. 
Palestinian accounts, particularly those in Gazad, 
stand out for the extent of disempowerment 
expressed by respondents. A lack of state protection 
and avenues for redress of grievances has fed 
resignation, and respondents say that the multitude 
of problems is psychologically overwhelming: 
“there is despair and depression, because people are 
insecure, their rights have been stolen, and there 
is no one to turn to. People have just started to 
surrender.” Experiences of cultural fragmentation 
have also contributed to the erosion of internal 
sources of resilience. This sense of a cultural lack of 
empowerment was also visible amongst the more 
vulnerable respondents in other contexts, such as 
Ukraine, where respondents expressed extreme 
pessimism that they could find protection or help 
anywhere in society. As Sen and Ogata point out, 
empowerment often depends on the existence of 
legal systems and alternate avenues of power that 
citizens can leverage to advocate on their behalf. 
Empowerment and protection go hand in hand.  
d  Interviews were conducted in early 2014 prior to the Israeli aerial and 
ground campaigns in July 2014.
or organisations, and involve generating social 
solidarity through mediating social conflict at a 
grassroots level. Collective empowerment can 
transform the cultural norms and relationships that 
foster insecurity.
Mexicans have been able to build social 
movements capable of pressuring the government 
to reform security policy. One national victim’s 
movement, the Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia 
y Dignidad, has conducted mass actions that have 
raised awareness of the victims of the violence 
in Mexico. The movement also calls for broader 
social transformation: “The movement is not only 
focused on victims’ attention, but in a deep and 
meaningful transformation of the country.” Social 
movements have been sources of profound citizen 
empowerment that can change government policy.
Conflict resolution mechanisms old and new
Civilians have found empowerment by turning to 
community conflict resolution processes. In the 
Philippines, civil society and tribal leaders have 
de-escalated longstanding intertribal violence by 
reconciling tribal differences and emphasizing their 
shared kinship. Through bottom-up consultative 
processes, tribes have forged intertribal covenants 
and revived traditional conflict resolutions 
processes. In the absence of rule of law, pre-
existing traditional customs have filled the void of 
governance. These traditional conflict resolution 
systems have reduced the length and escalation of 
violent conflict.
In Zimbabwe, the Ecumenical Church Leaders 
Forum (ECLF), a grouping of church leaders 
from all denominations, succeeded in bringing 
together diverse political leaders, traditional and 
church leaders to equip them with mediation and 
dialogue skills for conflict prevention, management, 
resolution, and integration (CPMRT) to decrease 
community violence. In the district of Nyaki, one of 
the sites of extreme political violence in the 1980s, 
police have noted a decrease in crime and violence 
since the programme began. The success of the 
CPMRT program and the need to sustain it in their 
communities prompted participants to form local 
peace committees (LPCs) on their own. According 
to an advisor to a traditional leader in Masvingo, the 
LPCs have enabled the community to de-escalate 
political violence.
from the state or recourse to external authorities, 
such as NGOs and international organisations. 
Ideally, they require a degree of political freedom, 
where challenging or contesting the ruling powers 
is possible. As Sen and Ogata write: “Protection 
and empowerment are mutually reinforcing. 
People protected can exercise many choices. 
And people empowered can avoid some risks 
and demand improvements in the system of 
protection.”2 
Rights and literacy
The existence of a legal framework or other 
mechanisms for recourse to legal or community 
action supports citizen empowerment. In Ukraine, 
some respondents found that they can protect 
themselves from abuse by state actors when they 
are educated and demand their rights. Citizens 
can force state actors to be more accountable 
when they are informed about the laws and are 
empowered to demand their own fair treatment 
and protection from the authorities. In Afghanistan, 
several respondents refer to human rights and 
literacy as key sources of empowerment and 
individual and collective security. Literacy is also 
mentioned by several respondents as an important 
component of human security in the context of 
being protected by an educated society. Societies 
can become collectively empowered. As a professor 
in Kabul says: “People now have a sense of what 
their rights are, so if something happens, you know 
you can go to the many independent agencies to 
file a complaint and get help.”
Including citizens in policymaking
Governments can facilitate citizen empowerment 
by inviting their participation in policy-making. 
President Calderon’s invitation to Mexican civil 
society for collaboration on security issues in 
Ciudad Juárez resulted in the civil-government 
security partnership Mesa de seguridad. The result 
of this long-term multi-stakeholder dialogue was an 
agenda to demilitarise the government’s security 
strategy. It began to address deficiencies in the 
legal and enforcement system, while increasing the 
participation of citizens in local city government.
Social movements
Other citizen empowerment strategies increase 
human security by transforming social relationships 
outside of the formal state, thus developing greater 
social cohesion, trust, and power. Such movements 
are less dependent upon external authorities 
violent political divisions within the Palestinian 
community, which further undermine human 
insecurity. 
The convoluted, multi-layered framework of 
international law, Israeli military law, and domestic 
policy that governs Palestinian life creates the effect 
of a lack of governance or order. The complex 
situation in the Palestinian territories reveals gaps in 
the system of international law, the vulnerabilities 
of living under hostile occupation without a state 
of one’s own, and the weakness of an incapacitated 
and divided domestic authority. The international 
community, Israeli military law, and Palestinian 
national leadership are often in conflict and have 
largely failed to ensure the dignity, economic 
wellbeing, or even survival of average civilians. As 
a result, many individuals report a growing sense of 
futility and disempowerment. 
People’s empowerment
In their influential 2003 report Human Security 
Now, Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata introduced 
the protection/empowerment framework distinct to 
human security. Protection strategies are top-down 
practices by the state and other external actors that 
shield people from threats they cannot overcome 
on their own. Citizen empowerment reflects the 
agency of everyday people in ensuring their own 
security. “Empowerment strategies enable people to 
develop their resilience to difficult conditions,” write 
Sen and Ogata. “People empowered can demand 
respect for their dignity when it is violated. They 
can create new opportunities for work and address 
many problems locally. And they can mobilise for 
the security of others.”1 
Respondents across the six contexts presented 
demonstrate a range of empowerment strategies – 
from individual pursuit of equal rights to collective 
action. Some of these depend upon protection 
Social movements have been 
sources of profound citizen 
empowerment that can 
change government policy.
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may create the conditions for prolonging conflict 
in the long-term by undermining rule of law and 
creating future sources of insecurity.  
protection strategies should at the least do minimal 
harm to, and ideally protect and strengthen practices 
and institutions of the rule of law. State protection 
approaches can also complement bottom-up 
empowerment approaches. For example, police 
have referred cases to the local peace committees 
in Zimbabwe, which include traditional, civic, and 
political leaders, to manage and resolve community 
conflicts using traditional mechanisms. 
The principle of complementarity applies to citizen 
empowerment strategies as well. When citizens arm 
themselves and form militia groups, their response 
may effectively win security in the short term, but 
more powerful in their relationships with the state. 
Their influence helped lead to a change in state 
protection strategies from a militarised model to a 
rule of law model. In Zimbabwe, the formation of 
local peace committees brings together state and 
non-state community leaders to resolve conflicts 
ranging from community to domestic violence. 
While limited attention has been paid to the 
link between human security and international 
law, rule of law as part of the domestic policy 
framework has not garnered adequate attention in 
literature on human security.3 The perspectives of 
citizens presented in this publication suggest that 
strengthening the rule of law and improving the 
citizen-state relationship can be key human security 
strategies. Future study of the operationalisation of 
human security should therefore further examine 
the role of rule of law in achieving human security. 
Complementarity
The importance of the rule of law in providing 
human security addresses what is frequently 
perceived as a tension between a national security 
versus a human security approach. When national 
security strategies undermine the rule of law, 
they erode a key source of present or future state 
protection for citizens. A human security approach 
calls for complementarity between national security 
policies and the rule of law. When national security 
strategies undermine the transparent and fair use of 
civil and criminal courts, introduce military forces to 
conduct police operations, or violate domestic and 
international law, they undermine the foundations 
of human security. State protection strategies should, 
to the degree possible, reinforce each other, rather 
than conflict. To be effective in the long-term, state 
Human security and the rule of law
A key finding to emerge from the six contexts 
examined here is the central role of the citizen-
state relationship in shaping individual experiences 
of security. The case studies present a range of 
governance contexts, from centralised states to 
weak states to statelessness. Across the majority of 
contexts, respondents refer to the rule of law – a 
legal system of rules applied equally to all citizens, 
enforced by governing authorities – as one of the 
greatest contributors or missing sources of security. 
Rule of law reflects the conditions of the social 
contract. In a democratic society, laws articulate 
widely shared norms and agreements about rules 
to govern society, and reflect citizens’ interests 
and perspectives. As noted by Ogata and Sen, the 
rule of law not only protects citizens through law 
enforcement, but empowers them by establishing 
systems of recourse and legal standards to which 
they can hold the state accountable. The rule of law 
is one expression of the state-society relationship.
Citizen trust in the institutions of rule of law – the 
judiciary, the police, and the legal system itself – 
may be one useful indicator of the levels of human 
security in a population. If citizens do not trust state 
institutions, it is likely that the state is not providing 
key aspects of human security. Respondents in all 
contexts express their fear or mistrust of police and 
military forces. 
The citizen-state relationship
Effective human security strategies transform the 
citizen-state relationship. They make the state 
more responsive, trustworthy, and accountable 
while empowering citizens to participate in 
governance and address social conflicts. Successful 
human security strategies both improve the 
state’s effectiveness at protecting citizens and 
simultaneously empower those citizens. For 
example, the existence of civic-government policy 
platforms has enabled Mexican citizens to become 
Implications  
for human security
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approaches yet to be accepted as ‘best practices’ 
by many governments and intergovernmental 
organisations.
Gendered security 
The practical application of a people-centred 
approach in the security field can learn from recent 
global efforts to address women’s specific security 
needs and the development of gender-sensitive 
approaches. The UN Security Council Resolution 
(SCR) 1325 on Women Peace and Security is built 
on a strategy of prevention, participation, and 
protection, which are also key human security 
principles. By emphasising consultative processes 
and women’s participation in formulating security 
policies, SCR 1325 provides an opportunity to 
ensure women’s participation in public dialogue. 
Women’s voices are usually missing from official 
state policymaking and discussions: “Precisely 
because states and state security systems are 
gendered, women’s experiences and analysis are not 
often captured in the dominant discourse.”6 Cultural 
and psychological barriers, particularly in traditional 
societies, often prevent women from participating 
in community decision-making or in disclosing 
their experiences of gender-based violence. Such 
obstacles reinforce the need for a people-centred 
approach and an emphasis on empowerment to 
ensure women’s participation.f
In addition, gender advocates have also made 
great strides in developing gender-sensitive 
approaches to conflict analysis and programming.7 
Such approaches go beyond a focus on women 
to identify the ways that socialised gender roles 
support cultural values that condone or enable 
f  While this publication focuses on women’s security with regards to 
gender, it recognises that gender-specific forms of violence and related 
security needs go beyond women as a group, and merit their own analysis 
and people-centred solutions. 
Expanding the traditional security discourse
When applied to the traditional security sphere, 
human security principles have the potential to 
transform security policies and approaches by 
involving affected individuals and communities in 
redesigning security goals and strategies. As this 
publication argues, more inclusive security processes 
change security outcomes. Inclusive policymaking 
can yield innovative solutions that protect 
individuals and their communities more effectively.
Rather than proposing a wholly new approach, 
inclusive security imports concepts and approaches 
more familiar in governance and development to 
reframe and expand traditional security discourse. 
People-centred, participatory approaches are 
widely accepted in the development sector. For 
example, the World Bank through their ‘Voices of 
the Poor’ project in 1999 conducted a large scale 
survey of more than 60,000 poor individuals from 
sixty countries in order to make economic and 
development policies more effective and people-
centred. Some of their recommendations run 
parallel to those advocated for in a human security 
approach, including a focus on protection and 
empowerment, and strengthening the citizen-state 
relationship. In their conclusion, ‘An Empowering 
Approach to Poverty Reduction’, authors Deepa 
Narayan and Patti Patesch advocate
promoting equal and effective relationships 
between poor people and the state. Fostering 
such partnership processes requires a dual focus 
on actions that, on the one hand, improve state 
capacity to grasp poor people’s needs and […] 
strengthen poor people’s capacity to mobilize, 
articulate and defend their interests, and hold 
government accountable.5
Such people-centred approaches are increasingly 
identified as best practices in food security, health 
care access, and community development. Human 
security advocates for a similar approach in the 
security sector, applicable both in the analysis of 
security threats and in the design of intervention 
strategies. While innovative case studies of people-
centred security strategies can be harvested from 
civil society organisations in the peacebuilding field 
across the world,e these continue to be isolated 
e  See for example the mapping of such initiatives conducted by GPPAC 
and the Alliance for Peacebuilding under the Civil Society and Security Sector 
Engagement for Human Security project, and the People’s Peacemaking 
Perspectives Project implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld.
responsibility not just to provide for welfare, or 
representation, but – first and foremost – to ensure 
the security of their citizens. This is arguably the 
basic compact or contract that led humanity out 
of the Hobbesian anarchy.”4 A similar conclusion 
is made in the chapter on Ukraine, which suggests 
that Ukraine needs a modern ‘demand-driven’ 
security approach that puts police in the role of 
service providers rather than armed semi-military 
forces. 
By democratising security, human security 
strategies also require the transformation of 
social relationships beyond the citizen-state 
relationship. Successful human security strategies 
mediate social conflicts and generate new social 
capital. The citizen-led biking initiative started 
by activists in northern Mexico is generating 
new civic relationships by demonstrating public 
ownership of public spaces and building public 
trust and respect. In the Philippines, tribes have 
overcome longstanding violence through a series of 
reconciliation ceremonies that rekindle traditional 
kinship alliances. Civic collaboration has enabled 
people to engage government more effectively and 
promote more holistic approaches to deep-seated 
security problems. Increased civic collaboration 
has empowered government to more effectively 
address the needs of previously polarized social 
groups. Thus, human security strategies also enable 
the state to meet diverse security needs more 
equitably. Democratising security requires that the 
state and civil society increase collaboration and 
responsiveness to a more diverse set of groups. 
In The Palestinian territories and the Philippines, 
some have taken up arms to defend themselves 
against violence. This approach has sometimes 
triggered retaliation and has militarised 
communities, creating a new set of security 
challenges. Both bottom-up empowerment 
approaches and top-down protective security 
strategies should be complementary, so that they 
contribute to rather than diminish each other. The 
interconnected and multidimensional nature of 
human security also necessitates complementarity 
among interconnected sectors, for example, natural 
resource management and economic policy. 
Democratising security
Human security encompasses both an outcome 
and a process. The outcome is the preservation of 
citizen life, livelihood, and dignity. The process is a 
democratic one that requires engaging local people 
in dialogue on their security perceptions, needs, 
and solutions. Human security calls for opening up 
security policy formulation to greater democratic 
participation and to greater accountability to 
the rule of law and international human rights. 
Advancing democracy in the security sphere by 
empowering citizens to participate in public policy 
and hold the state accountable is the primary 
way that human security strategies transform the 
relationship of the citizen to the state. 
Some argue that human security is a logical 
extension of democracy and human rights. The 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) argues that human 
security is the logical extension of the basic liberal 
democracy paradigm, where state legitimacy 
is based on the ability of the state to protect 
fundamental individual rights. “States have 
Applications in  
conflict prevention
Successful human 
security strategies 
mediate social 
conflicts and generate 
new social capital. Inclusive policymaking can 
yield innovative solutions that 
protect individuals and their 
communities more effectively.
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The subjective and psychological dimensions of 
individual security are also vulnerable to influence 
or manipulation by outside forces. In many contexts, 
political leaders may target outside groups as security 
threats and mobilise citizens in perceived self-defence 
or retaliation. To avoid the manipulation of subjective 
experiences of security, particularly the phenomena 
of scapegoating and xenophobia, that can provide 
simplistic understanding of the sources of insecurity, 
it is important to emphasise the preventive, 
multidimensional aspect of human security, as well 
as uphold the principle of complementarity with the 
rule of law.
Expanding the definition of ‘security’ has potential 
drawbacks as well. There is a danger that rather 
than humanising security, human security can 
inadvertently support policies that ‘securitise’ 
development as has been observed in such contexts 
as Afghanistan, where development projects have 
been undertaken by the military as a means to win 
military objectives. Analysis of such an approach 
in Afghanistan has found that these development 
projects often fail to deliver economic or social 
benefit for local communities, and diminish 
rather than contribute to security because they 
feed corruption and do not address the political 
drivers of conflict.15 While it is important to draw 
the conceptual link between development and 
security, there must also be the awareness among 
proponents in the human security community 
that ‘security’ is often equated with militarised 
approaches in policy communities. 
process, strengthen civil society, and highlight the 
interdependency of transnational threats and local 
security.13
In spite of the challenges it faces, the New Deal 
is an example of the kind of unifying framework 
that a human security approach could provide in 
designing integrated approaches to development 
and peace. It has catalysed the formation of broad 
civil society coalitions spanning human rights, 
natural resources management, women’s rights, 
poverty reduction and others. It has facilitated new 
collaboration by actors across the development 
and governance spectrum. The New Deal creates 
a platform for government, civil society, and 
donors to identify root causes of conflict and 
strategies for addressing them. As such, it is one 
example of the way human security can work 
at the global level to support conflict resolution 
efforts. In global conversations on the post-2015 
development framework that will replace the 
Millennium Development Goals, many civil society 
organisations are advocating for the inclusion of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding goals like those 
found in the New Deal.14 
Challenges and unintended consequences
As it democratises security, human security 
brings with it the challenge of addressing 
subjective and conflicting security needs and 
perceptions. Security is no longer solely defined 
by state actors, but with the input of people 
from different social groups with different and 
sometimes competing needs and interests. Multi-
stakeholder dialogue processes are necessary 
to mediate these myriad interests and develop 
understanding and consensus on solutions to 
security problems. Human security brings the 
challenge of integrating and addressing the needs 
and sometimes conflicting perspectives of groups 
in society. As the Mexico and Philippines case 
studies demonstrate, social polarisation can be 
reconciled through structured multi-stakeholder 
dialogues over time, and can give direction to 
government policy. Such processes are complex 
and challenging to initiate and facilitate, and 
require long-term engagement. Human security 
approaches should give greater support to civil 
society, the state, and international actors in 
developing the political will and capacity to 
organize ongoing, inclusive dialogue processes.
 
analytical frames and intervention points with 
which to address root causes of conflict.
A key challenge for human security lies in ‘scaling 
up’ the types of intervention approaches presented 
in the preceding chapters. Human security is context 
dependent, which complicates efforts to mainstream 
it as a large scale approach. The example of the 
New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the 
New Deal) provides a possibility of a global human 
security approach that remains context-driven by 
focusing on inclusive processes and building the 
relationship between the state and society.
The New Deal addresses the impact of prolonged 
conflict on development. Initiated by the g7+, a 
self-identified group of 19 conflict-affected, so-
called ‘fragile’ states, the New Deal establishes 
new partnerships between donor states, fragile 
states, and civil society to create “country-led and 
country-owned transitions out of fragility.”9 While 
not explicitly endorsing a human security approach, 
the process embodies human security principles in 
several ways.10 The New Deal agreement commits 
signatories to ‘inclusive and participatory political 
dialogue’ and identifies civil society actors as primary 
partners in the process.11 It states that ‘people’s 
security’ is one of five primary peacebuilding and 
statebuilding goals (PSGs) that it seeks to achieve. It 
recognises that, “Constructive state-society relations 
[…] are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and 
statebuilding.”12
As a result, in several countries piloting the New 
Deal, civil society, governments, and international 
actors have come together to engage in new 
dialogues on how to create the political, economic, 
and security conditions for peace and stability. A 
practical example of how a people-centred approach 
has been applied in this process is the development 
of perception-based indicators, which reflect actual 
citizen experiences of, for instance, security, freedom 
and health, to measure the impact of state policies. 
The successful implementation of this relatively 
new framework is challenging and still uncertain. 
There is limited evidence that the ‘peoples’ security’ 
goal has been implemented substantially. Some 
civil society participants are calling for a more 
explicit focus on human security as a way to 
strengthen the agreement. This would promote 
more robust national dialogue, open up civilian and 
civil society space for greater participation in the 
violence. Male and female gender experts’ 
experience in navigating diverse perspectives can be 
important resources and models for managing the 
subjectivity of human security. 
Women’s rights advocates argue that women’s 
participation is not only important for a truly 
inclusive human security, but that human security, 
broadly speaking, is dependent upon women’s 
security and empowerment. Research suggests 
that women’s security and equality supports 
broad economic development, improves health 
for children, and is correlated with lower levels 
of state violence. The participation of women 
in politics, economic life, security forces, and 
peacekeeping supports the economic security 
of families, the effectiveness of police forces, 
lowers corruption, and is correlated with lower 
rates of state aggression.8 Women’s security can 
be strengthened by a focus on human security, 
and can be used as an indicator to assess overall 
human security.
Scaling up human security
At a coordinating level, conflict prevention 
efforts can benefit from using the human security 
framework. Human security’s broad focus can 
enable the mobilisation and integration of diverse 
sectors – government, health, food, economic 
development, natural resource management, etc. – 
that can work together to analyse root causes of 
conflict, identify overlapping goals and interests 
of stakeholders, and design multidimensional 
intervention strategies and public policies. By 
taking into account the diverse vulnerabilities and 
capacities of individuals and their communities, 
human security offers a deep and wide set of 
Gender experts’ experience 
in navigating diverse 
perspectives can be important 
resources and models for 
managing the subjectivity of 
human security accounts.
Security is no longer solely 
defined by state actors,  
but with the input of people 
from different social groups 
with different and sometimes 
competing needs and 
interests. 
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recognising that peacebuilding and statebuilding 
must be led by affected countries rather than by 
donor states. They also recognise that state-led 
implementation is not sufficient and that building 
peaceful societies requires a partnership between 
states, international institutions, and affected 
communities. 
The applicability of human security as a policy 
framework is not limited to conflict-affected states 
that receive international aid. Human security is 
a useful tool and approach that can be used in 
higher income, politically stable nations to advance 
the economic, political, social, and environmental 
security of their residents. As argued by Sharbanou 
Tadjbakhsh, an important breakthrough for the 
application of human security will occur “when 
industrialised donor countries, together with 
developing ones, apply the concept to their 
domestic policies.”19 While the people-centred 
principles of human security remain universally 
applicable, their practical application must be 
responsive to local contexts, gender-sensitive, and 
enable the empowerment of the people they aim to 
support. 
Where national security strategies undermine rule of 
law, human security advocates should highlight the 
short- and long-term risks of such an approach. On 
the other hand, actors such as the DCAF warn that: 
“Encouraging good governance with lower military 
spending may actually, in some cases, leave a state 
prey to lawlessness and anarchy. Of course, the 
goal is to contribute to the construction of strong 
and legitimate states, but the potential dilemmas or 
unanticipated consequences that human security 
policies may trigger must be recognised.”17 A 
state must be capable as well as responsive. This 
is a difficult balance that must be engaged and 
addressed.
Other critiques of human security argue that 
the focus on the individual disempowers rather 
than empowers because it doesn’t sufficiently 
acknowledge the international political, economic, 
and military factors that shape or coerce state 
policy, particularly in weak states directly influenced 
by the international community. One critique 
argues that: “Through pathologising the weak or 
underdeveloped state and recasting sovereignty in 
terms of responsibility, international institutions and 
states have potentially greater freedom to intervene 
in or regulate weak or failing states…. the citizens 
in weak or unstable states may arguably have even 
less freedom or power than under the old pluralist 
security framework.”18 Related critiques have been 
that human security gives legitimacy to military 
interventions conducted by powerful international 
actors. 
 
While some of this critique has been addressed 
through the explicit recognition by the UN 
that human security does not compromise 
state sovereignty, it is an important point that 
international institutions often lack accountability 
to citizens of nation states, though their influence 
on them may be significant. To avoid diminishing 
state accountability to citizens, international 
interventions should support the transformation 
of citizen-state relationship and seek to support 
locally owned institutions such as Zimbabwe’s 
local peace committees that mediate social 
relationships. International actors should support 
human security as a process of local dialogue 
and relationship-building to fully respect the 
principle of empowerment. Approaches that seek 
to achieve these objectives, such as SCR 1325 and 
the New Deal, address the democratic deficit in 
many multilateral institutions and processes by 
The concept of human security, if superficially 
understood, may expand the reach of traditional 
military-based strategies to areas originally 
considered outside its scope, including 
development, education, food security, etc. 
This unintended consequence can be avoided 
by emphasising human security as a process of 
inclusive dialogue that involves citizens and non-
state actors in identifying sources of insecurity 
and policies to address them. Emphasising the 
multidimensionality of human security threats and 
the importance of preventive action is another 
important way to build shared understanding 
that the task of providing security is often a 
civilian one. Human security should result in the 
democratisation of security policymaking, not the 
securitisation of development.
A complex and sensitive question for human 
security advocates is the role of the military 
and security forces in ensuring human security. 
A human security approach should proactively 
identify principles of military engagement to 
provide guidance to states on this security tactic. 
Current guidance on civil-military interaction 
and cooperation needs to be expanded to inform 
military and broader security sector relations 
to civil society beyond humanitarian and aid 
sectors.16 However, such an attempt should also 
go further and analyse the impact of militarised 
state protection strategies on other sources of 
human security, including rule of law, citizen 
empowerment, and such types of security as 
community security, health, and food security. 
Precisely because a national security strategy 
that includes military engagement is a dominant 
traditional state approach to security, human 
security proponents need to engage directly in 
discussions about the effects of military force on 
people’s experiences of security in a variety of 
contexts. 
Human security should result 
in the democratisation of 
security, not the securitisation 
of development.
International actors 
should support human 
security as a process 
of local dialogue 
and relationship-
building to fully 
respect the principle 
of empowerment.
5Invest in national and local infrastructures and capacities for multi-stakeholder dialogue 
and state-citizen partnerships 
that can link human security 
analysis to possible solutions. 
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Recommendations 
Empowerment and Protection – Stories of Human Security 
1.  UN, governments, business and civil society should work towards a common human security 
platform of learning and collaboration for different sectors and practice arenas. This could 
support information exchange, joint analysis and planning at different levels. As follow 
up to UNGA resolution 66/290, a global working group could explore and enhance the 
operationalisation of the human security approach, linking human rights, development, 
peacebuilding, humanitarian and environmental concerns with effective governance and citizens 
empowerment.  
 
2.  UN, governments, academia, donors and civil society should invest in enhancing and applying 
methodologies that are consistent with human security principles. These should focus on 
process, and specifically address the subjectivity and agency of diverse people and groups 
targeted by research, projects or other interventions. They can build on existing experience in 
devising qualitative, bottom-up and gender-sensitive methods which can complement larger-
scale indexes and surveys.  
 
3.  UN, member states, donors, and civil society should develop and implement protection and 
empowerment strategies which address, take into account and (where appropriate) build 
on existing coping strategies of the individuals, communities and societies of the context in 
question.  
 
4.  UN, member states and civil society should invest in national and local infrastructures and 
capacities for multi-stakeholder dialogue and state-citizen partnerships that can link human 
security analysis to possible solutions. Such initiatives can be supported through brokerage, 
resources and the provision of safe spaces by ‘outsiders’, but must ultimately be locally initiated 
and owned. As such, they should take into account cultural and gender sensitivities, roles and 
limitations to interactions such as civil-military engagements and local power dynamics.  
 
5.  UN, member states and civil society should support and implement public and policy-oriented 
awareness raising on the pillars and added value of human security at national and local levels. 
This should help to promote the articulation of human security needs and response measures, 
and make it meaningful beyond the global academic and policy circles. 
 
6.  Academia and think tanks should explore and position rule of law within the human security 
debate, and focus more on the empowerment aspect of human security strategies as well as on 
the interface and complementarity of protection and empowerment.    
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